


MAY 1957



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
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
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
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
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
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May, 1957

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Vice-Chairman of the Council

General Sir George Erskine, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Council for 1957.

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Admiral of the Fleet The Earl of Cork and Orrery, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., has been re-elected a Vice-President of the Institution.

Elected Members

These are recorded in the Proceedings of the 126th Anniversary Meeting published in this issue of the JOURNAL.

STAFF

Librarian. The Council have appointed Brigadier J. Stephenson, O.B.E., as Librarian of the Institution from 1st April, 1957, vice Wing Commander E. Bentley Beauman, retired under the standing order governing the maximum age limit. (See the Chairman's Address at the Anniversary Meeting recorded in this issue of the JOURNAL.)

Assistant Librarian. The Council have appointed Mr. T. J. Holland as Assistant Librarian from 1st April, 1957. Mr. Holland has been a member of the Library staff since 1909.

NEW MEMBERS

The following officers joined the Institution between 18th January and 9th April, 1957 :—

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Major A. W. Wise, D.S.O., The Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
Captain J. H. Ansell, Royal Artillery.
Captain R. C. Bish, R.E.M.E.
Captain N. Hamilton-Fletcher, Royal Tank Regiment.
Colonel J. F. E. Pye, R.A.S.C., T.A.
Captain J. E. Bashall, The Wiltshire Regiment.
Colonel H. G. Pottle, O.B.E., M.C., late Royal Engineers.
2nd Lieutenant T. J. Bible, The Royal Welch Fusiliers.
Brigadier J. Sykes-Wright, D.S.O., M.B.E.
Major E. J. P. Emmett, M.C., The Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
Captain P. J. Hunt, Royal Engineers.
Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Puttock, late The York and Lancaster Regiment.
Captain P. L. Nicholson, Royal Artillery.
Major J. W. A. Wright, M.C., 2nd King Edward VII's Own Gurkha Rifles.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

Professor J. H. Wardell, late 5th Bn., The Rifle Brigade.
 Captain F. M. Partington, Royal Signals.
 Lieut.-Colonel E. W. T. Darlow, O.B.E., R.A.S.C.
 Captain G. G. Koop, late R.F.A.
 Lieutenant E. A. Ireland, The Worcestershire Regiment.
 Brigadier R. E. Osborne-Smith, D.S.O., O.B.E.
 Captain D. S. Carter, R.A.S.C.
 Captain P. L. Stackhouse, The Sherwood Foresters.
 Major J. R. Baker, M.C., The Rifle Brigade.
 Captain J. S. M. Young, Royal Artillery.
 Captain A. H. Blanford, Royal Engineers.
 Captain J. W. Webber, The Buffs.
 Captain R. W. E. O'Kelly, The Royal Irish Fusiliers.
 Captain D. L. Bentley, Army Catering Corps.
 Major C. P. Langley, M.B.E., R.A.S.C.
 Brigadier H. V. Darrell Laing, Canadian Army.
 The Rev. P. Middleton Brumwell, C.B.E., M.C.
 Captain N. Twells, late The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment.
 Lieutenant C. Zelenko, Canadian Army.
 2nd Lieutenant R. K. Erskine, Queen Victoria's Rifles.
 Lieut.-Colonel M. C. Hall, M.C., Royal Artillery.
 Major C. E. Knight, M.B.E., The East Lancashire Regiment.
 Major D. J. Tregenza, 6th Gurkha Rifles.
 Major D. A. Banks, The Royal Sussex Regiment.
 Major J. N. Hallett, Royal Signals.
 Captain S. N. Tandan, The Central India Horse.
 Brigadier Sultan Mohammed, Pakistan Army.
 Captain W. M. M. Deacock, The Parachute Regiment.
 Captain G. B. Wilson, Royal Artillery.
 Lieut.-Colonel E. L. Richards, M.B.E., M.C., T.D., The Parachute Regiment, T.A.
 Captain B. B. Stevens, R.A.O.C.
 Lieut.-Colonel W. C. W. Sloan, 3rd Carabiniers.
 Major W. N. Sathaye, Indian Army.
 Captain J. G. French, The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.

AIR FORCE

Pilot Officer A. R. Pollock, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader W. J. Bishop, M.B.E., R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader K. L. Monaghan, D.F.C., D.F.M., R.A.F.
 Flight Lieutenant B. C. Meates, late R.N.A.S.
 Squadron Leader F. J. Mullins, R.A.F. (Retd.).
 Squadron Leader B. E. de Jongh, R.A.F.
 Squadron Leader C. P. H. Kunkler, R.A.F.

CIVIL SERVICE

H. D. Mackay, Esq., Air Ministry.

PRIZE MEMBERSHIP

Acting Sub Lieutenant T. R. Cattermole, R.N., 2nd Lieutenant N. E. Astbury, R.A.M.C., and 2nd Lieutenant W. A. Allen, R.T.R., have been awarded five years' free membership of the Institution.

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

The Council hope that many more members will support the scheme for covenanted subscriptions, details of which have been circulated.

This materially assists the Institution as it enables income tax at the full current rate to be reclaimed on each subscription and goes a long way towards meeting the increased essential costs of administration.

To date, there are 1,304 annual and 223 life covenanted members.

Any member who has not received his copy of the scheme or who requires new forms is requested to communicate with the Secretary.

LIAISON OFFICERS

The following alterations to the list of Liaison Officers, as published in February, have taken place :—

<i>Command or Establishment</i>	<i>Name</i>
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters	Lieut.-Commander G. D. Gregory, O.B.E., D.S.C., R.N.
Home Fleet	Commander A. T. Darley, R.N.
Southern Command	Lieut.-Colonel A. S. Bullivant, M.B.E.
Bomber Command	Group Captain J. H. Searby, D.S.O., D.F.C.

MUSEUM

" BOUNTY " CHRONOMETER

Larcum Kendall's Timekeeper K2 from H.M.S. *Bounty*, commonly known as the Bounty Chronometer, has been completely renovated by Smiths Electric Clocks Ltd. under the authority of Mr. D. W. Barrett, C.B.E., F.B.H.I., the General Manager of the Company, and it is now in mint condition. This expert and very generous service was given free of all charge and the Council record their most grateful thanks on behalf of the Institution to the Company and also to Colonel H. Quill, late Royal Marines, for the active part he played in arranging it.

ADDITIONS

A group of seven medals awarded to Captain J. R. Kenshole, R.A.M.C. (9712). Given by H. E. Monkton, Esq.

A sword which belonged to General Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B., and given by him to Field-Marshal Sir George White, V.C., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., G.C.S.I., O.M. (9713). Given by Lady Napier.

The badges of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and of the Order of the British Empire awarded to Edwina, Countess Roberts (9716). Given by Lieut.-General Sir E. A. B. Miller, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., A.D.C.

JOURNAL

Offers of suitable contributions to the JOURNAL are invited. Confidential matter cannot be used, but there is ample scope for professional articles which contain useful lessons of recent wars ; also contributions of a general Service character, such as strategic principles, command and leadership, morale, staff work, and naval, military, and air force history, customs, and traditions.

The Editor is authorized to receive articles from serving officers, and, if found suitable, to seek permission for their publication from the appropriate Service Department.

Army officers are reminded that such articles must be accompanied by the written approval of the author's commanding officer.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

Members are particularly requested to notify any change of address which will affect the dispatch of the JOURNAL.

Naval officers are strongly advised to keep the Institution informed of their address, as JOURNALS sent to them via N.C.W. Branch of the Admiralty are invariably greatly delayed.

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SECRETARY'S NOTES

As a serving officer is liable to frequent changes of station, it is better for such members to register either a permanent home or a bank address.

POSTAL SERVICE BY AIR MAIL

In order to keep the annual membership subscription to the lowest possible rate it is not economic in normal circumstances for the Institution to send letters, etc., overseas by air mail. Members who require answers by this service should enclose the necessary international reply coupons when making an enquiry.

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THE ASCENT OF KANGCHENJUNGA

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THE ASCENT OF KANGCHENJUNGA¹

By CAPTAIN H. R. A. STREATHER, THE GLOUCESTERSHIRE REGIMENT

On Wednesday, 31st October, 1956, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR COLIN B. CALLANDER, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: I should like to introduce Captain Streather, of The Gloucestershire Regiment. Captain Streather is 30 years of age. He joined the Indian Army just before the war ended, and after the war he served for a number of years in what is now Pakistan, on the North-West Frontier mostly. He then transferred to The Gloucestershire Regiment and served with that Regiment in Korea. He is now serving as his regimental representative at Sandhurst.

Captain Streather took part in the Norwegian expedition in the Himalayas in 1950. A couple of years later he was a member of the American expedition which took part in the climb on K.2, which, as you know, lies about 1,000 miles away from Everest.

Last year he was selected to be part of what was thought to be a reconnaissance party for Kangchenjunga, of which the object was to get information, but the expedition was so successful that four members of it succeeded in getting to the top. One of the successful members was Captain Streather.

This was a tremendous feat. The peak of this mountain is over 28,000 ft., which is only some 900 ft. lower than Everest, which lies some 60 or 70 miles away.

I am sure that you would now like to hear Captain Streather talk about the ascent.

LECTURE

I HAVE had the pleasure of telling the Kangchenjunga story to quite a variety of audiences. I have spoken at several public schools, and that is quite easy. I have been over to America and spoken there a little, including to a rather rowdy university crowd, and that was relatively easy. I have spoken at small boys' prep. schools, and that is reasonably easy, except that some of the little ones get frightened. I have also spoken at a few girls' schools. That may not sound too easy, but they usually put the sixth form at the back where they cannot make eyes at you.

However, I am not quite sure how I should set about talking to a distinguished Service audience like you. It may seem that the story that I have to tell has nothing whatever to do with the interests of this Institution, but I hope that by the time I have finished speaking some of you anyhow may consider that there is, in fact, in the planning, the organization, and the execution of an expedition of this type—one of the great Himalayan peaks—a parallel with the problems that we have to face

¹ The lecture was illustrated with a number of lantern slides.

day by day in the Services and the sort of problems that we are particularly facing today, and possibly shall be in the next few days, in the Middle East.

When Sir John Hunt returned from Everest in 1953, the first thing he was asked by the reporters was, "What next?" Without any hesitation he replied, "Kangchenjunga." It is a fact that if, when the British party were planning to go to Everest in 1953, the Swiss party had climbed the mountain, Sir John Hunt's party would have switched to Kangchenjunga; but they would have gone there to a certain extent blindfold, because at that time little was known about the approaches, to the south side anyhow, of Kangchenjunga, the world's third highest mountain.

A party [German] led by Paul Bauer, had attempted the ascent from the north-east in 1929 and 1931, and a huge expedition, led by Dyhrenfurth, had attempted the north-west face in 1930, but there had been no serious attempts from the south. However, in 1953 and 1954, a British party, led by John Kempe, were climbing in the area south of Kangchenjunga, and while there they saw what they thought might be a feasible route on the south side of the mountain. It had been seen previously from Darjeeling, where Frank Smythe had looked at it through a telescope and said that it was too dangerous an approach. It was a very snowy face, continually threatened by avalanches, and he said that any attempt on that side of the mountain would not be justified.

As a result of the 1954 reconnaissance and the photographs which they brought back, it was considered worth while sending a party to have a closer look at the south-west side of Kangchenjunga. So the Alpine Club and the Royal Geographical Society jointly sponsored our expedition, which was to be a reconnaissance expedition to have a look at that side of the mountain. No one had been above 19,000 ft. on it, and it would not have been wise at that stage to say, "We will climb it."

We were a reconnaissance party, but we decided to take plenty of food and equipment so that, if we found a route, we should have a reasonable chance of getting high.

We had not long arrived in India when we encountered our first snag. The people of Sikkim, a small State to the east of Kangchenjunga, were objecting to our attempt. They said that it was their mountain and the gods lived on the summit. They are Buddhists, and Kangchenjunga is one of their sacred mountains.

I shall now show you some slides of the coloured photographs that we took during the course of the Summer and tell you the story from them.

APPROACH MARCH

Kangchenjunga is a local word which means 'the five sacred treasures of the snow.' The mask which I show you is the mask which the Sikkimese use in the devil dance once a year. They wear the most magnificent robes, and they dance about with these masks on their heads to frighten away the devils.

The Sikkimese were not keen on our staying to climb the mountain, but Charles Evans went to Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, and had a long talk with the Maharajah, and it was agreed that we should go to Kangchenjunga but were not to go higher on the mountain than was necessary to see if there was a route to the top. Whatever happened, we were not to tread the summit. That seemed a reasonable agreement.

Kangchenjunga is about 80 miles to the east of Mount Everest, on the borders between Nepal, where the Gurkhas and Sherpas live, and Sikkim, and it is about 40 miles, as the crow flies, north of Darjeeling, a town many of you know, and from which one gets a wonderful view of the mountain.

In Darjeeling we stayed with some tea-planter friends in a house overlooking the mountains. We spent a few days there enlisting the 300 coolies that we should require to get us to the base camp, and sorting out our baggage into loads of 60 lb., the amount that each coolie would carry.

We would be able to go a few miles by lorry, and then we would have to get out and walk for the rest of the journey. In about a fortnight we should be at the foot of the mountain.

Looking out from the bungalow, we saw straight across to the northern horizon and had a wonderful view of Kangchenjunga floating on the dark valleys of Sikkim; we could even pick out the face of the mountain that we hoped to climb.

From photographs which were brought back by Kempe we could see more details of that face. The route, he had said, might be feasible up the 18,000 ft. icefall running from the glacier into a basin. Then we hoped to get on to the great shelf of ice and snow which cut across the mountain at about 24,000 ft. It looks like a little ledge in the photograph, but it is maybe a mile wide and nearly three miles long.

From Darjeeling we had a long walk to our base camp. It was only 40 miles as the crow flies, but we had to wind a way through eastern Nepal because the direct approach to the mountain was still very snowy. At that time of the year, in early March, there is still a lot of snow on the high ridges.

As we went along the first few stages of the Singalila Ridge we got a wonderful view in the mornings before the clouds came up. The mountain was luring us on to our goal as we were preparing for the day's march along the ridge towards the next camp.

After a few days the snow was quite deep and we were getting high. The ill-clad coolies were talking of going back, so the time came to drop off to the west into Nepal and make the rest of our journey through the warm valleys.

Before we left the Singalila Ridge, we had a last view of the mountain, getting closer now. We could just pick out the valley behind the first line of hills up which we were to go.

We dropped down in one day from 14,000 ft. to the warm, humid valleys at 4,000 ft. in Nepal. At night we usually camped in the small terraced fields which the people cut from the side of the hills to grow their crops. The whole area of the foothills is terribly mountainous. It would be all that one could do to find a sufficiently large, level place to make a football pitch. Finding a place to camp was a problem. We were not able to move the whole party of 300 coolies at one time. Some had to come on behind because there was no room for a party of that size to camp.

This picture shows the first party at Kebang, one of the last villages we passed through. They were met by the entire population, who turned out in strength to welcome them. You can see them having their afternoon meal. The umbrellas appear to be a bit out of place, but they remind us that at that time of the year the sun is still very strong. However, by the time we leave the mountains, about the middle of June, the monsoon will have begun and every day there will be rain or snow. While our umbrellas protect us from the sun now, they will protect us from the monsoon rain later on. While the party were having their picnic lunch, the local girls, carrying the pots they use to collect water, did a sort of native dance for them.

This slide shows some of the party going over the last ridge before dropping down to the Yalung river leading to the glacier and the face of the mountain. Up here on the high ridges one often meets one of the most pleasant features of travel in

the foothills of the Himalayas. The whole hillside is covered with wild flowers. You can see yellow, white, or red rhododendrons.

Through the last valley and up into the snow line, well above the trees, we came to the little Alp of Tseram, where we made our acclimatization camp. Our only neighbours there were to be a few hairy old yaks (brought over for grazing) from the village of Ghunsa, over on the Tibetan border, about three days' walk away, over a 15,000 ft. pass. With them was the old shepherd and his son to look after them and, along with them, the youngest member of the family. They lived alone up there in a little stone shelter.

Here we paid off our 300 coolies who had come with us from Darjeeling. There remained only the climbing party and the Sherpas who were to remain with us during the Summer.

This was our last place with any sort of comfort. The whole ground was carpeted, particularly when coming down in the Summer, with wild Himalayan primulas. We had a certain number of luxuries there, including the cook who had been on Everest. There was no village shop. When he wanted to go shopping, he would send a party to Ghunsa over the 15,000 ft. pass. They came back once with a few chickens, and in this picture you see the cook feeling them to see whether they will make a good meal.

While we were camped at Tseram, we sent parties out for a day or two days climbing on the smaller peaks round about to get used to the altitude and to the particular conditions of Himalayan climbing. There we see Joe Brown, one of the younger members of the party, limbering up on a peak near the acclimatization camp. There are some of the Sherpas. They have come down from their villages to the south of Everest. Many of them had been on Everest in 1953. Incidentally, I see Charles Wylie in the audience. With Wilfred Noyce, the man in the centre, Annullu, was the first to get to the South Col.

The Sherpas are most hard-working, cheerful people. They always go out of their way to find something to laugh about, unlike many of us who are always looking for something to grumble about. Ang Dawar was one of the most cheerful of them. Here is Da Tenzing, the sirdar. He is not a sophisticated Sherpa; he still has a pigtail. He is known in his village as King of the Sherpas, being held there in very great esteem. He was our sirdar, looking after the other Sherpas.

The girls were not to be done out of it. A number of them, sisters, came down from the Sherpa villages with the men. Most of them went back from our acclimatization camp, being paid off with the coolies. The pair you see in this picture were keen to stay and see the fun. They said they wanted to stay for the Summer. It was agreed that they should remain and work between the lower camps towards our base camp. When the day's work started, there was no question of light loads for the girls; they had to carry 60 lb. with the best of them; and when they had finished their day's carrying they were set to cooking for the Sherpas and darning their socks!

THE YALUNG GLACIER

As you can see from this map of the Yalung Glacier we have still quite a long way to go. We are at the south end of the glacier. We had to put in three intermediate camps before we got to our base at the foot of the south-west slopes. Most of the peaks around Kangchenjunga are over 25,000 ft., and the whole area, as we go up the Yalung Glacier, is a wonderful mountain basin.

Previous attempts had been from the north-east, by way of the Zemu Glacier and the north-west by the Kangchenjunga Glacier.

Our next camp was at the edge of the moraine above Tseram. I remember that there, one morning, the Sherpas were a bit slow in starting. They were not at all keen to get the day's work started. I was not sure what the trouble was, and so I asked Da Tenzing what was worrying them.

"Did you not hear it last night?" he asked.

"No; hear what?"

He said, "That strange whistling."

I said that I had not heard it. Da Tenzing then told me that there had been a yeti on the glacier last night and that it had been whistling to its mate somewhere down round the camp. I told him to let me know if he heard it again and we would go out and catch it. If we could come back to this country with an abominable snowman it would not matter two hoots whether we climbed Everest, Kangchenjunga, or anything else; but that was the last we heard of it!

On the glacier itself the going was very slow. The glacier was covered with rubble and we saw little of the ice. We were making to the far side, about three miles away, where we had planned to make our next camp. The ice was covered in loose rubble and snow, and the going was terribly tedious.

We spent a number of days going backwards and forwards, carrying one load up to the next higher camp and returning to carry another one the next day.

Although the mornings were still clear, we were usually getting snow in the afternoons. The Sherpas made these picturesque cairns to mark the route and we followed our way back to the lower camps by means of them, through the snow.

Two of the Sherpas came to England as our guests afterwards, and I am told that if you go to the hills of the Lake District or Wales, where they climbed, you will find them festooned with these cairns.

As we pressed on, the weather was bad. It was terribly cold, and it looked as if Winter was still upon us. We had to get on to the mountain as soon as we possibly could because we knew that we should not have much time to climb before the arrival of the monsoon. Da Tenzing said that the gods of Kangchenjunga were not being particularly kind to us, but eventually it cleared, and we got on towards the base camp.

Charles Evans was at the camp below base one day with Joe Brown, and in the early morning there was a particularly strong gust of wind. We had a large, dome-shaped arctic tent, weighing 80 lb., with a metal frame, and Charles Evans saw that the wind had got under the tent, picked it up, and dumped it 100 yards away down the glacier. But there, where the tent had been, were lying three Sherpas. They had put their heads out of their sleeping bags, seen that it was not a nice morning, put their heads back in again, and curled up and gone to sleep.

When it cleared eventually, Charles was able to see at last the south face of the mountain we hoped to climb. He could pick out the top of the 'lower icefall' running into the basin behind 'the hump' and, above that, the 'upper icefall' and the 'great shelf.'

Charles was Sir John Hunt's deputy leader on Everest. He was a member of the first assault pair with Tom Bourdillon who was killed so tragically in the Alps the other day. For the summit climb on Everest they used the closed circuit oxygen,

and when they were only a few hundred feet from the summit Charles's oxygen set went wrong, the valves freezing up, and they were forced to return. A few days later a higher camp was established, and, using the same route, Tenzing and Hillary got to the summit.

Charles has been in the Himalayas every year since 1949, and, without doubt, is the greatest active expert on Himalayan climbing.

From that camp we were going into the basin at the foot of Kangchenjunga and at the foot of the icefall. We had to be careful about choosing the route because all round were great masses of snow hanging from the sides of the steep, rocky faces, threatening to avalanche. We had to wind our way up the centre of the basin to be safe from any debris that might fall from the avalanches.

We found a safe route by winding through the centre past the frozen lakes. As we went backwards and forwards for several days, carrying the loads, the path improved, and I remember John Jackson, a married member of the party who had a family, saying that the path was getting better and that one could almost wheel a pram along it.

At long last our base camp was beginning to take shape as we dumped boxes of food and equipment on the glacier at the foot of the icefall. We got a good stock there and part of the party continued to carry up stores from below.

THE LOWER ICEFALL AND ROUTE OVER THE HUMP

It was now time for the first reconnaissance party to have a look at the actual icefall. To do that, Charles chose Norman Hardy, the only New Zealand member of the party, who was later appointed deputy leader. Norman had climbed in the Himalayas with Edmund Hillary the previous year and he is a great expert on snow and ice. The New Zealand Alps are rather more snowy and icy than the Continental Alps. With him was to go George Band, who had gained considerable experience in snow and ice work on the icefall of Everest.

They set out from base camp to the foot of the lower icefall and had not been gone very long before they realized that they had quite a problem ahead of them. There were great cliffs of ice and gaping crevasses all round them and the whole thing seemed somewhat unstable, there being blocks of ice frozen one above the other, all poised to fall. George found himself in a somewhat compromising position, but, having cut a little ledge across a cliff which dropped back behind him to the glacier, he was able eventually to get over the problem by using pitons, nails hammered into the ice, and putting in a rope ladder to secure the worst part. However, when Charles Evans came forward to look at the route, he decided that it was far too dangerous to use as the main approach to the mountain. It was a question not only of climbing it, but of going over it backwards and forwards for several days on end, carrying heavy loads with quite a party of Sherpas to help carry them.

He had to make a very bold decision. There was no route on the lower icefall. We were very disappointed. It looked as if we might have to turn back before even reaching 20,000 ft. on the mountain.

But before going back we decided to have a look at another possible route which we had seen a little to the left of the lower icefall. We moved the base camp round off the glacier and on to the little outcrop of rock and re-established ourselves there. As you can see from this slide we could look down to the earlier camp some few miles below and down the glacier towards our acclimatization camp.

We built the new base camp in the area of what is marked on the map as Pache's grave. Alexis Pache was a Swiss member of the party which climbed in the area in 1905. There had been an accident in an avalanche and Pache and three of the Sherpas were killed. Some of you may have read of the sinister Englishman who led that expedition—Aleister Crowley, 'The Great Beast.'

We found the grave, made some 50 years before, there among the rocks. We found a stone carved "Alexis Pache, 1905." The only other thing we found was a champagne cork.

Now, in the new base camp, let us meet the other members. This picture shows Neil Mather. He had not been in the Himalayas before. He is a textile researcher in the north of England. He has done a lot of climbing in the Alps. He was one of the younger members of the party. John Clegg, the expedition doctor, was also on his first Himalayan trip. There he is just trying out some of his doubtful wares on the unsuspecting Sherpas. There is also Joe Brown, a fantastic chap, who is a plumber from Sheffield. Ever since he was a boy he has been keen on climbing. He was the youngest member of the party, being only 24 years old. The previous year he had been doing the most fantastic climbs in the Alps, setting quite a new standard in rock climbing. Even the French and Swiss guides were hard put to it to follow him.

Also, there is John Jackson, a schoolmaster from Redcar. He was on the 'abominable snowman' expedition which the *Daily Mail* sponsored some years ago. Then there is Tom Mackinnon, the oldest member of the party, a Scotsman, who in some ways provided a slight brake on our youthful enthusiasm. The last member of the party you might or might not recognize from this slide!

Now that we were established at our new base camp, we settled down to talk over our plans for the next move. One evening in our tent—we had wireless contact with India, receiving only—this picture was taken. We had the news sent to us from India, and the weather forecasts were particularly important so that we might have some idea of how the monsoons were moving and what sort of weather to expect. About that time we received from Darjeeling with our mail, which was sent up once a week, a large envelope containing photographs taken by the Indian Air Force a few weeks before. When we looked at them we were not particularly pleased, for they made the whole thing look quite impossible.

We could pick out the lower icefall, the one where George Band and Norman Hardy came unstuck. We had hoped to climb into the basin and then get onto the great shelf by way of the upper icefall. We noticed the little gulley running down off the hump to the left of the icefall. We thought we would try to get up the ice to the west, drop down the gulley, and avoid much of the difficult and dangerous climbing on the lower part of the icefall.

That is what we now set about doing. There we see a party winding its way up the snow slopes above the base camp towards the hump. We had to be very careful how we chose the route, avoiding the cliffs which threatened to avalanche at any time. That was our main danger, and the important problem was to find a route which was safe from avalanches.

We steadily gained height. The base camp was at about 18,000 ft. About halfway up the icefall we came upon the most appalling crevasses which looked as if they would stop any further movement up that slope. We established camp just below them and persevered for a bit, and we were able to fiddle a way through and round the crevasses until eventually we were able to cut a little track out of the ice

cliff and go up the far side towards the top of the hump. We put in a rope handrail to secure the parties going over.

This picture shows a party coming out from the crevasse. You can just pick out the path running off below. There are flags used to mark the route. We were still getting a lot of snow, in the afternoon particularly, and at nights, and unless we used these flags the route would have disappeared each day. We had to follow the route of the flags through the fresh snow.

Eventually the party rested just below the hump, and then we were on the top of it and able to find a way to cut across. We could look down on the far side to the top of the lower icefall over towards the upper icefall and the great shelf. We could see one large crevasse at the top of the hump to be negotiated somehow. We could see the top part of the mountain, the 'Sickle,' as we called this rock, and the gangway running up towards the col and the summit through there in the dark background. Looking back from the hump we could look down to base camp, across the glacier, and down towards the south.

We crossed the crevasse at the top, using one of our ladders for the first time. Once over it we could drop down the steep gulley which led down to the top of the icefall. There below us we could see the most appalling crevasses, and we were not at all sure how we should be able to find a way through them. At the bottom of the gulley there was a particularly nasty crevasse. We put one of our ladder bridges over it. We were very glad we had done so, for a few days later, when still going backwards and forwards over the same route, we realized how much it had opened. Anything dropped from the bridge as we crossed the crevasse took an awfully long time to reach the bottom!

We had still a few hundred yards to go in this messy icefall before doing the last step, which we did by using a ladder again. At last we were up into the basin at the top of the lower icefall and at the foot of the next icefall. Camp 2 was established there. We looked down and saw the hump that we had crossed. We had crossed it at 20,000 ft. and come down the gulley and then climbed again to 20,000 ft. to Camp 2.

THE UPPER ICEFALL AND THE GREAT SHELF

From Camp 2 we looked up and saw the slopes of the upper icefall which we now had to climb.

People are always asking what one eats on these expeditions and how one feels about eating. It is a little difficult. The higher you get the more unusual things your appetite does. You have a craving for something that you would not normally think of eating, and the things that you would normally like you cannot touch.

Joe Brown told us that he felt hungry at lunchtime one day at Camp 2, and he found an enormous Cheddar cheese and washed it down with half a bottle of tomato ketchup. He thought it was a splendid lunch, and he would talk of nothing else for the rest of the expedition.

Now we had to go up the slopes of the upper icefall, looking for our third camp site, Camp 3, which we hoped would be at about 22,000 ft., halfway towards the great shelf. At this stage we still hoped to reach the great shelf. That was our limited objective. If we could do that we could think later about going on.

Camp 3 was established under a steep cliff, which protected it from avalanche from above, about halfway up the icefall. From here, Charles Evans and Norman

Hardy, using closed circuit oxygen, as Charles had done on Everest—it is better if it works—set off to see if they could find a route to the great shelf. While they were away, the rest of us continued to bring up supplies and to stock Camp 3.

There was not much room at Camp 3 for the party. We supplemented it by digging a cave into the side of the cliff. It may not seem the best place to sleep, but it was preferable to tents, in that we were protected from the wind and we did not have canvas flapping against our heads.

When Charles and Norman came back, we heard that they had reached the great shelf and found a reasonable site for Camp 4. Not only that, but they had gone on up the great shelf and found a place where they might establish Camp 5, a little above 25,000 ft. at the foot of the 'gangway.' That would mean that Camp 5 would be about equivalent to the South Col Camp on Everest in respect of both height and planning for the final stage of the climb.

In this picture we see the route we have taken. Here is the lower icefall again. We had crossed over the hump. Camp 3 was halfway up the upper icefall under the cliffs. There is the route taken by Charles and Norman up to the great shelf and on towards the foot of the Sickle and the gangway at 25,000 ft. where they had found a place for Camp 5.

When Charles returned with that news, the time had come to set the stage for the final phase of the climb. We remembered our promise to the people of Sikkim, but still we had a long way to go before we were near the summit. The biggest problems were still to come, and they were the rocks on the final summit ridge.

Charles decided that Camp 4 should be established on the great shelf by the first party and that then a strong party, with Mackinnon and Jackson and 10 Sherpas, should go on, spend the night at Camp 4, and then carry on as far as they could to Camp 5 with the equipment for the final climb. Theirs was a thankless task. The people who did that had not much of the glory at the end of it, but without that high level carry we should not have been able to get very much farther.

A story develops from that. Mackinnon and Jackson and party got to Camp 4 and were ready to start for Camp 5 in the morning. However, Jackson had taken off his snow goggles for a short time the previous day and now found that he could hardly see at all for he had snow blindness. The Sherpas were getting tired and some of them were not keen to go on. To encourage them, Jackson roped himself up between a string of Sherpas, and, although he could not see, he followed on the rope and encouraged the Sherpas to get up to Camp 5. Eventually most of them made Camp 5, dropped their equipment there, and then returned to Camp 4.

That made it possible for the final part of the plan to be put in motion. The first summit ridge pair was to be Joe Brown and George Band, and following a day behind would be the second summit ridge pair, Norman Hardy and myself.

The first pair set off from Camp 3 to Camp 4, which by now had been established, ready to go on eventually to Camp 5. They were all using oxygen now. You can see the masks in this picture. They are using open circuit sets. It is the same sort of apparatus, with a few modifications, that was used for the final climb on Everest.

They reached Camp 4, and that same night Norman and I were below them in Camp 3. We were in touch with them by radio, walkie-talkie, and soon after they arrived we heard from them that they had been struck by a fierce Himalayan storm, and soon we were to get it at Camp 3. We had been dreading this for some days. We realized that they, exposed as they were on the great shelf, were having quite a

time. The snow was piling up against them, and they had to crawl out of their tents every few hours to shovel it away. It seemed to me that now that we were so near the final stages of the climb we might be going to have the same sort of bad luck that we had in 1953, when I had been with the American expedition on K.2, the world's second highest mountain. We had then got up onto the south shoulder at a little over 25,000 ft. Eight of us—seven Americans and myself—had got to the high camp and we were well stocked with food and equipment and we had a line of camps stocked on the mountain below us. There was every chance of reaching the summit, but the same night that we reached the high camp the weather deteriorated and the following morning there was the most appalling storm. It went on day after day and we had no option but to lie in our tents and wait. We stayed there eventually, through force of circumstances, for 10 days before we had to try to go down. During the storm one of the Americans was taken very ill and could not walk and we had no option but to try to carry him. When we had got so far there was a nasty slip involving most of us, and it was only through a miraculous stroke of luck, and extremely clever climbing on the part of one of the Americans, that we were saved, but in the course of the accident we lost the chap we were trying to carry down. Several days later a very battered party eventually reached the safety of the base camp.

On Kangchenjunga now it looked as if we were going to have the same bad luck in that, being within reasonable reach of our goal, we had been struck, as so many previous Himalayan parties had been, by bad weather. Finally, on the third morning, the weather was clear and we were able to go on.

The first summit ridge party, Band and Brown, with Charles Evans and Neil Mather and a number of Sherpas supporting them, moved up towards Camp 5 at the foot of the gangway. When they got there, they found to their dismay that in the few days of storm a lot of fresh snow had fallen over the dump of stores left by the first party and some had been carried away by an avalanche. They found an oxygen bottle here, and farther away there was a tent and somewhere else a primus stove. It was several hours before they could gather up all the essentials for establishing the camp.

Finally they got the camp established. Again it was nestling under a cliff in order to give protection from avalanche. Having had to gather all the stores together again the previous day, they were very tired the following morning, and instead of going on to establish the final camp, they had to call a halt and wait while they looked for the rest of the lost equipment and recovered it.

During this time, Norman and I moved on up and were one camp below them, at Camp 4.

From Camp 5, looking out of the tents, as you can see from this slide, we had a wonderful view of the peak, Jannu, which will certainly be one of the very last to be climbed. If anybody can climb it, it will be Joe Brown.

THE SUMMIT RIDGE

The day Norman and I left Camp 4 to go to Camp 5 was the day on which the first party were pushing on up the gangway above the Sickle towards the highest camp site, Camp 6, which would consist just of one small tent to accommodate the final summit pair. It would be somewhere in the region of 27,000 ft.

As we climbed up from Camp 4 we could see the party moving steadily up the gangway. They gained height very slowly. They were all using oxygen. As they

moved up they looked down on the western peak of Kangchenjunga and saw the monsoon clouds rolling up from the south and south-west, warning us that there was not a lot of time before it would be on us and we should have to leave the mountain.

They gained steadily in height up the gangway. One by one their oxygen was running out. They could not carry much because of the weight, and they had to carry stores for the high camp. They were terribly tired. Moving at an altitude approaching 27,000 ft. is a terribly slow business.

They noticed ahead of them what they hoped would be a few level rocks where they could pitch the final tent. When they got there they found that there was nowhere for them to put the tent and that they would have to cut a ledge out of the ice and make room for it. None of them had the energy to set about doing this, but suddenly George Band noticed that the oxygen set belonging to one of the Sherpas was still working. He looked at the gauge and found that there was still a considerable amount of oxygen left. All the other sets had been finished a number of hours previously. George could only assume that during one of the halts on the final climb the Sherpa, Tashi, had turned off his oxygen and forgotten to turn it on again. He had climbed from 25,000 ft. to 27,000 ft., not only without oxygen but with a most uncomfortable mask suffocating him. That may not be a good advertisement for the oxygen, but it certainly is for the Sherpas!

George took the apparatus from him, set a good flow rate for the oxygen so that he could do plenty of breathing, and then got down to cutting the platform out of the steep ice slope for the small tent. It took him a considerable time.

It is interesting to note, in the meantime, the foot in the foreground of this picture, not because it is wearing a high altitude boot but because an hour later, when George had nearly got the tent up and this second picture was taken, the foot is still there. It shows how at these altitudes and in these conditions one literally does not feel like moving one foot in front of the other. George Band rudely points out that it shows not merely that the particular Sherpa who owned that foot did not move much, but that Charles Evans, who took both photographs, did not move much either!

Finally the tent was up, George and Joe were left there for the great day that was to follow, and the remainder of the party came slowly down to Camp 5, their job well done.

In the meantime, Norman and I had come up from Camp 4. We arrived at Camp 5 just before the support party came down from above. When they arrived, some of the Sherpas fell down exhausted in the snow. We realized how much they had put in to getting the camp good and high up the gangway. They realized, as we did, that unless we got a high camp at near 27,000 ft. we should not have much chance of seeing what the climbing was like on the final ridge.

Next day, 25th May, was Summit Day. Joe and George set out from Camp 6 soon after eight and we were able to watch the two little dots move out of the tent, move steadily up the gangway, and disappear in the rocks below the summit ridge. We did not see them after that for a considerable time.

Norman and I, with two Sherpas to help, carried between us the equipment for our final climb. Using oxygen, we climbed from Camp 5 steadily up the gangway towards Camp 6. When we got there we found that they had collapsed the tent to prevent it being blown away.

As to the plan now—there was room for only two at Camp 6. The first pair were to climb as high as they could and if they could get to a point near the summit, well

and good. If not, they would get as high as possible and then come down in time to get to Camp 5 that night, passing Norman and I and telling us what they had found on the ridge. If they had not been able to get near the top, then we would have another try the next day, making use of the experience which they had gained.

We waited there for them through the afternoon. If all was well we hoped to be able to send them down with the two Sherpas who had come up with us from Camp 5. On the other hand, if they were completely exhausted, we would be there to help them down. As the afternoon drew on, there was no sign from above. We shouted but we could hear nothing from above. Finally, we had to send the two Sherpas down alone, and they went back to Camp 5. We settled down to wait, certainly being the two highest men in the world apart from the two moving somewhere above us.

Soon it began to get dark, and still there was no sign from above. We went out and shouted, and we thought that we heard replies, but later on we discovered that it was only the people from Camp 5 also shouting as they, too, expected Joe and George to return there that night. Still there was no sign of them.

Eventually, it must have been nearly 7 o'clock before two very exhausted climbers came down from above and collapsed on the little platform cut out of the snow outside our tent. We heard from them the great news that they had been to a point within a few feet of the summit of Kangchenjunga.

There was no time for jollifications over this. We were now faced with the problem of four of us somehow spending the night in our minute little tent at 27,000 ft. Also we were worried whether George and Joe would be too exhausted to be able to get down the next day.

This photograph was actually taken on K.2, but it is of a tent of the same size as ours perched in the same sort of nasty position as at Camp 6. We heard from George Band that when they got there the day before, they kept their rope on and tied it round a rock outside the tent. They had drawn matches to see who should have the outside berth. Eventually they crawled in, George having lost the draw. Now four of us had to get into the same tent. We did not waste time drawing matches—George Band knew all about being on the outside, and so we put him there again! The four of us got into the tent somehow.

In the meantime, Norman and I had prepared masses of tea and other hot drink for them, because at these altitudes one works up a most phenomenal thirst. It was a considerable time before they had drunk and eaten and rested enough to be able to tell us the story of their day's climb.

They had set out from Camp 6 quite early in the morning, at about half-past eight, and it was jolly cold. They cut steps slowly up the gangway, Joe Brown leading. Soon the time came for them to traverse across the rocks leading to the final summit ridge.

Here is a slide of George on the ridge just above the col looking across at the western peak of Kangchenjunga. Over to the west, about 80 miles away, he could pick out the summits of the Everest group just above the clouds.

We still remembered our promise to the people of Sikkim. We had not seen the summit since soon after leaving Camp 4. We had been close to the face of the mountain and could not see how far there was to go. There were difficult rock problems to cope with. George and Joe had traversed across, keeping below the summit ridge to keep out of the wind, and eventually they were apparently blocked

by a final cliff with a crack running up it. Here Joe Brown came into his own. The whole thing had been a bit of a bore up till then and he had not had any decent rock climbing, but now, at 28,000 ft., he had come all that way and was at last going to get it! He took the lead from George and wriggled up this horrible crack, which would be difficult enough in Wales or in the Alps, let alone up there at 28,000 ft.

Joe got to the top, and to his surprise and the surprise of George Band, he turned round and shouted "George, we are up!" There ahead of them was the final snow cone which formed the summit some 15-20 ft. above them and maybe 20-30 ft. away.

From this slide of one of the air photographs that we had been looking at to study the route as we came up, we could pick out where they had been.

There is Camp 6 on those rocks well up the gangway, near the Sickle. They had come up almost on to the col, traversed across, keeping below the ridge until they were finally just below the final snow cone, which you can see in this picture.

We got as much sleep as we could that night, which was very little. We spent most of the night talking, particularly about tomorrow's plans. Norman and I reckoned that we would have to go with them to help them down, but they swore that they were fit enough to go on their own, and they wanted us to stay at Camp 6 and have another try for the summit. We thought it might be a waste of time because neither Norman nor I were great rock climbers, and they said "If you get to the final cliff you will not get up it." They told us how Joe had managed to find his way up the final crack.

In the morning we were pleasantly surprised to find that, although the four of us had spent the night with only two sleeping-bags in a minute tent, in intense cold, at 27,000 ft., we were all reasonably fit. George and Joe were able to go back on their own to Camp 5 where Charles Evans was waiting for them.

Norman and I set out to repeat the climb. We made good speed up the gangway, using the steps cut the day before by the previous party. The steps had been covered over by fresh snow, but we found a lot of them that we were able to use. Soon we passed the point where George and Joe had left their oxygen sets the previous day when they had run out on the way down.

Just before that we had a serious mishap with our oxygen, when one of the cylinders that Norman was carrying slipped out of its straps and went down the mountain. The valve cracked open on a rock and we heard the cylinder hissing on its way down 10,000 ft. to the glacier. At one blow we had lost a third of the oxygen on which we had relied, and we were not sure whether we had enough now for the final climb. We decided to go on, moving fast, and we continued up, making good time until we came to the great cliff about which we had heard so much the previous night. We did not like the look of it any more than we had during the night!

We determined to have a look round to make sure that there was not a better way. Norman went ahead about 20 yards, and then he shouted. I followed on, and there, running to the summit, was a nice little snow ridge, and, without even taking off our crampons, we were able to walk easily to the same point that George and Joe had reached the day before! There ahead of us was the snow cone which formed the summit of Kangchenjunga. It is true to say that Kangchenjunga has still not been climbed, for there has been no one on the final snow cone.

We were able to look down to the left and the right of the summit cone and had a wonderful view below us.

We had made good time. We were there in a little over four hours. We had left Camp 6 at half-past eight, and it was a little after half-past twelve when we got there.

We reckoned to get down to Camp 6 in half that time, getting there by about three o'clock, and then down to Camp 5 that night.

It was a wonderful day, not too windy, and we probably enjoyed our time there near the summit more than anyone has yet enjoyed their time on the top of a high Himalayan peak. We sat there for an hour chatting and taking films, eating a little, changing our oxygen cylinders, and admiring the wonderful view of the world below us. Up here we seemed to be floating completely above it all and quite cut off from anything going on below. Even the peaks of 20,000 ft. seemed to be way down below us. We looked across them, across Nepal into Tibet, and up over Sikkim into Tibet. We could look over to the west, over to the western peak of Kangchenjunga, and there we got a clearer view of the Everest group.

The time had come to go down again. We were soon to find that our descent was to be a lot more difficult than our climb. We had not been going many minutes before my oxygen gave out, and we realized that we had, in fact, used nearly all that we had with us. Consequently, we had to go down most of the way without it. This made the going very slow, and it took us longer to get down than it had taken us to get up. By the time we had reached Camp 6 it was already late evening, and we were not in a fit state to go on down that night, as we had hoped, to Camp 5. Therefore, we had to spend another night at Camp 6—we could not sleep—before finally, next day, going down to Camp 5 where Charles Evans was still waiting for us.

It speaks well for Charles that he chose to remain at Camp 5, in support of the first and the second summit climbs, when he could quite easily have put himself in one of the summit pairs. Although he had been so near to the top of Everest, and here he was close to the top of Kangchenjunga, he decided that, as leader, he was better placed to keep an eye on things from Camp 5 rather than put himself into one of the summit pairs.

We met Charles and were to have bad news when we got down. He was pleased, but we realized that something was worrying him. He was not keen to tell us what it was. Finally, we heard that that morning news had been passed to him over the walkie-talkie radio from the base camp that one of the Sherpas, who had been taken ill some days previously, had died almost within the hour that Norman and I had reached the point near the summit. Some of the Sherpas were saying that the gods of Kangchenjunga had not let us get away with it scot-free after all.

We went on down and had one more night in Camp 3 before we finally crossed the last snow slopes and down to the base camp.

When we reached base camp we found that the Sherpas had already buried the dead Sherpa, Pemi Dorje. On an overhanging rock they had carved the date, and they had also carved on the rock the eternal Buddhist prayer which you hear the Lamas and Tibetans mumbling and see on their prayer wheels and flags: "Om mani padme hum."

That evening in the base camp there was not as much rejoicing as there might have been.

However, we realized that we had been extraordinarily lucky. We had come to have a look at Kangchenjunga, but we had managed to get not one pair but two pairs of climbers to a point only a few feet from the summit. We were particularly glad that during the course of the Summer we had become a very close team, not only the climbers but also the Sherpas, who had worked so very hard and well with us, and without whose help it would not have been possible for us to achieve our success.

DISCUSSION

THE CHAIRMAN : Are there any questions which any of those present would like to put to Captain Streather ?

THE LECTURER : I shall be pleased to answer any questions about the subject of my lecture or Himalayan climbing in general.

WING COMMANDER R. MILROY HAYES : Captain Streather, you were saying that you got extremely thirsty. Did you drink entirely tea and tinned milk, or melted snow, or what ?

THE LECTURER : I think the physiologists have worked out that at those altitudes you need six or seven quarts of liquid to replace what you lose purely through breathing the dry air. You lose a terrific amount from the mouth. Nearly everything that we took high was in liquid form—tea, soup, or insipid porridge. We used gallons of lemonade powder with lots of sugar in it, which gave us a certain amount of energy and was better than just water. Everything was snow melted, with paraffin cookers.

CAPTAIN R. OLIVER, R.N. : Is there a book written about the ascent ?

THE LECTURER : There is one which it was threatened would be published on 15th October. For some reason it was not published then. It may be that they are waiting for Christmas. Charles Evans has written it. I do not know what the hold-up is. It is called *Kangchenjunga—the Unrodden Peak*. I think you will be able to buy it for Christmas.

THE CHAIRMAN : We have heard a story of great personal courage, a story of disappointment and success, and a story of great team work. I think you would like me, on your behalf, to thank Captain Streather for the most wonderful talk that he has given us. Thank you very much, Captain Streather. (*Applause.*)

IDEALS THE WEST IS DEFENDING

By THE VERY REVEREND THE DEAN OF ST. PAUL'S

On Wednesday, 12th December, 1956, at 3 p.m.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN: It has been the policy of the Council to aim high and to approach distinguished persons in inviting guests here to talk to us. Recently we have departed from the customary subjects and broadened the addresses which have been given. You will remember that two years ago Cuthbert Bardsley, now Bishop of Coventry, came to us. Last year we had His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, and you may remember that it was unfortunate that either the Press did not attempt to understand what he said or slept and consequently grossly misrepresented him in the Press that evening and the following morning. This year we are again very fortunate in having to talk to us today the Very Reverend the Dean of St. Paul's. He has chosen his own subject—*Ideals the West is Defending*.

LECTURE

I HAVE been asked to speak on the subject of the ideals that we in the West are defending. I should not have chosen that precise form of words because at the present time 'ideals' and 'idealism' are out of fashion and perhaps not altogether without reason. They convey to the minds of many of our contemporaries the picture of persons with no practical sense who live in a dream world remote from the hard and obstinate world of fact. And we cannot deny that a certain type of idealist is peculiarly prone to be victimized by the fallacy of wishful thinking. A better word would be 'principles,' because that has a nuance which links it more definitely with conduct and policy. A man of principle is one whose behaviour is regulated by some intelligible ideas and, as we say, we know where we are with him. I suggest that our subject is of immense practical importance and it is a waste of time to discuss it unless we have our eyes constantly fixed on the question, what ought we to do, what defensive policy should we adopt?

Let us begin at any rate with our feet firmly planted on the ground. I will start then by giving a short answer to the question, what are we defending—we are defending ourselves. I don't know whether this could be called either an ideal or a principle; it is certainly a fact. And I think it is a fact which needs to be recognized and understood. The instinct of self-preservation is deeply seated in the human animal, as in all other vertebrates, and if we believe in God, we shall, I suppose, also believe that this instinct was implanted by the Creator and is not to be rejected or condemned as evil, though of course, like all other instincts, it can be perverted or over-developed. Self-preservation is an instinctive motive in societies, those larger unities which have some of the characteristics of selves. Any closely knit society reacts spontaneously against a serious threat to its continued existence, and it is by reacting to such threats that a society or nation becomes a unity, a closely knit whole.

I remember a trivial incident in the last war which brought this truth forcibly home to me. I had given a lecture at a large R.A.F. station on the issues at stake in the war, and when I dined afterwards in the mess the young pilot officers very politely gave me to understand that my visit was quite unnecessary. They knew what they were fighting for and it was not for democracy or for any word ending in 'cy' or 'ism.' They were doubtful whether they believed or disbelieved in any of them. They had a simple answer, "We are fighting for England"—I regret to admit that

they did not even say "Britain" or "the British Commonwealth." The thought of England and its peril was the one which they shared and it was enough. It would not surprise me to learn that the well-intentioned efforts of persons like myself who went round explaining what we were fighting for were completely useless so far as the morale of the Country was concerned. The vast majority were just defending England. When Hitler invaded Russia, as we remember, the same phenomenon was observed. The doctrinaire Marxist rulers of Russia pushed into the background the cause of the international revolution and brought forward the ancient appeal of national patriotism. Marxism was not the steel that stiffened the Russian armies: it was the thought of Russia—yes even of "holy Russia," for in their extremity the cynical realists of the Kremlin did not disdain the help of religion.

All this has a bearing on the present situation. At last, after much futile talk, there seems to be some hope that a U.N. police force may come into existence. I have no right to an opinion, but I should have thought that, if this project is ever to be effective on a significant scale, the problem of morale would be worth considering. No doubt a collection of units gathered from various national forces may be sufficient for small scale operations such as keeping Colonel Nasser in some reasonable kind of order, but what if the force is required to act against a great Power? Cromwell said of his Ironsides that "they knew what they fought for and loved what they knew." That reminds us that men will fight for an idea, but they must feel the power of the idea, they must have some vision of its realization. There must be some beloved and honoured community, partly already in existence and partly to be built, if they are to be truly formidable to aggressors. In short, we need to create a new sentiment, beyond national patriotism—a world patriotism. That will be a long and difficult task, for it scarcely exists now. Among the first requirements for such a development I would place the need that U.N.O. should look more like a body of wise and dedicated men who are thinking and planning for mankind and less like a debating society or a world platform for propaganda.

When we think of the justification that we could give for supposing that we are right in defending ourselves, we bring in the notion of value. There are, we believe, certain qualities in our society and way of life which have value beyond the fact that they happen to be ours. Still keeping close to the ground, I would suggest that continuity of historical existence is one which is often overlooked. The nations of the West have undergone revolutionary changes, some more drastic than others, but they have never entirely broken with the past and their culture is an inheritance which bears the marks of centuries. In Britain change has been continuous and often rapid, but it has never been a clean break. The French Revolution was indeed the end of an old order, but even so the heritage of the Monarchy was not expunged from the national consciousness or repudiated and hated. On the whole, the West has changed by development and evolution, carrying its inheritance from older days into new times. We can easily overlook the importance of this. In England the sense of history is strong, though knowledge of history is perhaps confused and vague. It is a source of strength. Quite unlearned men respond to the appeal, "We must be worthy of our forefathers." In the crisis of 1940-41 this motive worked with great force and we heard, as it were, "ancestral voices prophesying" not "war" but victory. We are confronted with an antagonist who stands for total revolution on a world scale—for a complete break with the past and for a culture which has denied its roots. Of course, the attempt to make a clean break with the past is bound to fail, but it is surprising how far it has gone. A quite unimportant incident may serve to illustrate it. When Mr. Maisky, Russian Ambassador during the war, came to visit St. Paul's,

I took him to Wellington's tomb. Round that monument hang the standards of the Allies against Napoleon I, and I asked Mr. Maisky which was the Russian standard. He did not know. Was it not strange that an able and well-educated man did not recognize the symbol which had meant so much in the history of his country and of Europe? We defend then our right to go on growing from the roots of our European inheritance. We refuse to be uprooted. We prefer to enlarge and enrich the culture which has come down to us from our fathers.

It may be asked, however, what is the nature of this culture and way of life that we hold to be worth defending? To analyse a cultural tradition is a difficult enterprise and is almost bound to be misleading, because a culture and a social tradition are both complex and living and on both counts incapable of being summed up in concepts. It is, at any rate, beyond my competence. Perhaps we can, however, comment on some salient features without being too superficial.

No one seems able to talk on this subject without mentioning democracy at an early stage. I cannot altogether avoid it, but I must say that I would not regard it as the fundamental value, still less as the comprehensive term for all the principles which we are defending. I cannot forget that Plato considered democracy to be almost the worst form of government and the prelude to tyranny. But the chief cause of my hesitation is that I don't know precisely what democracy means. Whatever it may mean, it does not lack defenders, for at the present time everyone proclaims that he is rushing to the aid of democracy. A few days ago I read in the newspapers that the Russian tanks in Hungary were defending democracy against a conspiracy of Fascist and reactionary elements which, inexplicably, seemed to comprise the majority of the population, and they appeared to be defending democracy by the paradoxical method of destroying the demos in large numbers; at the same time the alleged conspirators against democracy claimed that they were rising on behalf of democracy. Recent history has only too many instances which support Plato's observation that democracy may lead to tyranny. All the tyrants that we have known in these latter days have been invested with power by an almost unanimous popular vote. There are, in fact, so many different systems and societies which go under the name of democracy that one can only say that though some so-called democracies may be good others are certainly very bad. We should be well advised before we assert that we are defending democracy to define carefully what kind of democracy we are defending.

What is the essential difference between the type of society and State which the free nations of the West have developed in the course of history and those of the East under Communist control? The main difference is that they are 'totalitarian' while the nations of the West are not. In Hitler's Germany and in Stalin's Russia we can detect a common characteristic. Differ as they may in many respects, they agree in this that the State has the right to plan and direct the life of its citizens in accordance with a pattern devised by the ruling group of politicians. But this is a statement which needs to be elaborated, for as it stands, it might mean little more than a relatively innocent exercise in rational economic planning. In the modern totalitarian State it means very much more, for it includes the claim to condition minds, to plan not only the life of the people, but their thoughts and minds. In the Communist State we have the most extreme example of imposed orthodoxy that history records. Great churches have attempted to order the beliefs of men in accordance with authoritative creeds, but they have never made so drastic a claim to control thought as the Marxist States, nor have they had so much success. Through education, the

rigid control of the Press and radio, through propaganda and the suppression of critics and dissenters, through the sealing off of the community from contacts with the outside world, the conditioning of the minds of innumerable individuals has been, to some extent, achieved. No doubt, as always, when orthodoxy is imposed by force, many conformists have secret thoughts which are not in the approved pattern. One can hardly believe that all the learned men who speak in accordance with the party line really believe what they say. Surely when in 1949 the Russian Academy proclaimed Stalin as "the greatest scientist of the age," some of its eminent members must have had their tongues in their cheeks. The salient fact, however, remains that the U.S.S.R., being in its nature totalitarian, cannot tolerate dissent or free discussion or recognize the right of the individual to think for himself outside the framework of the official dogma.

The characteristic of the Western peoples and their national States is that they are not totalitarian and their idea of freedom is primarily that of freedom for the individual. Their achievement of liberty has been a process, often a violent one, by which they threw off the shackles that a State with totalitarian tendencies placed upon the individual. The French Revolution finally destroyed the remnants of absolute monarchy, the English Revolution opened the way to the free expression of the opinion of the people, the American Revolution was made in the name of the rights of man, of the person. We should be mistaken if we held up our actual condition as models for the rest of the world, or pretended that we had no sins to confess and no problems to solve. Not even the most ardent patriot would assert that his nation approximated to the ideal society. It is, in fact, one of the marks of a truly free society that it can criticize itself, that it can have a guilty conscience and, in short, that it can hope to progress and amend. We have to think of the principles and ideals which, though most imperfectly expressed in our actual society and State, are the animating motives and guide to development in them.

The type of society which we regard as good, I would suggest, is one that respects and guards the freedom of the individual and is based upon a reverence for the human person as such. It holds that the State was made for man and not man for the State—and by 'man' it means all the individual human beings who compose the nation. There is a paradox in the history of the way in which this freedom was achieved: it is based upon a profoundly religious insight, but it came into effective existence largely through a revolt against religious authority. One of the decisive campaigns in the fight for this freedom was that for religious toleration against the restrictions imposed by orthodoxy, in alliance with the government, on the expression of individual opinion. The men who were the champions of freedom were themselves, for the most part, believers. Milton's famous plea for unlicensed printing, the *Areopagitica*, has the great sentence "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all others." He was stating a principle which had consequences beyond his own vision. Locke, whose *Letters on Toleration* are a landmark in the story of British freedom, was also the author of *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. The protest on behalf of the freedom of the individual was, in fact, prompted by Christian principles. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has admitted, there is in Christianity an idea, derived from the New Testament, which strongly supports the inherent dignity and worth of every individual person. The fundamental beliefs of Christians combine to make the person a central concept. Every man is created by God to be His child and each one stands, as a particular individual, under the judgment of God. Christ died for all, so that St. Paul can speak of an undistinguished individual as "the brother for whom Christ died." The doctrine of the Incarnation

asserts that God Himself has been perfectly revealed not in a State or a society, but in the life of a person, of the person Jesus Christ. According to Christian doctrine, moreover, while the State, being a product of history, will come to an end, the individual citizen is an immortal spirit who will survive the destruction of earthly existence and of the world itself. In the cosmic drama of creation and redemption the person, the individual, is at the centre.

Some, indeed, of the exponents of individual freedom have not been consciously inspired by Christian faith, but they spoke out of the inheritance of Christian ideas which had entered so deeply into the mind of western Europe. Kant was an unorthodox Christian, but he was reproducing a Christian idea in his own language when he laid down the duty of "treating everyone as an end in himself and never as a means only." Jeremy Bentham was not a Christian, but one may doubt whether he could have enunciated the principle that everyone should count for one and no one for more than one in connexion with his formula of "the greatest good of the greatest number" but for the Christian emphasis on the inherent dignity of the individual. It is no accident that the modern States that have been most inimical to personal freedom have been either un-Christian, as was the Nazi Reich, or based on an atheistic philosophy like Soviet Russia.

We are defending then the ideal of a State and Commonwealth which is based upon respect and reverence for personality, and which values freedom in the sense that it strives to give to each individual the maximum degree of self-determination compatible with the freedom of all others and the safety of the nation. The unity of this State and Commonwealth, we would hope, should be more than a unity maintained by law and its sanctions, it should become more and more a unity of spirit, a fellowship of free persons combined in a common enterprise in uncoerced agreement on the ends in view. We do not maintain that we have reached that ideal or are anywhere near it, but we believe that we have moved a little way towards it and that we still have an 'open society,' one that is able to go forward and develop the possibilities which as yet are only latent within it. Freedom of thought and discussion will, we believe, lead us into more truth and understanding, and freedom for individual enterprise will, in the end, prove to be better fitted to produce progress and welfare than the rigidity of the totalitarian State. Above all we hold that the real wealth of a nation is the persons who form its citizens.

I hope I shall not be going beyond my brief if I make one remark on the way to defend what we decide is worthy of defence; it is simply this, that the indispensable requirement of successful defence is that we should know the principles that we accept and act upon them vigorously, so that our western society may stand out in favourable contrast to its rivals. There are signs that the idea of freedom is not well understood even in this land of the free. When one hears, for example, such a travesty as one which came to my ears recently, "Democracy is the rule of the majority and therefore the minority has no rights," one trembles; that way lies the birth of the dictatorial State. The freedom of a nation can be judged by its treatment of minorities. How do we stand in that test? One would wish, too, that our politics were less dominated by the party system and that debates in Parliament were more like genuine discussions by reasonable men seeking the good of the whole community.

I wish, too, that our philosophers could write more confidently than they do in favour of the rights of men and the rights of the individual over against the State. So far as I can tell, on the whole they dismiss this conception, which has been such a powerful watchword in the struggle for freedom, as untenable on the ground that it

cannot stand up to logical analysis. I am inclined to agree that they may be right, granted their own presuppositions, but logical validity depends on the premises and assumptions with which you start and what may seem illogical with one set of premises can appear perfectly logical with another set. I would agree that if we leave out the major premise of the existence of God we shall have difficulty in giving a rational account of the rights of man, but I would add that if we start with the premise that God exists, we shall see that the proposition "man as such has rights which no State may legitimately override" is a perfectly logical statement.

I repeat, the best defence of our principles is that we should consistently apply them in our own national and international policies and show to the world the blessings of freedom in action. No iron curtain can permanently prevent the truth from spreading. It seeps through even the thickest barrier and with it the spirit of enquiry. Amid all the horror and tragedy of Hungary, one bright ray of hope is shining. The students and younger intellectuals in lands behind the curtain are restless. They begin to suspect that they have been deceived and no longer trust the doctored information that their governments hand out. This confirms, what we ought always to have known, that the most thorough and expert conditioning cannot altogether stifle the mind's longing for liberty. The tyrants are in a dilemma: they cannot carry on their technological economy unless they educate a large number of young men and women, but they cannot educate them without awakening the critical faculty and the impulse to think for oneself. When the young men begin to say, "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience," we may be sure that the tyrants are on the way out.

DISCUSSION

BRIGADIER K. B. S. CRAWFORD: While admitting the general principle that we fight to defend ourselves, should we not give our people credit for a deep anxiety on behalf of small nations not always part of the British Commonwealth, such as Belgium in the first war and Poland and Czechoslovakia in the second?

THE LECTURER: That is very true indeed. I did not mean to say that we were defending ourselves and that was the end of the matter. We were defending—as I went on to try to show—certain principles and ideals. Among them is the attempt to promote the freedom of the individual, first of all in our own society. But that attempt to promote freedom cannot really be limited to any single society. It extends to other societies which are only loosely connected with our own, and consequently I think there are always mixed motives.

The attempt to defend Belgium was partly an element in our attempt to defend ourselves, but it was also allied with the feeling that we ought, so far as we could, to defend freedom wherever it was attacked within the limits of our own competence and the possibility of our own survival. Nobody, I think, would have said it was right to go to the assistance by armed force, for example—perhaps I had better not give an example, but in a case where it was patently clear that we could not do anything but prolong the tragedy and weaken our own position, and make our own chance of survival much less.

I am afraid that is rather a confused answer, but I hope it has covered the question.

MAJOR-GENERAL L. O. LYNE: I was very interested in what the lecturer had to say about fighting for England, which I am sure is a most estimable feeling for a young man to have, but somehow we have got to broaden this idea.

I would like to refer to the Korean War. I was at that time, and still am, closely connected with the United Nations Association. During this campaign we did what we could to bring the United Nations Organization to the attention of the British Army in Korea. We sent out a United Nations flag and also a great number of Christmas presents and other gift parcels to the troops with a special message from the United

Nations Association. This was perhaps a small beginning, but I am quite sure that most of the British soldiers fighting in Korea had very little idea of what the United Nations Organization meant and indeed what the war was all about.

The point I want to make is that the difference between straightforward patriotism and fighting for one's Country and the new conception of defending freedom against aggression through United Nations action is very deep. We know from war-time experience how difficult it was to persuade, say, a man from Lancashire that he was as well placed in a south country regiment as in his own. It is a much bigger jump to be told that you are not fighting just for England but for an international organization which, however worthy, has never before entered into your thoughts at all.

I should like to ask the Dean whether he agrees with me that all this goes so deep that we have to start right at the beginning. The only place you can really start, with any hope of success, is with the early education of the boy or girl. Do not let us teach them ever to forget England but let us teach them to couple England with a wider loyalty. This seems to me to combine with Christian teaching in the schools.

I am old-fashioned in some things and new-fashioned in others. I am old-fashioned enough to believe that the child's upbringing and education ought to begin by a thorough understanding and knowledge of the Christian religion. On top of that one can build not only the old loyalty to one's Country but the new loyalty to a wider world. Indeed, if we do not achieve this, we may in the end achieve nothing. It will not, of course, come about in a day, but is something that we should all work hard to achieve in the end.

THE LECTURER: That is most interesting and a very large question. I am sure it is one of the great problems that have to be solved.

It seems fairly obvious that a start ought to be made in the schools, in education; and, of course, I agree that the most favourable way of starting is if it can be connected with the Christian faith and the Christian belief about God and man and the world.

But after all that does not take us very far. As it seems to me, one of the great difficulties is the imagination. Men are ruled by their imaginations far more than they are by their reason, and there is nothing very much to appeal to the imagination so far about the United Nations.

The word 'England' calls up in most people's minds a rather confused but quite appealing series of pictures of great men like Nelson and people like that, going right back to Alfred and the cakes, and a whole array of pictures in people's minds.

I remember at the worst time in the war Clemence Dane staged a kind of history—I do not know what to call it, perhaps a series of tableaux, historical tableaux—on the steps of St. Paul's, covering the great periods of history. There was a dramatic moment, I remember, when Nelson looked out of the west door of the Cathedral as though he had just come out of his tomb. That was at the worst time at the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941.

Strangely enough, one of the most moving parts of that curious drama was a quiet time that was supposed to represent part of the XVIIIth Century, when someone just recited the *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*. That was succeeded by a more dramatic and heroic theme.

What struck me was that quite a lot of ordinary people who were having a very bad time just then, with not much sleep at night, were greatly moved and helped. It recalled to them, so to speak, what England meant.

Now there is nothing of that in connection with the United Nations. If some of the eminent members of the United Nations could get themselves martyred in a spectacular manner, I have no doubt it would do a great deal of good! Whether that is practical sense or not I am not quite sure. At any rate, that is the kind of imaginative appeal that we must hope the United Nations sooner or later will acquire.

GROUP CAPTAIN R. FULLJAMES: If the United Nations is to be strong, presumably it needs not only force of arms but the support of the whole of the Christian world. Have we reached a stage in the world's development where the united churches ought to condemn action that is not in accordance with world authority?

THE LECTURER: That again is a very large question. Ought the united churches to condemn things which are worthy of condemnation?

Just a few weeks before the war I and the then Bishop of Southwark had the idea that the one hope of preventing a war was to make some kind of absolutely united and dramatic appeal to the Christian conscience of Europe. We had the idea that the Archbishop of Canterbury might fly in a very dramatic way to Rome and say, "I have come to join with you in any way you like to make this appeal."

As you know, that did not happen. I do not suppose it would have been a great success if it had. But there was at least a chance, we thought, that this unprecedented event might have arrested the wheels that were slowly grinding towards war by the united Christian conscience expressing itself.

Unfortunately, the amount of unity which exists among the divided Christian churches is not sufficient, I think, to make any condemnation that they are likely to agree upon of great value. And there are some Christian people who, I believe, would take the view that it is really unchristian to attempt to intervene in secular politics in any way. I do not know that they are very numerous, but they certainly exist.

At the same time, I do myself cordially agree that it is a mark of the terrible state of confusion in which the Christian Church is that it is not able to speak, apparently, with a united voice on the great moral issues of the time. We must all pray and work that it shall soon be able to do so.

CAPTAIN E. U. RAIKES: Does the lecturer consider that the top brass of the Church is in touch with the feelings of the common man and woman? May I give an example of what I mean?

In the last war, we were on the Kent coast for a time during the Battle of Britain and on Sunday we went to the parish church. The priest who was a production of Oxford and a very learned man, an Oxford scholar and so forth, sermonized the troops. When we looked round we found most of the Services were asleep during the sermon. They did not know what he was talking about. I am afraid the officers were, too.

THE LECTURER: I do not know how to answer that, as I am not quite sure what is meant by the top brass of the Church.

CAPTAIN RAIKES: The bishops and archbishops.

THE LECTURER: I am glad that deans are not included! I think that I know what the questioner means—the terrible exasperation you have in church. You see a church full of people you know, and you know that the man in the pulpit, if he only has the right message to give, has here an opportunity to give it. And the man in the pulpit does not give what you think is the right message. This is a most exasperating and disappointing experience.

I do not think there is any panacea to cure that. Some men have the capacity for sensing the minds of those they are speaking to, the level of their intelligence, the kind of needs they have, and their probable reactions. Some do not have that gift at all.

I do agree that we ought to think far more earnestly than we do about whether the message we give to the people we have to minister to is the kind of message which they are capable of receiving or the kind of message which is adapted to their particular needs.

Anybody who has ever tried to do that will realize how extremely difficult it is, particularly if you have a congregation that you have never seen before.

This is entirely irrelevant, but I remember Stephen Leacock, who is not exactly a theological authority but knew a good deal about human nature, in one of his books has an essay on lecturers and lecture audiences in which he says that you will invariably find in

every lecture audience there is a man with a face like a melon, and he generally sits in about the third row from the front. I hastily avert my eyes! He goes on to say that it is a fatal mistake to try to make this man with a face like a melon express any emotion at all. You will lose your place and you will lose the rest of the audience. There are certainly some audiences and congregations which seem not only to contain one man with a face like a melon but to consist almost entirely of faces like melons. In these circumstances, if the people are strange to you, it is extremely difficult to know whether the message you are trying to give is one which they are able to receive or not.

THE VENERABLE ARCHDEACON F. D. BUNT, Chaplain of the Fleet: We all understand that attack is the best form of defence and quite obviously a positive way of living is going to be the best definition of what we stand for.

Do you not think it is rather dangerous to emphasize the rights of individuals? Do you not think Mazzini was right to say that we have the duties of man? If we could teach people their duty to individuals, it would be a stronger and more positive line than insistence on the rights of individuals.

THE LECTURER: That is perfectly true. You cannot really claim rights unless you acknowledge duties. But in fact the struggle for freedom has centred to a large extent on the assertion of the rights of the individual, which were not admitted or not granted by the Governments and States against which the fighters for freedom were in revolt.

I entirely agree that rights and duties go together, and unfortunately—of course—in our present time there are so many people who assert their rights without ever recognizing their duties.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEOFFREY BLAKE: I think the Dean has made it extremely clear to us what principles we are out to defend—freedom and a decent way of life. I was wondering whether he would give us any idea as to the danger which we are in, in this Country, from—I won't say the spread of communism, but what is generally described as the Communist threat.

I really do not know exactly what communism is in this country and whether it is in any way based on the same thesis as exists beyond the Iron Curtain. But there is no doubt that it has some influence. It has a considerable influence on the labour situation in the trades unions and I cannot suggest any means of combating it. Perhaps the Dean, who must have experience of the feeling that exists in the Country, may be able to give us an idea of what is the best way to deal with it.

THE LECTURER: I do not really know to what extent communism in the Marxist sense of that word is a powerful movement in this Country. I suspect that a good number of those who would be quite willing to describe themselves as Communists have never read a page of *Das Kapital* and have only a very slight understanding of the economic and philosophical basis of Marxism.

So far as that goes, I think it is unduly pessimistic to think that communism is making great strides. In fact, I think one of the best ways of combating communism would be to explain quite impartially and clearly what exactly Marx said, and then go on to criticize it where it is open to criticism and show where it is inapplicable to the present state of the world. That, I think, can quite easily be done.

My point is that communism is very often an expression of a deep-seated discontent of some kind. Communism is adopted as a label because it seems to be the one which is most in opposition to the present set-up in the Country.

I would be inclined to think that in this Country—and probably other western countries, too—the chief danger to individual freedom does not come from the Government, as it used to do and as it still does in the Communist countries, but from the organizations within the nation—trade unions and federations of industries—which have their own rules and discipline. These they enforce by means which are not legal but which nevertheless restrict the freedom of the individual very considerably and effectively.

Where one has to look, I think, at the present time, chiefly for dangers to what I understand by freedom would not be in the central State. We are not going to become a police State or anything of that kind. As I say, one has to look to these organizations within the State, which are to an extent a government within a government and a State within a State.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is difficult suddenly to get on your feet and say anything that is useful after a talk like this; it is beyond my ability.

I remember when I sat at the feet of Sir Geoffrey Blake at the Staff College we used to learn that war was an instrument of policy. I suppose we ought to have gone back further and learned that policy must be framed on Christian ideals.

This raises a point. The United Nations is a collection of 60-70 nations with very differing creeds. It is endeavouring to foresee the needs of the world and to defend freedom. But it is rather hard to believe that its policy is based on Christian ideals as it is not a Christian community. It is a collection of nations with very differing creeds.

Education has been mentioned. I have always found in talking to the sailor that he does not understand freedom. Freedom to the ordinary man in the street is to be allowed to do what he likes. That is his idea of freedom.

I was trying to reason recently with a man who thought he was free if he went outside the Navy. I asked, "What happens if the milkman does not come? What happens if there is no fishmonger? Can you make your own bread? If your teeth ache can you pull your own teeth out?" You can go on and on. We are not free; none of us is free. The more civilized we are the more bound we are by the things round us. If the educationists could teach the masses the true meaning of freedom, I believe it would give us something really worth having.

One day when we read Staff College books and other things we may perhaps see war as an instrument of a policy based on Christian ideals. That is a very long way ahead.

The Iron Curtain which the lecturer mentioned is a tremendous feat on the part of the Russians, probably their greatest feat, in the last 20 years. They built this barrier and it was impenetrable. We did not know what was going on on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and they did not know what was going on on our side. That was maintained for a very long time. It may be that this is all over. If so, then—as the lecturer said—the masses, perhaps the educated side of Russia and the student class, will become, if they are not already, more and more conscious of what we on the other side of the Iron Curtain do and think. If so, it may be the end to the cold war.

I understand a large number of officers and others who would have been here to-day have been detained by the wrangle, usual at this time of the year, on estimates. That is why the audience is not big, as we all hoped it would be. I can assure the lecturer that what he has said will be published and read not only in this Country but in the Commonwealth where our JOURNAL is studied by very large numbers.

On behalf of those in this room, of the Council, and of the members of the Royal United Service Institution, I thank you very much indeed. (*Applause.*)

STAFF WORK FOR THE COLD WAR

By MR. DONALD McLACHLAN

On Wednesday, 30th January, 1957, at 3 p.m.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN GLUBB, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., in the Chair

THE CHAIRMAN : I think most of us must be convinced by now of the vital importance of this subject of cold war. I was thinking only this morning as I read the paper, coming up in the train, what an extraordinary contrast there is. It is incredible now to remember that 16 years ago Britain, standing alone, was challenging the whole world as a champion of the free countries. Only 11 years ago we, with America and Russia, were right on top of the world ; and now we see this rather sad anti-climax to all the heroism of those years.

My own interpretation is that we still, in this Country, have this basic idea that a country is either at war or at peace. In war-time the British people will sacrifice everything, and they have done so again and again. But in peace-time we think that it is fair game for everybody to look after his own interests. Nothing matters much as long as there is peace. That, I think, is the illusion under which many of us have been labouring, and it has to some extent created our present unfortunate straits.

So I think there is nothing better that we can do at this moment than do our best to make up the leeway, to study the technique of this war in peace-time or cold war at which, after being so triumphantly successful in the hot war, we have been so unsuccessful since the end of that war. For this purpose we are fortunate today in having Mr. McLachlan to speak to us.

Mr. McLachlan is a professional journalist. During the war he was in the Navy and so on the naval staff and afterwards on S.H.A.E.F. Since then he has made himself an expert on cold war and he has given particular attention and study to the question. He produced, for Chatham House, a study on the subject of the cold war. He was also a member of the Drogheda Committee which studied the whole question of the information services. I am sure that when you hear what he has to say you will agree with me that he really is a man who knows what he is talking about.

LECTURE

YOU can imagine that a journalist feels some nervousness about addressing this audience, particularly with General Glubb in the Chair. I regard his presence as a great honour. But I am a little reassured by the fact that you have already been talked to, I think very brilliantly, by Mr. Crossman on this subject.

I am not going to cover the same ground. I merely say that broadly speaking I am in agreement with him, although our experiences during the war were rather different. I am rather more interested in the operational side of things than he is. And it is to problems of technical organization and staff that I propose to address myself this afternoon. Those who expect me to say challenging things about our propaganda—what is said, how it is said—will be disappointed.

I should warn you that I propose throughout this lecture to refer to the activity which I want to discuss as para-military. You may object to that. It sounds rather like jargon. But I need this word para-military in order to emphasize the importance of dovetailing the kind of work I am going to talk about with every phase of military activity. The tendency for too long has been for the military planner, the commander, or his political head, to call in these auxiliaries too late—too late in the planning, too late in the execution. I will give examples of that later.

Now, my text for this afternoon comes from the third and fourth lines of the second verse of the authorized version of the National Anthem. I will remind you what they are :

" Scatter his enemies,
And make them fall ;
Confound their politics,
Frustrate their knavish tricks,
On him our hopes are fix'd,
O save us all."

That seems to me very appropriate. It may interest you to know that another version appeared in 1745 in connection with the Jacobite Revolt. It is really worth noting, although it has nothing to do with my lecture.

" Lord, grant that Marshal Wade
May by Thy mighty aid
Victory bring.
May he sedition hush
And like a torrent rush
Rebellious Scots to crush.
God save the King."

The Scots in the audience will perhaps appreciate that memory of different days, for after all they were rather good at the cold war.

I think " frustrate their knavish tricks " and " confound their politics " might be a very good motto for what I think we shall perhaps have to have soon—a Ministry of Peaceful Co-existence.

First of all, a very quick definition of what I understand by the cold war. I simply call it all mischief short of real war. It is not concerned just with the use of words but also with the use of money, with the use of threats, with the use of every kind of means by which the mind and nerves of an enemy or doubtful friend can be affected. We must get away from the idea that the only alternative to weapons is words. There are plenty of other alternatives.

I think in Whitehall particularly there has been—there still is—a feeling that we are being left behind in the art of mischief-making—the cold war, if you like. But there has been much too much emphasis on the use of words, on the use of propaganda or psychological warfare. People have come to expect from propaganda, from psychological warfare, results that it simply cannot achieve ; and it may be that we should try to limit its possibilities and scope a little.

I suppose you would agree with me as a general proposition that the key to effective action is good staff work and good organization ; without good organization and good staff work you will not get the right men. Broadly speaking, it is true to say that our para-military activities are understaffed and have not the quality of man that they should have.

As things are—in our information services, in our propaganda, in our economic warfare, such as it is, and in other activities—the quality of the men attracted and recruited is not as good as it should be. I think this is partly due to bad organization, and to the poor status that is offered. I may say, incidentally, that it is to me surprising how well the soldiers, sailors, and airmen, civil servants, Foreign Office officials, B.B.C. people, and others who are suddenly switched on to these very difficult jobs in fact perform them.

But in many cases what they do is extemporized and they are often called upon to learn at some cost in time and money and energy things which are perfectly well known and could have been communicated to them if there had been a proper staff system and a proper organization.

I think, too, everyone here would agree that if a department has not the right status and organization it gets shouldered aside in what I call the Whitehall scrum; that is to say, the Whitehall scrum for money, for position, for facilities, and for people. Para-military activity, in the last few months has had a specially rough deal. If psychological warfare, economic warfare, and all the other activities which can contribute to activity in cold war are to be successful, then they must be given the right status and position in the Whitehall hierarchy. And I shall make some positive suggestions about this in a moment.

Further, I want to urge this: that before we have forgotten everything that we learned in the last war—and we did learn a great deal—it is important that the men who know should be asked to record the materials for what I would call a doctrine, if you like a manual, of this kind of work. If we had a doctrine, and still more if we had some sort of manual, some sort of history, some sort of properly organized records, of the para-military activity of the last war, it would then be possible to organize some kind of training. At the moment, so far as I know, training in these activities is not of a very high order. Probably only in the B.B.C. is anything like a systematic training for this kind of work given. Otherwise, in the Civil Service, para-military activities become an offshoot of a man's normal Civil Service training, some aspects of which, I suggest, are almost harmful to efficient work in this direction.

Until we have doctrine and manual and a system of training, until the activity is taken seriously and studied, military persons, commanders in all the Services, those responsible for our strategy and operations will go on complaining that they are not getting enough help in the cold war.

One more point before I make my proposals. I do want to insist that I am not talking about the home front. I am not talking about organization to deal with Communists. I am talking about organization to deal with enemies, and what I call faint-hearted friends, wherever they are. They are not necessarily Communists; they are not necessarily Russia or China. I am talking about organization able to counter hostile activities against us by other States in which all the possibilities of the modern world are used—the media of communication, the news agency, speculation against the pound, control over raw materials, the blocking of the Canal, sabotage, the detention of people, brainwashing, and so on. There is a whole series of activities which are brought to bear in the struggle of our times, not all of which are connected with Communists.

The first of my proposals is basic to all the rest. If you do not agree with that, you will probably disagree with almost everything else I have to say for the next 40 minutes. It is that in the Ministry of Defence—which is clearly going to be reorganized in the immediate future—there should be a person of very high rank and great experience whom I would like to see called the Director of Para-Military Operations. Here is this word 'para-military' again. I would like to see him have a small specialist staff, performing very largely a co-ordinating role. What he would co-ordinate I will tell you in a moment. I was saying to the Chairman earlier that I am quite prepared, if you think it would help, to have him called P. There is a sort of magic about letters in Whitehall and if it would help to call him P, I should be quite content. If you like, I will call him P for the rest of the discussion.

His job would be to plan the para-military side, the auxiliary side, if you like, of all future likely operations short of global war. He could not do it in global war because, as far as I can see, in global war you would have to go over to a state of siege, and the way you would organize para-military activities would probably be quite different. So let us leave that aside for the moment and deal entirely with all likely future operations short of global war. P's job would be to plan the para-military side.

Thirdly, I suggest that he should not control any executive agencies himself. There could be no question of his controlling the B.B.C. or the Central Office of Information or the Treasury or the Bank of England or any of the agencies that come into this kind of work. That is out of the question. No one man could do these things and it would lead to confusion. In any case, most of the agencies are not susceptible of that kind of control. What I suggest is that he should co-ordinate them, and in a way I am now going to explain.

Further, I suggest that P, this director, should have—and this is most important—direct access to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and the Minister of Defence. That sounds a very tall order, but P is not going to be much good unless he can act quickly and decisively. On occasion he may have to move at the pace, shall we say, of the news, certainly at the pace of the enemy. And it would be quite useless, I think, for a man in this position to have to go through a very long series of channels before he could get the crucial decision he wanted.

The next point is that P would need secret funds. I do not think he could do a good job without them; and he would need some protection from parliamentary questions. I cannot insist strongly enough on the latter point. You cannot conduct this kind of activity in peace-time—it is even difficult to do it in war-time—if you are subject to all the normal risks of parliamentary questioning. This is a point, I think I am right in saying, on which Mr. Crossman agrees with me; that you cannot conduct effective work of this kind, para-military work, if you are subject to normal peace-time parliamentary questioning.

Incidentally, P would be responsible for liaison with similar organizations in friendly countries through which he would sometimes work. Sometimes it is easier to do the job that is required through a friend, through a neutral, through a third party, than directly against the object of your attack or your defence.

Lastly, I would make P responsible, anyhow temporarily, for drawing up some system of training in this activity. That is something of which he would have to be relieved later, but it would be his job to initiate that part of the process.

May I just run over these points again very briefly: a Director of Para-Military Operations in the Ministry of Defence, a senior civil servant, very senior; not controlling any agencies but co-ordinating the agencies that exist; having direct access to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, and Ministry of Defence in order to get quick decisions on policy; working at every stage—and this is a point I omitted—with the joint intelligence and joint planning organization; having access to secret funds; some protection from parliamentary questioning; and responsible for liaison with similar organizations in friendly countries.

I ask those of you who know the Whitehall set-up whether there is now anything like that at all in our system, or whether there ever was in war-time. So far as I know there was not, and it was a considerable weakness so far as Whitehall is concerned. In the great operational commands of the last war—certainly in S.H.A.E.F. and, I think, in Asia and to some extent in North Africa—something of

this kind did exist. There was something like this network of command and co-ordination.

Let me now develop the idea.

Firstly, I think you will all agree, that P—any para-military official or expert—who is expected to assist in military and police operations should know well ahead what they are likely to be. Too often, in my experience, they are called in at the last minute. A military operation is laid on in its essentials, may even have started, and the people I am talking about are called in to help. Sometimes it will happen that the central plan of the operation is from P's point of view quite wrong, or some essential detail, some point of timing, some question of personality, makes it from his point of view financially, psychologically, or diplomatically impossible. Then his power to help is very limited. I think that that may have happened in the Suez operation.

If P was a person with authority and power, he could ensure that the agencies working for him were told very early about future plans. His officers would take part in planning and the propaganda, financial, and other aspects would be in the plan as approved. That, I think, is absolutely essential. Otherwise, there will be continual misunderstanding between the Services and the people who do this work, and there will be muddles. Something like this co-operation in the early stages of operations was achieved in the last 18 months to two years of the last war.

Secondly, what is more important in some ways is that P and his staff should receive full and relevant intelligence, with full confidence in their discretion. If anybody needs accurate intelligence about the enemy and the objective, the operation, the resistance that is likely to be met with, it is the chap who has been asked to deal with personalities, with ideas, with economic factors, and so on. Normally he is neglected, or excluded on security grounds.

Lastly, I want to give you an example. I have no particular place in mind at all; that would be embarrassing. Say that in a British possession somewhere or other trouble is expected from elements within that country supported by a foreign government outside. A hostile element in the country is supported by a foreign government outside which is prepared to go to great lengths to support it, by all mischief short of war—again my definition of cold war.

Small-scale military operations will probably be necessary; some propaganda on the spot; probably a rather delicate political operation; and a certain amount of economic pressure, either on the territory or on the enemy. It would be very important to have all the information that could be given. Is it to be a surprise operation or not? Are we to take the initiative or the enemy? Such matters all affect the first impact of the news of the operation on the world. The B.B.C. is involved. Eventually, of course, the Press are involved. Financial institutions are involved, shipping. . . . I need not labour that point.

P's job, as I see it, would be to be in on that plan right from the beginning, to point out what were the various difficulties arising from his point of view and to organize measures to meet them. It would be his job to go to agencies A, B, C, D, and E and say, "I have an operation for you. You do not need to know all about it. I will give you the objective and the time and certain details. I want you to report to me how you propose to do it and what results you think you can obtain."

If you have no P—and you have not at present—this part of the job does not get done at all or it gets done very badly. It gets done by someone with inaccurate knowledge or insufficient authority. I do not know which is worse.

The example I have taken is a rather small operation. I can imagine the procedure working for a bigger one. It could also work when planning joint strategy with some defence organization like N.A.T.O. or S.E.A.T.O. or the Bagdad Pact Organization.

For a moment I want to digress to propaganda which is an important part of para-military activity. We should draw a very clear and vital distinction between a special operation and the day-to-day output of news, information, argument, which reaches foreigners by the various media—B.B.C., the Press, leaflets, booklets, information offices, and so on. That is what I call the regular day-to-day civilian contact, which may or may not be part of the cold war. Where you are dealing with friends it is not cold war. Where you are dealing with enemies it probably is. But anyhow the day-to-day maintenance of contact between this Country and the outside world is necessary. That I do not regard as an operation to come under the surveillance of P. It must to a certain extent be left to conduct itself according to the judgment of talks producers, editors, leaflet writers, writers of books, ambassadors, and so on. It is equivalent, I think, in this para-military sphere to diplomacy—day-to-day diplomacy.

I suggest that P's job is to prepare for and co-ordinate the work for the special operations and to leave the broad day-to-day job to be done very much as it is at present. I think I can say that the B.B.C., for instance, and the Central Office of Information do a very good long-term job. In the long term you have to maintain good relations with most of the world. You cannot spend all your time fighting a cold war with everybody. I believe that they do that long-term, steady, objective job extremely well. They are right to insist that it should be done in that objective way.

But what is so difficult—in my view impossible—is to combine day-to-day, calm, good-tempered, gentlemanly, fair work with the kind of thing that I am talking about. It is very difficult to entrust the two jobs to the same office, let alone to the same organization.

My idea is that if the para-military directorate were established, these organizations would be gradually relieved of a propaganda responsibility that they do not like, that they cannot perform without great difficulty. It seems to me that the job of answering Nasser that the B.B.C. was called upon to do when we started the Suez operation must have been acutely embarrassing—one voice having to speak to Persia and Europe, to friends and enemies, to the Middle East and the Far East.

I come now to the question of staff. Good staff work becomes possible once para-military activity has a status, an organization, and a clearly defined job to do.

We need, and our Allies need, the counterpart of what the Communists call their "cadres." It is a military expression, well known to you; but it has also a political meaning. Cadres in politics are instructed, enthusiastic, vigorous nuclei of people with influence. In a free country we cannot organize them in the way the Russians and the Chinese do. But we have our own methods and in various ways we have hit on the right idea in the past. In a sense, I suppose, Cecil Rhodes saw the need, although he would certainly not have described his scholars as cadres. Yet in some respects they have proved to be just that.

How can we get such cadres for work abroad and how can we train them?

Firstly, the path has to be cleared by private enterprise. I cannot see Whitehall, the Government, at this stage, founding a para-military staff college. I imagine

there would be some resistance even in this hall to the idea of starting another staff college. But I am sure something of the kind is required. The only way to get it would be for great firms, which have interests abroad and which are worried about the political and public relations problems that face them, to organize an experimental course of instruction and training for their executive staffs.

The first thing that is needed by the amateur—by private enterprise—in the cold war is good and ample political intelligence. One does not need to be a Foreign Service official or a member of the Intelligence Service to collect good political intelligence. Everybody can do it when they are abroad if they know what is required; if they know how to look for it; if they know how to assess it; if they know how to report it. Any intelligent, reasonably informed person can do it. But in my experience it is not done enough. Again and again we have seen in foreign parts a decisive change in personalities or in governments, the start of a new movement, the spread of a new idea—and it is not understood in London fully, accurately, imaginatively, until it is too late to cope with the situation that is created. You must all of you have come across such cases. It is, of course, one of the jobs of my profession to see that this does not happen; but the kind of work I am thinking of cannot be done by newspapers alone. It must be done by people on the spot, watching, reading, travelling, meeting people, confirming their judgments and communicating them.

Some of you may say that this is just espionage. It is not. It is nothing more than observation directed to foreseeing events and communicating judgments about them to people who can take action. It is already done by every insurance company in this Country, every bank, every industrial firm which has to watch developments abroad all the time. It is the political counterpart of what every live economic business concern should do in its own interest.

That is the first need: better collection of intelligence. The second activity in which people could do with some instruction is the technique of argument. How often has one heard or seen the British point of view, the line in our defence, clumsily presented.

How many of those who demand better propaganda have ever reflected on the art of persuasion? I would quite seriously suggest that our performance in the cold war would be much improved by a revival of the art of rhetoric.

The third job to be done in this experimental staff college is to explain to people how the modern media of communication work. Many well-informed and experienced people in very responsible positions do not realize the speed of modern communication, and what its impact on politics and business affairs can be. Let me give a quite simple example. If the Yemen publishes a story at two o'clock this afternoon about a British air attack on a Yemen town, that story will reach most of the capitals of the world within the next two hours. The process of checking in London and Aden the truth of the story through the Colonial Office, through the people on the spot; then of publishing the truth in the right languages and getting it over the wireless to the world—if efficiently done all this could take 24 hours. But that would be extraordinarily efficient. It would be good work if the charge by the Yemen were caught up with in under 36 hours. There are a lot of things of that kind which are just not realized by British people abroad. They do not understand the acceleration and centralization of modern means of communication or the fact that nearly all our enemies have something like a totalitarian grip on the Press and wireless. Nor do they realize how the speed of political intelligence,

of appreciation on the spot, has become much more important than it used to be.

I believe that our diplomatic, military, and commercial representatives abroad ; our lecturers and teachers and technicians, should learn something about the machinery of information, so that they can be at least instructed amateurs.

My last suggestion is that we should devise instruction in the understanding and presentation of what is generally called " the British case." And I do not mean by this projection of " the British way of life "—a terrible expression with all sorts of offensive associations. I mean by " the British case " the facts and arguments that are relevant to the British point of view in a particular place at a particular time.

This is a matter that is very often overlooked. An explanation of why the British committed action X or made statement Y may be perfectly appropriate in Salisbury and Cape Town or—shall I say—in Paris and Copenhagen. It may be utterly inappropriate in Karachi, Colombo, Singapore, or Cairo. I maintain that you cannot, with the best organization in the world and with the most brilliant staff, turn out from London alone the arguments, facts, and figures that are needed. No piece of government machinery could really cope in peace-time with the demand for quick, relevant, varied presentation of the British case all over the world. So somehow or other we have to get our British officials, representatives, and people working abroad to understand certain principles about using facts and figures made available to them for defending their Country, their Government, or their interests. That, I am sure, can be done.

You may say, " All right. You want all this done by private enterprise. You want all these jobs done at the expense of big firms in a special little staff college. If this works, do you want the Government to take it up." My answer would be that many useful public services have been started by private enterprise and later taken over by Government or made into a public corporation.

You may ask how my suggestions about private enterprise will help to provide the right kind of people for Whitehall. This is a difficult question, which we examined carefully in the Drogheda Committee. I should add, of course, that I do not speak on behalf of my colleagues in the Drogheda Committee. It was felt that the man who does this kind of work in an embassy or consulate, who is expected by one means or another to get the British case across, needs a higher status. He has to be offered a good career. At present he is looked down on in the social and diplomatic hierarchy, and is generally not properly appreciated. One way of improving matters would be to recognize that para-military activity, as I call it, is a definite branch of skill which should have its recognition in our services abroad. It should be possible for a man who is good at it—it is partly a matter of natural talent—to make it his life's work, even if it is interrupted from time to time with spells of pure diplomacy, or routine staff work. He should always come back to it so that he can acquire experience and skill and pass them on.

At the moment, so far as I know, it is not easy to find people in the public service who can pass on a corpus of knowledge, doctrine, experience, to young men wanting to do this job well. There *are* such people, some of them outside the services, some of them inside, but they are few.

I have mentioned already the importance of recording what has been done. We know from the Press and from friends that remarkable successes in para-military operations have been secured in, for instance, Malaya and, I think, in Kenya. We know or suspect that serious mistakes have been made in Egypt and Cyprus. I

should like to see the lessons and opinions of the people who had this experience recorded so that this mysterious, very difficult, and controversial branch of warfare (and it is a branch of warfare) could be studied under staff college conditions. That would at least help to disperse some of the nonsense that is talked about what can be done, what should be done, by para-military methods. If the experience accumulated in the last war and since were set down, studied, digested, discussed, there could be then some body of agreed principles and doctrine on which to work. So far as propaganda is concerned we tried to do this in a minor way in the course of the Drogheda report. We found it very difficult. We took a long time over it. And we were very surprised that it had not been done before.

One last point. Let us learn from other nations. The Americans have learned a great deal since the war, and their experience should be carefully studied. Some of their work is good, some bad. The experience of the French in North Africa would certainly be useful for us. And certainly there is a lot to be learned from the Russians and from other countries who carry out para-military activities against us in rather more subtle ways than are generally known.

DISCUSSION

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GIFFARD MARTEL : We have had an extraordinarily interesting lecture as we knew we should have from the lecturer. It has, of course, followed a number of very interesting lectures, including one by yourself recently. He has stressed and put quite clearly before us the organization which he thinks we need. I entirely agree—and I am sure we most of us do—about the organization that is needed to achieve this result. He has, however, left out—almost left out—one very vital part that I feel I should like to touch upon now, and it is this. I will be very brief.

I was in Russia the last year of the war and met all the present Russian leaders, talked to them for long periods, knew them very well, and got on with them very well. From my experience, however, I am perfectly sure the Russians have no intention whatsoever of advancing against us through Europe, if war-like conditions arose. If they did they would have long lines of communication, hundreds and hundreds of miles through hostile territory. I do not think they could keep their communications going, and I am perfectly sure they have not the least intention of doing anything of the sort.

What does that lead us to as regards ourselves and America? We have two choices. We do not want to fight with Russia, but if there should be a threat of that sort we can attempt to meet it by building up great land army forces—America and ourselves—in an attempt to meet that threat. The other alternative is to put your money on the spreading of ideas psychologically. The Russians made no mistake whatever. They went straight for the psychological side at the end of the war, and they have never hesitated for one moment on that point.

You may say that in addition they have very big land armies. Actually, they are not as big as they appear and also they do not have to pay their men so much, which helps a good deal from that point of view. The fact remains that we on our side cannot possibly afford the really first-class psychological organization which our lecturer put so clearly before us and at the same time maintain a great land army as well. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recently made it clear that we have to make up our minds which we want. We cannot have the two.

That raises a very difficult point on which something has to be done, but long periods seem to go by, year after year, without our getting very much nearer to the solution. Therefore, I thought it was worth raising today.

As an example, let me tell you that in 1953 the Soviet spent £400 million on propaganda alone. That gives a good idea of the sort of thing that is needed.

What I feel is that we have to make up our minds, the sooner the better. I think most people now in this Country, as a result of the lectures we have had at this Institution, would agree that we have to go to the psychological side and build up a first-class, big show. What we have at present is just a joke compared with what the Russians have. We have to have something far bigger than anything we have at present for doing the things that the lecturer has so clearly put before us. That is what we want and I hope we shall do it.

I do not mean for a moment to suggest we should not need any armed forces at all. I think we should have to have an armed force to deal with small hot wars and disturbances and keep our H-bombs and guided missiles. What I meant was that we cannot use huge land forces.

COLONEL J. MACNAIR-SMITH: The lecturer mentioned the rather obvious objection and difficulty of starting another staff college. But have we not got the Imperial Defence College? This function he has mentioned might be put on to it—with expansion, certainly.

THE LECTURER: What I have in mind would, I think, be such a distraction from the present curriculum of the Imperial Defence College as to make it rather difficult to include. I think the I.D.C. is rather too small. I would have thought something like the Joint Services Staff College would be better, or some *ad hoc* group might be set up. There is a lot of thinking and study to be done before it is at all clear where all this fits into Service staff work.

I would like to make one point clear which General Martel dealt with: I am not envisaging a great expenditure of money or a vast extension of staff, anyhow in the present circumstances. I do not think it is necessary or practicable. There are a lot of people in this field and a good deal of money has been spent in it. My concern is that both should be as efficient as possible. I think that with the organization I have suggested it could be made more efficient.

Where the doctrine could be studied I do not know. I should like to hear the views of the audience. Three things are clear to me. First, it must be a joint Services venture. Secondly, there must be a considerable civilian element from the B.B.C., the Press, and the information services. It is important to have experts in the technical services involved. Thirdly, you will need in the initial stage someone, or some group of people, who will pull the whole thing together. There is a Joint Services Staff College, I believe?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, there is.

THE LECTURER: That might be the place. I do not know. I think my first suggestion is the most practicable: that this should be undertaken by private enterprise to begin with and the Services brought in from outside rather than to start with the Services and bring all the civilians in from outside.

LIEUT.-COLONEL THE LORD BIRDWOOD: My first question relates to the personnel in Whitehall. I am not sure how you reconcile what is to be recognized as a para-military organization with the need to build up the personnel of an organization and give it a bit of prestige, at the same time keeping it secret?

The second question relates to the enlistment of private enterprise. I wonder if you are not underestimating the great difficulties of enlisting private enterprise. In a small way I have had some experience in trying to interest big business in this sort of work. As you know, in America, there is as much money as you like to finance Radio Free Europe. When you come to this Country you find people are not so much ashamed to come into the open about spending money on subversive activities, as an indication of *fear* of its being known that they are helping anything of that kind whatsoever. There are difficulties about passing the money through the balance-sheet and approaching shareholders and so on. That is my experience and I should like to hear your comments.

THE LECTURER: On the first question, I did not suggest that the Director of Para-Military Operations should be a secret person or organization. I do not think that is

necessary. What I suggested was that he should enjoy access to secret funds, and have some protection from parliamentary questions about some of his work. That is what I was suggesting, and that does not seem to me to present great difficulties.

On the second point about private enterprise I cannot speak with any special knowledge at all. But I can understand that great firms should be loth to be publicly associated with activity that seems to be hostile to Governments or people that they have to work with. That seems to me perfectly natural and sensible. But I am not really suggesting anything like that.

I am suggesting that private enterprise should subsidize, or temporarily support, the study of these problems with a view eventually to the staff college, as I call it. contributing to the training of their own staff. I do not see that this is any more subversive or sinister than sending a man, say, to the School of Oriental Studies to learn a rather unusual language or to study the habits and tradition of some tribe or set of people with whom the firm may have to work in its business affairs.

I can understand our business firms feeling worried about something like the American Radio Free Europe, because it is a very vigorous, I suppose one would almost say aggressive, propaganda organization. It has come to play a large political role in central and eastern Europe, and there is much controversy about the quality of the work, whether it is good or bad, whether it does the right things or the wrong things. For a business firm to be associated with that could be dangerous. But I am not suggesting that.

WING COMMANDER C. M. CLEMENTI: Coming from the Joint Services Staff College, I am able to assure the lecturer that the study of cold war problems forms a very considerable, and increasing, part of our curriculum there. It has therefore been very useful to have his constructive help this afternoon.

I would ask if he could expand on two aspects for me. Firstly, could he reassure me that P will not, as defined by him, lead us into the errors perhaps of planning without responsibility for executing those plans, bearing in mind how much the lecturer stressed that P should not control any agency himself?

The other point on which I am not yet entirely clear is where P and his organization fit into the planning so far as limited war is concerned, bearing in mind that the lecturer equally stressed that P would plan the para-military side of all activities short of global war, and that his definition of cold war was "all mischief short of war."

THE LECTURER: I know the argument about divorcing planning from command very well and I respect it. But as things are at the moment so much of this activity—and I do stress I am not only talking about propaganda and psychological warfare but about the whole gamut of methods by which one tries to influence the enemy—is in fact done to some degree by private enterprise or semi-independent agencies. You could not give P executive control of men, even, I think, in war-time. So, reluctantly, I suggest that he should be primarily a co-ordinator. Although it seems to me that he would have to develop such a relationship to the executive agencies that when an operation was called for an instruction from him would be treated as an order. I do not think that would be too difficult, judging by past experience. But if you tried to define formally the power of this Director to give orders to some organizations such as I have mentioned, you would run into a first-class row before you had even started.

My other reason for thinking that my plan will work is this. If the executive agency had been brought into the early planning, some of the difficulties which might arise between P and the agency ought to have been settled in advance—not all of them, but some of them.

On the second point, what is a limited war? I am not sure.

WING COMMANDER CLEMENTI: It might be defined as "an international armed conflict short of unrestricted warfare." This takes it out of the cold war setting.

THE LECTURER: You mean something I have left out of my definition of the cold war. I said it was "all mischief short of war." What I meant to say was "all mischief short of a global war." Whether that would meet your point I am not sure.

But let us consider this problem. What I have suggested as P's organizational duties would fit very well into a limited conflict. I think they would have fitted very well into the Suez operation, and I suppose that what you have in mind is something of that order.

I thought I made it clear that P would be responsible for para-military activity in every situation excepting global war, where the conditions would be such as to impose a state of siege and a special kind of relationships. I think the organization I have suggested would be efficient in a limited war, if your planning organization was not taken entirely by surprise. I can imagine my scheme proving difficult to work in a situation where something happened which had been entirely unforeseen by P and the agencies working with him.

WING COMMANDER CLEMENTI: So far as limited wars are concerned, it seems to me that P would have to come in on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. I wondered whether in reality we have not already got our P established in the person of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, even though he is in uniform and not a civilian, to do the co-ordination where actual fighting is concerned?

THE LECTURER: I think P's task is a very specialized one. I suggest the first P should not be a Service officer. He might eventually be. The right man to start this would be a very senior civil servant, a man right up at the top who knows the ropes and will not be shouldered aside in the Whitehall scrum, a man who will understand the mentality and structure of governments working against us. Only a very senior civil servant could carry weight at Whitehall and deal with the three Services at the level you are suggesting.

THE CHAIRMAN: I found this lecture extremely interesting myself, and it seems to me that it fits in so well with the need which has struck me personally since I have been in this Country. Anybody who speaks to me about this always starts with the detail at the bottom. People always say to me, "Oh, yes, we quite agree with you. I think we ought to have another wireless station in Aden," or something like that. Or else people say to me, "Now, have you noticed that things are much better in the last fortnight? We must be doing more propaganda." It seems to me that everything has to start at the beginning. You cannot indulge in any activity like this or in any operations without having plans. And you cannot have plans without a staff. And you cannot have a staff without building up that staff. That is why it seems to me so ridiculous when people ask whether we are doing more propaganda since Suez.

Obviously you have to start at the beginning and lay the foundations of something which is going to be an immensely important service in the future. What we have heard today on the basic organization seems to me so extraordinarily valuable.

The second thing I should like to say is this: that I myself cannot help agreeing with the lecturer that we all have the idea that these activities are rather shady. It is my impression that it is perfectly true that people in other departments, or the best people in other departments, in other services, are unwilling to go in for this. Whether you are talking of the Foreign Service, Colonial Service, Army or, I imagine, Navy or Air Force, fellows who are posted to any job connected with cold war such as intelligence, information services, press attachés, etc., want to get out of it as quickly as they can. It is not the way to the top jobs. There is no future in it.

Somehow we have to make a career of it. Perhaps if you have some organization such as the lecturer suggests, there will be top jobs. Therefore there will be a career in it. But of course it is a very poor thing in any service to get into a sideshow in which there are no senior ranks; so something has to be done so that the good people will not try to get out of this thing to be ambassadors or something else. It is important for really good chaps

to feel it is worth their while making this the job of their lives. Until you do that, you will never get the best officers, and it will be a poor sideshow to everybody else.

We have all been extremely interested in everything Mr. McLachlan has told us, and I ask you to show your appreciation in the usual manner. (*Applause.*)

COMMODORE R. HARRISON: Before we disperse, I should like to ask you, on behalf of the Council of this Institution, to join me in a hearty vote of thanks to Sir John Glubb for so ably and so charmingly taking the Chair for us this afternoon. (*Applause.*)

POLICY AND GRAND STRATEGY

A STUDY IN THE ATOMIC AND ROBOT AGE

By ADMIRAL E. BIÖRKLUND, ROYAL SWEDISH NAVY (RETD.)

THERE is a tendency in the political and military literature of the great Powers to distinguish between the expressions policy, grand strategy, and military strategy. Grand strategy here shall be understood to mean that part of statesmanship which concerns the problems of warfare, and it is therefore a borderline between policy and military strategy. It represents the large-scale plans for eventual warfare, the distribution of effort and means between military and other demands, and also the co-ordination of all the reserves of a country or a coalition of Powers respecting conditions in time of war.

Grand strategy is concerned with the political aims and ultimate objects of a war, and with the most effective means of subduing the enemy. It must decide when a Power or a coalition should employ political threats and warnings, when it should resort to economic warfare, when terror warfare should be used against the enemy's population and production, and finally when it should decide upon the invasion of enemy territory. In the present atomic and robot age the decision whether or not atomic and robot weapons should be used must be added, and again, if they are to be used, whether they should be used against both military and non-military targets. A coalition war also requires the organization of the political and military High Command and a determination of the order in which the different enemies shall be definitely attacked.

In large and small countries alike grand strategy establishes the principles for the distribution of budget, personnel, and material resources for war industry, also for the organization of the necessities of everyday life which are so important to national endurance during war-time.

From a psychological point of view we may recollect the general political aims stated in the Atlantic Charter of 14th August, 1941,¹ and how the Allied plan of war was the subject of a series of political conferences and readjustments during the period 1941-45. Let us also remember that Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery recently declared that the Western Powers should agree upon a modern plan for a war thrust upon mankind by the Soviet.

In order to establish such a plan we shall not only be required to draw upon the lessons of history but also to bear in mind that the present atomic and robot age presents problems of an entirely new aspect. Even in the small countries it must be realized that, apart from the military strategical principles which have been analysed by such men as Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet, there exists a series of problems of grand strategy which are of a defensive character.

POLICY AND GRAND STRATEGY

The present world political situation is a good reason for now examining these problems.

The policy of the U.S.A. is one of containment in order to prevent the Soviet from enlarging its sphere of power. A 'dynamic peace policy' is, in time of war, completed by a policy of 'massive retaliation' of an unlimited or, in certain respects perhaps, limited nature. The offensive air forces and sea-air forces are the backbone of American grand strategy. But this does not mean that her conventional military

forces are neglected. It has been observed that in a few years the Soviet may be on a level with the U.S.A. as far as atomic weapons are concerned.² The 1960s will be dominated by the inter-continental robot weapons. It is perhaps necessary to build up offensive centres of power in Europe, Korea, Japan, the Middle East, and North Africa.³ The 'grey areas' from Pakistan to Turkey must be secured.⁴⁻⁵ In December, 1956, the U.S.A. gave a guarantee of integrity to Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, and this kind of grand strategy may be extended to the Middle East by the Eisenhower doctrine.

In the U.S.A. there is a tendency to recommend the employment of atomic weapons only against military targets, but this 'counter force strategy' presumes a mutual understanding in time of war which is extremely uncertain.⁶ A strategy of graduated deterrence may be employed in smaller wars, but the U.S.A. must be prepared for an unlimited war.⁶⁻⁹ Without effective controls the atomic bomb cannot be banned. The U.S.A. will help a N.A.T.O. country which has been attacked by the Soviet and will deliver atomic weapons to her Allies.¹⁰

The policy of Great Britain is to protect the interests of the Commonwealth and with this in view she is prepared to counteract the expansion of the Soviet. In the present situation Britain is re-examining her strategical plans whereby nuclear bombs will be at her disposal "as long as other great powers have such bombs." She is following the trend of the 'new philosophy' with regard to Imperial defence.¹¹ A radical change to the advantage of robot weapons was announced in January, 1957. In Europe, Britain's most important objective is to keep the Russian robot bases as far from England as possible. In Asia, the Bagdad and S.E.A.T.O. Pacts must be maintained. With regard to the manifest risks facing England in an 'unlimited war' meanwhile, the principles of 'limited warfare' would seem to be in her very best interests.¹²

In France, the crises in North Africa have stimulated the desire to safeguard the great natural riches recently discovered in Morocco, Algeria, and parts of the Sahara. The military leaders have requested atomic weapons to strengthen their defences,¹³ but the French Government has declared that such weapons cannot be produced in France before 1960. The discussions on this matter have been very heated.¹⁴ France, however, should the necessity arise, can obtain these weapons from her Allies.¹⁵ Belgium will have the right to produce and to use atomic weapons.¹⁶

In Western Germany, Adenauer has emphasized the importance of coming to a decision concerning the abolition of atomic weapons and has pointed out the enormous superiority of atomic power in some countries. It seems to be the desire of the West German Government to hold a small atomic stockpile similar to that of other Western Powers. In Spain, the American air bases are of importance to the defence of Europe.

The N.A.T.O. problems concerning grand strategy are manifold. The growth of the Soviet bombing forces and the increase in her submarine fleet and in the number of robot weapons is alarming, and makes necessary a more extensive system of precaution against attack. To consider cutting the total power of the N.A.T.O. forces is impossible. Many countries are opposed to the principle of 'massive retaliation,' bearing in mind the vast destructive forces which the Soviet could bring to bear upon Europe, and are more in favour of the principles of 'limited warfare.' The problems involved in extending the activities of N.A.T.O. to political, economic, and social fields will present the new Secretary-General, M. Spaak, with some exacting difficulties; it will be necessary to create a co-ordinated policy and common conception of grand strategy.

The Soviet policy is constructed on the basis of a revolutionary communistic state-strategy, and employs every possible means for world domination by communism. Their idea is to extend the spheres of power by successive measures, at the same time avoiding a world war which might involve them in the loss of their satellite States.

Articles in prominent Russian periodicals¹⁷ show the tendency of Soviet policy to 'liberate' colonial peoples; in other words to make them dependent upon Soviet support for their future. The desire to liberate Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, the Philippines, Africa, and the South American States from their dependence upon the U.S.A. seems to be a very popular creed in the Soviet. The Arab States also belong to this category. The Soviet appears to need oil from central Asia and uranium from South Africa.

The production of atomic weapons, giant bombers, submarines, and all kinds of robot weapons is very much favoured, but at the same time superiority of military land forces is also maintained. Every opportunity is taken to weaken and undermine the cohesion of the Western Powers,¹⁸⁻¹⁹ and this pursuit is actively carried out in the spirit of Peter the Great, who is so much admired by the Soviet's leaders and peoples alike.

The Warsaw Pact is utilized to underline the necessity for a common defence, especially against air attacks. It seems to be a Russian idea that the principle of 'massive retaliation' in no way prevents the Soviet from pursuing its 'policy of the small steps.' In the event of war the Soviet could, in the face of great losses, advance in western Europe and central and southern Asia, and do vast damage by bombing western Europe and even the U.S.A. She would also be able to conduct submarine warfare under conditions more favourable than Germany enjoyed during the last two world wars. But within Russia itself the low living standards and the strictness of the régime create sentiments of obvious discontent.²⁰⁻²¹ The Russian leaders themselves conduct a particularly precarious policy, especially with regard to some of the satellite States.

The Soviet's satellite States and a number of 'independent republics' along the Soviet frontier in Asia are shown in a very interesting new Russian atlas which indicates the Soviet expansion tendencies.²² The east European satellites live directly under Soviet domination and events today make it clear that Russia has no intention of granting them any form of real independence. The West will support the liberation of these States only through peaceful means. Hungary has shown an admirable spirit but has suffered appallingly as a result. Poland, meanwhile, has played the game more cautiously. With their 88,000,000 people the east European satellites are very important to the Soviet, particularly from an economic point of view, and there are Russian 'counsellors' in all the important departments of the satellite governments. Developments during 1957 cannot be foreseen, but it is quite evident that the Soviet will not be able to rely upon her satellites, either in time of war or during any major crisis inside Russia itself.

The People's Republic of China co-operates with Russia on a basis of absolute equality. China needs economic, industrial, and military help from the Soviet, and Russian counsellors are to be found in most branches of the Chinese State organization, though the Chinese Government makes all the ultimate decisions.²³ The Soviet supports China's claim to be elected to the United Nations, her rights to Formosa, and her demands for wider influence in southern Asian affairs. Naturally there exist differences of opinion between these two countries, but nevertheless they both

appreciate the advantages of having a 'backrest.' It should be remembered that in December, 1956, China declared her solidarity with Russia in respect of the latter's policy regarding her satellite States.

The problem of the Eastern Powers is to agree among themselves upon plans for the near future, plans for making the block industrially and economically self-sufficient, plans for war industry development and for the development of atomic energy both for peaceful and military purposes.²³⁻²⁴ Their object is to keep level with the U.S.A. and at the same time to find a common line for Communist expansion in southern Asia, India, central Asia, and Africa. They are anxious to avoid a world war and are striving to continue their expansion by the 'small step' policy. Their greatest military objective is to persuade the U.S.A. to withdraw her string of air bases extending from Japan throughout southern Asia to North Africa.

Today, the influence of military balance upon grand strategy is very clear. Soviet-China has more than twice the population of the N.A.T.O. Powers and this enables them to maintain bigger standing armies.²¹ There is a certain balance in air power, however, with a qualitative superiority on the Western side. From a naval point of view the West is greatly superior, except in submarines. The Soviet is in a position to use at least 150 submarines on the high seas, and some 350 other submarines in an unlimited war against sea traffic, though at the same time the Western Powers are exceedingly well equipped for anti-submarine warfare with aircraft carriers and light warships fitted with robot weapons and highly technical means of detection.

If we now consider the land and sea forces and leave the question of air power for the moment it becomes obvious that the West's superiority at sea gives her considerable liberty for strategical action in different parts of the world. Soviet military superiority is faced with two great difficulties; first the risk of military concentrations in the face of atomic weapons, and secondly the menace of discontented satellite States behind a Russian offensive.

The effect of atomic weapons is so much greater than that of the ordinary bomb that any country equipped with a nuclear stockpile has an immediate advantage in power over any country which is without recourse to such weapons. Small atomic weapons are necessary to the defence of all countries and the number of countries which have access to these weapons is increasing rapidly. It has been pointed out that atomic weapons in the wrong hands may be used indiscriminately in local wars, but on the other hand there is no denying that they must be available for legitimate defence.

The U.S.A. has an atomic superiority over the Soviet of about five to one, but this superiority is diminishing. Both now have a sufficient number of nuclear bombs for their war targets. The U.S.A. is already delivering atomic weapons to her Allies, just as the Soviet is delivering them to China. Manoeuvres of Russian troops in the satellite States are carried out with atomic weapons in order to show the people where the real power lies.

The importance of atomic weapons on grand strategy will grow considerably in the near future if these weapons can be projected over great distances.

The influence of robot weapons upon grand strategy depends upon a number of factors; they can be launched from concealed bases on land or from ships at sea, ships which are able to change their position rapidly. This enables a robot offensive to be carried far into enemy territory.

The old system of vast sea convoys will have to be revised. When in the 1960s robot missiles replace bombing aircraft much will have to be changed. Robots require no fighter escort and where escorts are required fighter robots will replace conventional aircraft. Defensive measures against robot attack are difficult to stage. On the whole it can be said that offensive actions will become more easy and defensive actions more difficult.

In the present situation we must consider the possibility of huge inter-continental robot weapons with a range of something like 5,000 miles, medium-sized robot weapons with a range of perhaps 900-3,500 miles (the latter being better calculated to hit specific targets), and a great variety of small robot weapons used for direction against air attack and also for targets at sea and under water. The great Powers have their testing grounds: the U.S.A. Florida to St. Helena (5,000 miles); Great Britain the Hebrides to Greenland; and the Soviet from east Siberia to the Barents Sea. Besides these major testing grounds there are various smaller ones. Already a 'strategy of threat' is possible. Russian medium robots from Poland can reach England, while every point on earth is vulnerable to a medium robot launched from a vessel stationed at an appropriate position at sea. The robots will greatly influence land warfare.

Strategic security and vulnerability are important factors in grand strategy. Security may be fortified by alliances and mutual aid agreements, but any form of security against air attack will be exceedingly difficult to create in the robot age. U.S. vulnerability in an aerial war will be greater than that of Russia because of the closer concentration of important war industries and population in the U.S.A., but the United States is better equipped to reach her desired war targets²¹ and has a superiority in atomic weapons and a better offensive air force. The inter-continental robots thus seem to be Russia's best means of balancing the situation.

The policy of disarmament ultimately depends upon some factors of grand strategy. Disarmament now seems to be subordinated to a period of rearmament. It is impossible to neglect technical development, while at the same time conventional armaments remain a necessity.

The international conferences and the Eisenhower-Bulganin correspondence has produced no definite result and the question of control has not advanced.²⁵⁻²⁶ The Soviet has accepted a plan for supervision from the air but only within a restricted zone in Europe between East and West. Eisenhower's suggestion that a certain number of kilotons of explosive power could be established as a limit for conventional weapons has started a discussion as to whether or not this limit might be regarded as a division between great and small atomic weapons.²⁷ The U.S.A. is now also ready to discuss the control of robots with reference to space flying.

The economic and psychological world struggle is intensifying. The total production of the U.S.A. is still about three times as great as that of Russia, and the same is true of the whole of the N.A.T.O. block in comparison with the Russian block. The war industry of the West is about twice that of the East.²¹ Nevertheless, Soviet production is increasing and her economic offensive in Asia has opened new markets. Even the Russian credit system in Asia and countries outside Asia has produced some political advantages for the Soviet. Competition for oil and nuclear material has been sharpened. Psychologically, Russia is using her vast organization 'Agitprop' for agitation and propaganda, and its numerous equivalents abroad, to great advantage.²⁸ The Western Powers would do well to observe this Soviet advantage carefully.

For neutral countries the problems of grand strategy must be seen in the light of what a future war may be like. The political aims are restricted to pure self-defence and an estimation of what means of aggression an eventual enemy might adopt. In order to be able to pursue the narrow path of neutrality it is necessary to maintain a good defence and also to avoid becoming involved in a major war on the wrong side. Thus even a neutral country needs small atomic weapons with which to induce an enemy to give up any serious plans for aggression.

CONCLUSIONS

It seems quite evident that the political points of view dominate the fundamentals of grand strategy, but these fundamentals must be taken into account in political decisions. An intimate reciprocal action between the two ideas is necessary. We can also say that grand strategy is only a part of political action. No Power today is sufficiently strong by itself, and systems of political alliance have become a pure necessity even among the great Powers. In the future it will be important to observe the development of competition in the Arab States, India, South-East Asia, and Africa.

The importance of surprise has grown both politically and militarily. Pacts like the Ribbentrop Pact may radically change a specific situation and diminish the value of preparation. Attacks like that upon Pearl Harbour will be easier because of technical development, since an inter-continental robot missile can pass over the Atlantic in less than two hours. Biological and chemical weapons may be used by a desperate autocratic leader, and therefore various forms of 'anonymous warfare' are now possible. All these factors have increased the importance of national security measures.

The leaders of the two great blocks have certain difficulties to overcome. The West cannot count upon a serious break between Russia and China because the need of these two countries for each other is too vital, but the unrest among Russia's European satellites is a most serious internal threat to the Eastern block. It is possible that the Soviet will discover that Stalin bit off considerably more than he could chew when he appropriated the east European States. But it may take a considerable time for the crisis to develop, and the West should not make the possibility of such a crisis an excuse for failing to give N.A.T.O. a more consolidated high authority. M. Spaak's programme will certainly be both positive and immediate.¹⁸ The cracks resulting from the Suez crisis will have to be repaired, mutual understanding will have to be established in respect of taking any serious major action, even though this action may be outside the limits of N.A.T.O. itself, agreements will have to be reached concerning the so-called colonial questions, and a common basis found for grand strategy in the future.

It should be understood that the expansive power of the Communist ideology can in no way be neutralized by a passive, negative, and often disparaging attitude. There seems to be a need for a new and modernized form of grand strategy in the West, a policy applicable both to peace and war.

The political aims of both peace and war must be harmonized and it seems necessary to draw up a plan for improving the powers of action and endurance, politically, economically, and industrially. This plan, completed by the objectives of war, could serve as a basis for a new grand strategy for the democratic Western Powers. The principles of the Atlantic Charter may inspire this work, and perhaps it

would be as well to remember here Churchill's words in *The Second World War*: "In war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity; in peace, goodwill."

The object of a war must be to diminish the endurance of the enemy and to create the circumstances for a favourable and just peace. Two great problems of grand strategy are whether unlimited or only limited atomic weapons should be used in a war and whether or not non-military targets should be attacked. In these questions it must be established under which circumstances a limited war is advantageous.

An unlimited war would seem to be inevitable if the U.S.A. and the Soviet come into armed conflict with each other, since the principle of 'massive retaliation' will be difficult to avoid. An unlimited war seems also to entail unrestricted submarine warfare, and in view of these factors the three greatest Powers in the world have every reason to avoid such a conflict.

Limited warfare is possible only if the belligerents have limited political aims and are therefore anxious to avoid the use of certain weapons and are prepared to leave non-military targets alone. In the smaller 'wars by representatives,' such as the recent conflict in Korea, no atomic weapons were used. A policy of reprisal and blockade, combined with the destruction of the enemy's air power, is often the first step in smaller conflicts.

The atomic strategy of the future seems as if it will follow the principle that small atomic weapons may be used against an aggressor who will have no excuse for using large atomic weapons in return. Such an understanding, however, has not yet been arrived at, while the careful use of propaganda could easily confuse the issue regarding which side was the real aggressor. Here then is a great task for modern diplomacy, the achievement of which could do a great deal to lessen the risks and damages inflicted upon both sides.

The employment of large atomic weapons may endanger the future of mankind, but a mutual lack of confidence has up until now made it impossible even to arrive at an agreement to ban hydrogen bomb tests.

A more extensive robot strategy must be expected in the near future and this will radically change the principles of grand strategy over the whole earth.²⁹ Soon the U.S.A. and the Soviet will be in a position to bombard each other directly—from both directions. Air bases in all parts of the world will be open to attack by enemy robot missiles and this in turn will perhaps create a tendency to withdraw from these bases and to construct new secret underground launching bases. In a land war the robots will be used as a means to concentrate attacks directly upon the enemy's offensive. Robot television is already under construction.

Sea-air strategy will develop widely all over the world. Aircraft carriers and task forces which are at present able to inflict great damage upon ports and military bases near the coast will be supplanted by vessels capable of launching medium robot missiles while at sea, and this will result in a new submarine strategy for the future, a strategy strongly affected by the new form of nuclear propulsion in submarines. Experiments are now being made with torpedo-robots, launched from submarines at great depth. The way in which Russia is building up her submarine fleet—a fleet far greater than that of Germany in the last war—is indicative of her intentions and the Western Powers must be well prepared to counterbalance this menace.

From her ships in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere the West is in a position to bombard with robot weapons the whole chain of Russian nuclear mines from Lake Baikal to Caucasia. This in itself is a new means of protecting the 'grey areas,' better known in Britain as 'the northern barrier.' It must be borne in mind, however, that Russian submarines carrying robot weapons may also operate in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and elsewhere, and protection against such operations calls for a world-wide defence system.

Some final conclusions must now be added. No definite conception of a world-wide war is possible and any number of unexpected events may occur. Nevertheless, what has been said here may enable some considerations to be made. The two greatest Powers, the U.S.A. and Russia, are both immensely strong, but at the same time both very vulnerable. Broadly speaking it may be said that the Western Powers have an advantage in their superior war- and peace-time industrial capacity—of two or three to one in fissionable material—and they are also at an advantage inasmuch that they are able to regroup military forces of all sorts in all parts of the world through sea transport. Unrest within the frontiers of the Eastern block and the impossibility of safeguarding their external and interior communications against air attack is a vast drawback to Russia and more than outweighs her superiority in manpower. The development of atomic weapons will make large-scale aggression on land a more difficult matter, but if the Eastern block does manage to gain ground in the Middle East, southern Asia, and Africa then the potentialities of the new robot strategy will put Russia in a position seriously to threaten the Western communications. This is a predominant aspect of grand strategy.

To draw a line between policy and grand strategy is a very difficult matter. B. H. Liddell Hart has suggested³⁰ that air attacks against civil targets is a part of grand strategy. I believe that the decision to attack civil targets, either by sea or air, is really a matter for grand strategy, but how such attacks should be carried out comes within the realm of the different branches of military strategy.

The budgeting for conventional and nuclear weapons is a very difficult problem, since it seems that this can only be done by an overall increase of the total budget. The futility of attempting to predict the course of a future war shows the imprudence of radical cuts which may easily prove fatal.

Every government during peace-time ought to prepare documents for a system of governmental measures which could be adopted in time of severe tension or war; plans on foreign policy, drafts of diplomatic notes, agreements covering war commerce, and all the resolutions and public declarations which, prior to or during a war, are regarded as emergency policies. These documents must conform to the general plan of grand strategy which serves as a basis for planning the military strategy of the country or of a coalition of Powers.

From the point of view of grand strategy it is necessary to follow a sensible line of power economy (*économie des forces*) even in time of war, if only to avoid the disaster of economic exhaustion when the war ends. This principle may be contrary to the ultimate aim of military strategy which is to bring about a final military decision; such an aim, however, should be avoided in the interests of attaining a favourable truce and final peace.

Political warfare will also have to be prepared in order to maintain a national cohesion and to strengthen the power of an alliance. Gibbon's observations in

The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire regarding the main reasons for the disaster indicate that the psychological conditions and the interior diversities of opinion were of prime importance. It is the side which is most united and which possesses the greatest capacity for gathering of their own free will its peoples under the banner of common ideals that will be victorious in the end.

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STAFF PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD

By MAJOR A. L. KING-HARMAN, ROYAL ARTILLERY

GENERAL Sir Richard Gale in his lecture¹ to the Royal United Service Institution in April, 1956, pointed out that the whole staff machine is geared to the element of procedure, such procedure being an excellent servant but a shocking master. Giving examples of generals who could command without being bound by restrictions of rigid procedures, he quoted Guderian and Rommel.

There are many other successful generals who in the past ignored or short circuited official staff procedures, but this does not mean that these procedures are necessarily useless encumbrances. It does, however, mean that staff work must be adaptable and flexible. The chief enemy of flexibility is the 'drill'; staff drills in themselves are excellent and assist in the swift and logical presentation of facts in certain prescribed circumstances, but cannot by their very nature deal with the unforeseen and the unpredictable. Be it in Whitehall or in battle the staff must always be prepared to abandon its set-piece procedures yet serve its masters with unimpaired efficiency. I believe that we are not today striking a fair balance between stereotyped and *ad hoc* staff work. This is particularly true of our present infantry formations where the staff continue to try to make the course of operations conform to its procedures, with the result that the command and control of operations become insufficiently flexible. I suggest that the main culprit is the 'O' Group Conference. These conferences at which orders are given out for future operations take place at all levels from corps headquarters down to platoons, but for the purposes of this paper it is proposed only to consider the system for the issue of orders by a brigade headquarters; the principle is the same at corps and divisional headquarters and to a lesser extent at battalion level.

The standard brigade 'O' group consists of a conference at brigade headquarters attended by the commanders of all the battalions and supporting arms in the brigade, accompanied by their intelligence officers. The brigade staff is usually present *in toto* and also liaison officers from divisional headquarters. These conferences take place in comparative comfort and the brigade commander has the assistance of his staff to cover the intelligence and administrative aspects of his plan. Provided there is time and that all is quiet forward this system is excellent and allows the fullest possible exposition and co-ordination of the plan. Nevertheless, the procedure is exactly the reverse to that advocated and practised by many, if not most, of the great commanders during the last war. Field-Marshal Sir William Slim goes so far as to say² that:—

"On principle, in the field, it is better to go forward to subordinate commanders, than to call them back, to give them their orders at their headquarters rather than at your own. That applies whether you command a platoon or an army group."

Nothing could be more clear or more concise and it is interesting to note that General Balck (in the opinion of many Germans, a more outstanding commander than Rommel) followed the same rules. As a divisional commander he wrote the following report³ on the great tank battles following the withdrawal from Stalingrad.

"Orders were exclusively verbal. The Divisional Commander made his decision for the next day during the evening, and he gave the necessary orders verbally

¹ *Generalship and the Art of Command in this Nuclear Age*. JOURNAL for August, 1956, p. 376.

² *Defeat into Victory*, Chapter X.

³ *Panzer Battles, 1939-45*, by Von Mellenthin, Chapter XI.

to his regimental [brigade] commanders on the battlefield; he then returned to his main headquarters and discussed his intentions with the Chief of Staff of 48 Panzer Corps. If approval was obtained the regiments were sent out the wireless message "No changes," and all the moves were carried out according to plan. If there were fundamental changes, the Divisional Commander visited all his regiments during the night and gave the necessary orders, again verbally. Divisional operations were conducted from the forward position on the battlefield

Whilst the lessons of a past war are not necessarily true of a future one, the converse is also not always true. Certainly the accepted concept of operations under nuclear conditions, which envisages wide dispersion of formations with the consequent requirement for a commander to be given more than the normal latitude, is very similar to the conditions of dispersion which existed in Burma in 1944 and which were specifically mentioned by Field-Marshal Sir William Slim.⁴ His advice on 'O' groups can therefore be considered to be equally applicable today.

To appreciate the extent to which the staff system regulates the whole course of operations it is worthwhile examining in more detail exactly what is entailed by a standard brigade 'O' group. Let us take a typical action in a summer campaign at about 1830 hours with dusk at 2130 hours. The brigade commander should have got the feel of the battle by late afternoon and will have sufficient information to make his first outline plan for the next phase. Events then follow roughly according to the following time table.

1830 hours. Brigade Major ensures that the following officers are warned for an 'O' group at brigade headquarters at 1930 hours :—

Three battalion commanding officers, three battalion intelligence officers, Royal Armoured Corps commanding officer, one or more Royal Armoured Corps squadron commanders, field artillery commanding officer, three field artillery battery commanders, light anti-aircraft battery commander, squadron commander Royal Engineers, signals officer, supply officer, medical officer, provost representative, liaison officers, and brigade headquarters staff.

1900 hours. All the above officers less those already at brigade headquarters set off, usually in a jeep apiece, to reach brigade headquarters.

1930–2015 hours. Brigade 'O' Group takes place in a tent, barn, or similar form of cover.

2015 hours. Return journey to units. Company commanders, O.P. officers, and troop commanders leave forward positions to rendezvous at battalion or regimental headquarters.

2045 hours. Battalion and regimental 'O' group held at battalion or equivalent headquarters.

2115 hours. Forward troops briefed by company commanders, etc.

A cursory comparison of these methods of giving out orders with those advocated by Field-Marshal Sir William Slim and General Balck reveals that our present system is both lengthy and cumbersome. Closer examination moreover will, I suggest, show that the procedure is intrinsically bad and completely unsuited to anything except the opening phase of a battle. The main drawbacks are :—

- (a) Lack of opportunity for adequate reconnaissance.
- (b) No time allowed for fireplanning or registration of targets.
- (c) Absence of commanders during consolidation phase.

⁴ *Defeat into Victory*, Chapter XXIII.

- (d) Congestion of roads.
- (e) Unnecessary risk of allowing all commanders to meet together in a confined area liable to air or nuclear attack.

Undoubtedly the most serious criticism of this type of 'O' group stems from the fact that commanding officers of infantry, armour, and artillery units have no time for ground reconnaissance. Adequate opportunity for reconnaissance is a pre-requisite for success in both the attack and withdrawal, and orders must at all cost be planned to allow this. Moreover, even the simplest plan for supporting arms will normally require a degree of registration by the artillery. Plans made by an infantry commander after dusk with artillery targets picked off the map are doomed to failure unless ground reconnaissance has first taken place. The next most serious drawback is the physical absence of so many commanders from their posts of duty. Seconds-in-command are trained to undertake the full responsibilities of command, but it is courting disaster to leave a whole brigade front devoid of its commanders during what may be a vital hour of the day. A further point is that the absence of armour and artillery sub-unit commanders usually leaves no one in these units to register or co-ordinate the defensive fire plan for the night; such plans are not a success if plotted from the map after dark. The disadvantages of traffic congestion and of the target afforded by an 'O' group need no amplification; and there is the final point that, of all the officers present, only a few need know the whole plan and that for this reason alone the composition of an 'O' group could be much reduced.

It is true that a correct and sensible use of warning orders can do much to eliminate the criticism that the above system allows little or no time for reconnaissance; unfortunately this in itself requires very high grade staff work, since the broad concept of the plan must be made known to the brigade staff, and through it to battalions, at a much earlier stage than normal. Therefore, unless great care is exercised to avoid late changes of plan the saving of time may merely turn out to be a waste of effort. Certainly the warning order procedure is worthwhile and in fact is almost essential if this set-piece type of 'O' group is not going to run everyone short of time. Unfortunately it is for some unknown reason falling into disuse.

It is difficult to know therefore why this stereotyped 'O' group still forms such a large part of our modern training, and one is led to the conclusion that it is for the convenience of the staff, particularly the brigade major and D.A.A. and Q.M.G. who are enabled with the minimum of discomfort—and it is not easy to be an efficient staff officer in uncomfortable, wet, or ill lit surroundings—to produce well co-ordinated operational orders with the maximum speed.

Let us now examine an alternative system whereby the brigade commander leaves his headquarters and goes forward with his brigade major. The course of events might run as follows:—

1830 hours. Brigade commander writes his plan at headquarters with the assistance of his staff as required. Battalion commander of the unit chosen for the assault warned that the brigade commander will visit him at 1930 hours.

1930 hours. Brigade commander goes forward to the assault battalion area, accompanied by his brigade major and his field artillery and armoured regimental commanders, to give out his orders. The affiliated squadron and battery commanders will already be at the battalion headquarters.

2000 hours. Brigade commander moves to next battalion. Meanwhile the commanding officer of the assault battalion moves forward to give out orders to the company chosen for the assault.

2030 hours. Brigade commander holds 'O' group at the second battalion accompanied by artillery and armour commanders. At this time the assault battalion starts reconnaissance and supporting armour and artillery sub-unit commanders work out fire plans. Artillery registration starts.

2115 hours. Brigade commander visits the battalion chosen for reserve role, not necessarily accompanied by supporting unit commanders. By this time the second battalion will be starting its reconnaissance, and possibly the registration of one or two targets, defensive fire plans having been co-ordinated before 2030 hours.

2145 hours. Brigade commander re-visits the assault battalion to co-ordinate final details with adjutant. Brigade major does the same for the second battalion, then both return to brigade headquarters.

During the period 1930-2030 hours, other sub-unit commanders, liaison officers, etc., will be told to call in at brigade headquarters where the intelligence officer or D.A.A. and Q.M.G. can brief them.

The advantages of this system are:—

(a) Time is available for essential reconnaissance, and for the co-ordination and registration of fire plans.

(b) 'O' groups are smaller and therefore take less time, and attention can be concentrated on essentials.

(c) Commanders do not leave their units.

(d) The brigade commander gets a good last light look at the ground his units are holding, and is well forward and in touch with the battle at a very important period.

(e) There is less road movement and less risk of casualties to commanders from air attack.

The above suggestions are capable of considerable variation both in the locations visited and the officers in attendance. For instance a battalion commander may carry out his reconnaissance before his "O" group. In general, the governing principle will be that the more the need for speed, the further forward a commander must go, and the fewer people will he allow to accompany him.

The main disadvantages of the forward 'O' group system are that either the brigade commander must be accompanied by his brigade major, thus leaving his headquarters under-staffed during an important phase of operations, or he must do without his senior staff officer during a series of verbal conferences where there is a vital need for an accurate record of decisions to be taken. The solution to this difficulty is comparatively simple and lies in the training of the D.A.A. and Q.M.G. or G.S.O. III to be capable of carrying out the brigade major's work when required. This was common practice in many formations in the last war. Another drawback is that the commander may find it more difficult to give out his orders, since complicated timings, description of inter-unit boundaries, details of fire plans, and other types of co-ordination are all easier to issue and to understand if a formal brigade headquarters 'O' group is held. Also the close proximity of enemy shot and shell is not conducive to the issue and receipt of orders. However, orders ought to be simple and straightforward and there are in any event advantages in giving them out from a position where the enemy positions can be seen.

Whether or not orders should be confirmed in writing is dependent on the time available and whether it is safe or practicable to distribute them. In training and also to a certain extent in war there is a natural tendency to rely on written orders; nevertheless, units must be trained to fight and move without them.

The issue of orders by wireless is perhaps the best method when speed is paramount and security at a discount. This method is likely to assume more importance in the future despite the temporary effect of nuclear explosions on radio transmissions. Correct and fluent wireless procedure is a sign of a high grade staff or, to put it more forcefully, a staff which is afraid or unable to use its wireless is a danger both to the commander and the troops which it serves. The whole principle of flexibility of manoeuvre stems from the passage of orders by wireless. The idea that the "officer to officer" wireless procedure is the prerogative of armoured formations and gunners dies hard. The solution lies in high priority training for infantry staffs and operators. It just is not true to say that the gunners have better wireless sets!

Nothing that I have written above detracts from the fact that the staff of a field formation is still required to carry out essential tasks of command, intelligence, and administration. Whenever time permits these functions are best fulfilled at formation headquarters and not at an *ad hoc* forward location. Nevertheless, no commander should ever be asked to come back for orders while his troops are in contact with the enemy. The time and place for a full 'O' group is before a battle, not during one.

Of course any form of battle procedure is open to abuse, and, since Rommel is so frequently quoted as a paragon of all military virtues, it is probably worthwhile to point out that on one occasion at least Rommel's complete lack of regard for normal staff procedures jeopardized the forces under his command. This occasion was during 1941 when the Eighth Army had crossed over the Egyptian frontier into Libya. Rommel left his headquarters during the height of the battle and personally led the counter-attacking force. He was absent from his army headquarters for four days during which time his G.S.O. I, Colonel (now General) Westphal, was left to command the main force composed of both Italian and German divisions. This young staff officer eventually had to take the decision to order all the Axis forces to withdraw to the area of Tobruk, while Rommel, who was out of touch with events, was still fighting behind the main British front. General Westphal told me after the war that Rommel never learned to appreciate that a commander could remain too far forward too long, thus losing the essential element of control provided by a well-established headquarters.

I have given the above example to show that extremes must be avoided and that the degree of staff control and participation in any operation must be balanced against the time available and the circumstances. In our present training I feel that careful preparation and co-ordination of orders is receiving an unfair proportion of time and attention to the neglect of sound field tactics, and I have suggested one method of eliminating this. There are others, including the issue of orders by wireless, but whatever the solution I am certain that our present battle procedures cannot afford the luxury of large set-piece 'O' groups at brigade or divisional headquarters except in certain circumstances such as the advance to contact.

THE CAMPAIGN IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE—I

JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1944

By "MUSKETEER"

A GREAT deal has already been written about this campaign, but the necessary factual information upon which a final survey can be based will not be available until the official histories are published. There were, however, aspects of the Allied conduct of operations about which much difference of opinion existed and the effect of which was already apparent before the end of the war in Europe. This paper is an attempt to examine these differences in the light of present knowledge, as well as to comment on the application of the major principles of war in this campaign and to note the influence of the elements of chance and uncertainty on the execution of plans. It is not the purpose of this article to give a detailed account of operations or to delve into tactics.

GENESIS

Ever since 1940 our intention had been to return to the Continent when possible, and minor operations were mounted from time to time to keep the enemy guessing. It was not until Russia and the United States entered the war that the prospect of a return became brighter, though much remained to be done. We knew from experience that an assault made with inadequate means would be suicidal. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the General Staff was that victory could only be won by offensive action, which however, "should be undertaken whenever the circumstances are favourable."¹

Early in 1942 the U.S. General Staff proposed a landing in the Autumn either on the Pas-de-Calais, or Cherbourg, or Brest, but were only able to contribute two or three 'green' divisions and no naval or air forces. In 1942 the circumstances were obviously not favourable and the British Chiefs of Staff refused to attempt such an operation which, even if successful, could have little or no effect on the Russian front, and would inevitably lead to heavy losses among the troops bottled up in a narrow bridgehead. How right they were was illustrated by the Dieppe raid in August of that year. Eventually, the Prime Minister succeeded in obtaining American agreement to the British plan for a landing in North Africa, a feasible operation which, in conjunction with the advance of the Eighth Army from Egypt, promised outstanding strategic results. In the event, the campaign was highly successful and led to the opening of the Mediterranean and an enemy disaster second only in magnitude to that of Stalingrad.

It should be remembered that the Americans had neither experience of fighting Germans in this war nor of combined operations until late in 1942. But they were optimistic and self-confident, believing that enthusiasm, drive, and vast material resources could overcome all difficulties. This attitude led them to oversimplify the problems that faced the Allies. There is no doubt that they learned much during the preparation and execution of the campaign in North-West Africa and were able to profit by their battle experience.

After much argument it was agreed that circumstances would not be favourable for the opening of the main offensive "Overlord" against Germany until May, 1944. In addition, a landing, code name "Anvil," was to be made at the same time in

¹ *Field Service Regulations, Vol. III, 1935, Section 3.*

THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM

the south of France. The effect of this dispersion of force on the conduct of the war should not be lost sight of. It will be reverted to later.

Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, who was appointed Commander-in-Chief West in July, 1942, was responsible for the defence of the Low Countries and France with a coast line of some 3,000 kilometres. He believed that, owing to Allied strategic flexibility and consequent uncertainty as to where the main effort would be made, it was useless to think of preventing them gaining a foothold ashore. On the other hand, if the build-up of the attacking forces were delayed by denying them the use of a port or ports they would not be in a position to resist a strong counter-offensive either in or when moving out of their bridgehead. Consequently the ports and their immediate vicinity were given top priority in heavy guns, material, and construction gangs. Next in priority were the shores of the Pas-de-Calais where Rundstedt concluded the main attack would most likely fall because it covered the direct route to the Ruhr and afforded the shortest sea passage. Elsewhere the "Atlantic Wall" was on a less organized scale.

In November, 1943, Rommel, then Commanding Army Group 'B' in Northern Italy, was sent by Hitler to report on the western defences. Rommel acted with his customary energy and soon recommended changes in the anti-invasion plans. He argued that invasion would only take place within the range of Allied air support and therefore that the assault would be made somewhere between the Franco-Belgian frontier and Cherbourg. Further, that Allied air action would frustrate the moves of any mobile reserves held back for a counter-offensive, and would ensure the Allies' tactical mobility once they were firmly established ashore.

The command was reorganized in February, 1944, into two army groups, 'B' (Rommel) responsible for the Low Countries and France to the Loire, and 'G' (Blaskowitz) holding the Biscay and Mediterranean coasts. Rommel at once took steps to thicken up the defences, particularly north of the Seine, and in the area between Le Havre and Cherbourg which had previously been neglected. He endeavoured to get all heavy gun emplacements rendered bomb-proof, introduced underwater obstacles, and generally speeded up work on the defences. "We must," he said in an instruction, "stop the enemy in the water and destroy his equipment while it is still afloat."

The difference of opinion between Rundstedt and Rommel may be summarized as follows. Rundstedt held the orthodox view of a 'crust' on the coast between defended ports with infantry divisions in tactical reserve and panzer divisions further inland in strategic reserve for launching as the spearhead of a counter-offensive at the decisive time and place. Rommel, with his experience of Allied air forces in North Africa, advocated the reinforcement of the beach defences and the positioning of all reserves near the coast to fight the decisive battle on the beaches. Hitler intervened with a compromise which resulted in a dispersal of force. It was that the bulk of the infantry should be pushed forward to the coast while the panzer divisions were to be kept well back and not moved without his consent. This, of course, satisfied neither Rundstedt nor Rommel. It is of interest to note that General Montgomery prophesied at a conference held in May, 1944, the line Rommel would take.

At the beginning of June, 1944, there were approximately 60 divisions in the Low Countries and France of which seven panzer and 36 infantry divisions were north of the Loire. South of that river there were three panzer, one panzer-

grenadier, and 13 infantry divisions. Infantry divisions varied considerably in quality and mobility; some were normal formations, others were static coast-defence or training divisions. Details of distribution and types are given in Appendix I. There were also about 28 good divisions in Italy.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

The directive for "Overlord" given to General Eisenhower, Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated his task as follows: "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other United Nations undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of its armed forces."


The Allies' first problem was where to deliver the assault. It would be essential to break through the "Atlantic Wall," form a bridgehead, and then to secure a port or ports. After an exhaustive study of the coast between Flushing and Cherbourg, that part running west from the River Orne to Grandcamp had been selected by the planners, mainly because this area appeared less heavily defended and offered facilities for the quick capture of Cherbourg. The initial assault was to be made by one corps of three divisions.

Montgomery did not regard this plan as a "sound operation of war." The assault would, he considered, have to be made on a wider front and in greater strength. Owing to the vital importance of securing Cherbourg quickly, he recommended that the front should be extended westward to include beaches at the base of the Cotentin peninsula and that the assault be made by five with two follow-up divisions. This was approved although it involved the provision of an extra sea-lift for the assault and build-up. In the event, there were insufficient landing craft available in May; "Overlord" had to be postponed until June, and "Anvil" until mid-August.

It is necessary to refer here to the framework of command which was set up. Under the Supreme Commander were a Naval and an Air Force Commander-in-Chief. There was no commander land forces. Montgomery, G.O.C. British 21st Army Group, with General Bradley's U.S. First Army under his operational control, was to command the operation. Eisenhower intended to assume direct command of the land forces when an American army group should be deployed in the field. In the meantime, Headquarters U.S. 12th Army Group would be formed to take command of the U.S. First and Third Armies at the appropriate time, though Montgomery would remain responsible for ensuring that there would be no interruption in the general conduct of operations until Eisenhower took over.

The battle of the Atlantic had been won by May, 1943. Preliminary operations by the air forces included the gaining of mastery of the air over the Channel, the interdiction of road and rail communications with the object of delaying the movement of enemy troops and stores to Normandy, and finally, pre-D-Day attacks on coast defences and installations in the Pas-de-Calais and Normandy. The strategic air forces were not under Eisenhower's command. However, he insisted on their use on the above tasks relating directly to the invasion instead of maintaining a more or less independent war on their own, but only won his point against considerable opposition. As one military writer puts it: "Strategic bombing, for the time at least, became truly strategic."²

² *Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. III*, Major-General J. F. C. Fuller.



Sketch-Map "A"

It was obviously impossible to secure strategic surprise as had been done in North Africa; the object of the cover plan, therefore, was to mislead the enemy as to the time and place of the assault. Prior to D-Day it would indicate that the landing would be astride Cap Gris Nez in the Pas-de-Calais. After D-Day it had to create the impression that the Normandy assault was a diversion and that the main thrust was still to come—on the Pas-de-Calais. Drastic measures were instituted to prevent leakage of information and its transmission overseas through diplomatic channels.

The attack would be delivered on the selected front with the U.S. First Army on the right and the British Second Army on the left, each on a front of two corps. The actual assault was to be made on five beaches by eight brigades supported by armour and assisted by commandos. To protect the flanks during the early stages and to carry out special tasks, two U.S. airborne divisions would land during the night before D-Day at the base of the Cotentin peninsula and the British 6th Airborne Division in the Orne Valley. The objectives for D-Day included Varreville, Ste. Mere Eglise, Carentan, thence north of Isigny to Bayeux and Caen, east of the River Orne to just short of Cabourg. The full weight of the available resources of the three Services was to be employed to cover the landing and to assist penetration by the assaulting troops. For this purpose a joint fire plan was made. (See sketch-map "A".)

By the end of D-Day it was planned to have eight divisions ashore, including airborne troops, together with commandos and some 14 tank regiments. The total forces ashore by D plus six would amount to 13 divisions, exclusive of airborne troops, but including five British armoured brigades and a proportionate number of American tank units. By D plus 20 it was anticipated that there would be 23 or 24 divisions ashore. In addition, of course, corps and army troops would be landed as required.

It was agreed that H-Hour should be in daylight, that there should be moonlight during the preceding night, and sufficient light and time for the preliminary bombardment. Finally, it was decided that the best conditions would obtain if H-Hour were fixed 40 minutes after nautical twilight on a day when at this time the tide would be three hours before high water. This restricted the days suitable to three per month.

On 7th April, 1944, Montgomery explained his broad strategic plan for the development of operations after the assault. He warned all commanders of the necessity for penetrating inland quickly and of retaining the initiative. Once ashore and firmly established, it was his intention to threaten a breakout from the eastern front—the Caen sector. Caen was of great importance as a communications centre through which the main routes from the east and south-east pass and, since the main enemy mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach Normandy from the east. He considered that this threat would attract the weight of the enemy forces which he proposed to hold there by strong offensive action and then to make the breakout *in the west*.

THE ASSAULT AND CONSOLIDATION

At the beginning of June there were high winds and rough seas in the Channel and meteorological forecasts so bad that the invasion was postponed; but, on 5th June, it was decided to launch the assault the next day. The airborne troops were to commence landing at 0130 hours, the air bombardment was to open at

0314 hours, followed by the naval bombardment at 0550 hours. The first waves of the invading forces from the sea were to land between 0630 and 0745 hours, the difference being necessitated by the flow of the tide.

The airborne landings were successful in spite of unfavourable weather, though the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division was widely dispersed. The seaborne landings were also successful, though in varying degree. On Utah beach the U.S. 4th Division penetrated to a depth of six miles and gained contact with U.S. 101st Airborne Division, but on Omaha the leading troops of the U.S. 29th and 1st Divisions were pinned down on the beach until late in the day.

In the eastern sector, the British 50th Division advanced almost to Bayeux, the Canadian 3rd Division, although meeting stubborn opposition, pressed forward to a depth of nearly seven miles, while the British 3rd Division by late afternoon reached Bieville and defeated a counter-attack supported by some 20 tanks of the 21st Panzer Division. The British 6th Airborne Division, east of the Orne, succeeded in stopping a counter-attack by infantry and tanks designed to recapture Ranville. But by no means all the days' objectives had been reached and there was still a good deal of mopping up to be done. (See sketch-map "A".)

The bad weather gave fortuitous help to surprise. Rommel was at Ulm, whilst the commanders of the German Seventh Army and 1st S.S. Panzer Corps were at Rennes and Brussels respectively. When Rundstedt received news of the landing he asked O.K.W. to release the panzer divisions behind Seventh Army front, but permission was received too late to get them into action that day. Hitler, Rundstedt, and Rommel all agreed not to call on the Fifteenth Army as they believed the landing to be a feint. Rommel's plan was to seal off the Americans with infantry and to attack the British in the Caen sector with the three available panzer divisions.

On 7th June an attack was made on the Canadians west of Caen by the 12th S.S. Panzer Division alone, as the 21st Panzer Division was already committed. Rommel ordered another attack for 8th June between Bayeux and Caen with all three panzer divisions. The attack went in again but without the Panzer Lehr Division which had not yet arrived from the Chartres area. At dawn on 11th June the Canadians counter-attacked and regained all the ground lost in these actions. The delay in moving the panzer divisions was due to the action of the Allied air forces which paralysed movement by day. "From 9th June onwards," writes Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff, "the initiative lay with the Allies who fought the battle as it suited them."³

By 12th June the bridgehead was firmly established and 326,000 men, 54,000 vehicles, and 104,000 tons of stores, etc., had been landed. On the right the U.S. VIIth and Vth Corps had linked up and the latter had advanced to the River Vire and pushed its left to Balleroy. On the left the British XXXth Corps was nearing the Balleroy-Caen road, and the British Ist Corps had established itself on a line from Bretteville round the north of Caen, thence to St. Honorine and Franceville Plage on the Channel just west of Cabourg.

During 13th-15th June, Rommel launched a counter-attack in the Carentan area with the 17th S.S. Panzer-Grenadier Division, brought up from Army Group 'G.' This attack was a failure and, on 18th June, the Americans reached the west coast of the Cotentin peninsula. On 21st June the U.S. VIIth Corps closed in on Cherbourg which surrendered on the 29th.

While Cherbourg was being attacked, the British Second Army, now reinforced by the VIIIth Corps, made a determined attack on Caen. Though the latter met with

³ *We Defended Normandy* by Lieut.-General Hans Speidel.

some success and secured a bridgehead over the River Odon, the other two corps made little progress.

During the period 13th–30th June, five more panzer divisions appeared on the British sector.⁴ There were thus eight panzer divisions on the 20-mile front between Caumont and Caen, and none on the American sector. No infantry appear to have been taken from the Fifteenth Army in the Pas-de-Calais, although two divisions from Army Group 'G' had been identified. By the end of the month both Rundstedt and Rommel came to the conclusion that the only course open to them was to withdraw behind the Seine. Hitler would not agree.

THE BREAKOUT


Montgomery now ordered the U.S. First Army to advance to the line Coutances–St. Lo, preparatory to a breakout in the west. This was commenced on 3rd July, but by the 10th had come to a standstill during bad weather in difficult country. It should be remembered that the *bocage* country south and south-west of the Bayeux–Caen road favoured the defence. The dominant characteristics are thick hedgerows planted on banks three or four feet high with a ditch on either side separating very small fields, walled orchards, thick woods and copses, and many small streams. The countryside was criss-crossed by a maze of small byroads, and the stone built villages with their narrow streets provided formidable strongholds which could seldom be easily by-passed.

On 1st July, five panzer divisions made repeated, though not simultaneous, attacks on the British Second Army salient and lost heavily. During 7th–9th July the British 1st Corps captured Caen, though the Germans held out in the southern suburbs and prevented further advance. Montgomery continued to adhere to his original plan of holding the maximum enemy force about Caen leaving the minimum to oppose the U.S. First Army. So, while that army prepared to advance again, the British Second Army was to attack. On the night 15th–16th July, a feint attack was made west of Caen by the recently arrived XIIth Corps. On the 18th the main attack was launched east of Caen. Considerable progress was made, but on the 20th the weather broke and the plain east of Caen became a sea of mud. The attack by the U.S. First Army had to be postponed for the same reason. Rommel was severely wounded on 17th July.

Another panzer division, the 116th from the Fifteenth Army, had arrived. On 25th July, therefore, when the preliminary operation of the breakout was due to commence, there were seven panzer divisions plus four heavy tank battalions on the British Second Army front and two on the U.S. First Army sector. The number of infantry divisions brought from Army Group 'G' now totalled three, if not four, and, at last, infantry divisions from the Fifteenth Army were ordered to move to Normandy. The U.S. Third Army had been arriving and was to become operational under General Patton at the end of the month. On 1st August the U.S. 12th Army Group would also become operational under Bradley.

The U.S. First Army offensive commenced on 25th July and made good progress. After taking Coutances on 29th July they swung southward, reaching the vicinity of Mortain by 4th August. (See sketch-map "B.")

⁴ 2nd Panzer and 1st S.S. Panzer from the Fifteenth Army, 2nd S.S. Panzer from Army Group 'G', and 9th and 10th S.S. Panzer from Poland.



Meanwhile, the British Second Army had regrouped and the VIIIth and XXXth Corps attacked south-eastwards between Caumont and Evreux during 28th July–4th August, gaining a good deal of ground, particularly towards Vire on the left flank of U.S. First Army. Villers Bocage was captured on 5th August.

The U.S. Third Army captured Avranches on 31st July, and Rennes on 2nd August. Next day the Third Army was ordered to leave a minimum force in Brittany and to advance towards Paris. This move commenced on 4th August. At this time Hitler ordered a counter-attack on the bottleneck at Avranches with eight panzer divisions. The Germans succeeded in concentrating only five with some 250 tanks and two fresh infantry divisions, but the preparations were observed by the Allied air forces and counter measures were taken. The Germans struck westward from Mortain on the night 6th–7th August, but after advancing some seven miles towards Avranches were halted by American armour and the attack petered out.

On 7th August the Canadian First Army, which had become operational on 23rd July, commenced a thrust south-east down the Caen–Falaise road. Next day Montgomery requested Bradley to order the U.S. Third Army to swing its left corps, then at Le Mans, northward to Alençon and to close in on the enemy's communications. On this day the 9th Panzer Division from the Mediterranean coast was identified, and three infantry divisions and elements of a para-division had arrived from the Fifteenth Army.

Elsewhere, the British Second Army and the First U.S. Army closed in from the north-west and south-west forcing the enemy into a pocket between Mortain and Falaise. By 12th August the Germans were beginning to pull out and make for the neck between Falaise and Argentan. The latter place was occupied by the U.S. XVth Corps on the 13th, and next day the Canadians were only four miles from Falaise with the British XIIth Corps coming up on their right. In spite of desperate attempts to keep the neck open it was closed on 19th August, though some formations and remnants succeeded in breaking through.

In the meantime the U.S. Third Army had occupied Orleans and Chartres on the 16th and Dreux on the 17th. A bridgehead over the Seine at Mantes was established on 19th August.

On 15th August, while the battle of the Falaise gap was at its height, the U.S. Seventh Army commenced to land on the French Riviera. It is necessary to digress here and to discuss this operation.

OPERATION "ANVIL"

A landing in the south of France with one or two divisions had been suggested in December, 1943, as a diversion to "Overlord." But owing to extra landing craft being earmarked for the main operation in March, 1944, "Anvil" could not be mounted simultaneously. It was postponed, not cancelled, and eventually developed into a major operation with priority second only to "Overlord." Three U.S. and four French divisions were to be detached from the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy, together with supporting air forces and lines of communication troops. Three new French divisions would be drawn from North Africa.

The British Chiefs of Staff were never enthusiastic about this project and when it could not be mounted in June, considered it should be abandoned. Their reasons were:—

(a) The assault would take place 500 miles from Normandy, and even if mounted in June would be too late to influence the main operation.

(b) The switch over to "Anvil" would lead to six weeks comparative inactivity in the Mediterranean just at the time when "Overlord" was developing.

(c) An advance up the Rhone valley did not offer a threat to anything of vital importance to the enemy.

(d) A new base would have to be established instead of continuing operations in an organized theatre of war.

The British Chiefs of Staff's view was that "Overlord" could be best assisted by exploiting victory in Italy. Furthermore, that an advance into northern Italy preparatory to a thrust into southern Germany or Austria would have a decisive strategic effect and thus facilitate the attainment of the political object of the war. There was much discussion, but the U.S. General Staff would not agree to any change; both Marshall and Eisenhower regarded "Anvil" as "an integral and necessary feature of the main invasion across the Channel." The British Chiefs of Staff, though quite unshaken by the arguments offered, or by the fact that 1944 was presidential election year, recognized that deadlock had been reached. They informed the Prime Minister on 30th June that they would yield to the American view, in the broadest interests of Anglo-American co-operation if he thought it necessary. On 1st July the Prime Minister made a final appeal to the President. The reply was unfavourable and on 2nd July, General Wilson was ordered to mount "Anvil" on 15th August.

In June, 1944, after the capture of Rome on the 4th, the 15th Army Group, under General Alexander, was driving the enemy rapidly northward. But the withdrawal of troops commenced and priority of movement on the lines of communication had to be given to "Anvil" requirements. During the latter part of June and early July the U.S. Fifth Army was reduced by 40 per cent, including its most experienced troops. The Germans had reinforced their army in Italy by some eight divisions after the Anzio landing, but after "Anvil" four of their best divisions were withdrawn, one went to the Russian front, the others to France where the 3rd and 15th Panzer-Grenadier Divisions were located late in August on the front of the U.S. Third Army.

The actual landing on the Riviera was hardly opposed. The enemy, except for the garrisons of Marseilles and Toulon, retired in good order covered by one panzer division; the other armour had already gone to Normandy. The Americans reached Grenoble on 24th August and Avignon on the 25th—five days after the battle of Normandy had been decisively won. The French captured Marseilles and Toulon on 28th August, and then moved north-eastward entering Lyons with the Americans on 3rd September. These two ports were not in operation until late in September.

PURSUIT

By 20th August the enemy situation in Normandy was desperate and Montgomery was concerned to ensure a wide encirclement on the Seine. Two corps of the U.S. First Army moved down the left bank as far as Elbeuf before they were relieved by the Canadian First Army. Paris was 'liberated' on 25th August.

Orders for the advance to the Seine and beyond had been given by Montgomery on 6th August. The British Second Army was to advance to the Somme between Amiens and the sea whilst the Canadian First Army cleared the Havre peninsula. Initial moves by the British Second Army commenced on 20th August, when the XXXth Corps on the right began to pass through Argentan, directed on Vernon. On their left was the XIIth Corps moving on Louviers. The Canadian First Army

had their IInd Corps on the right directed on Elbeuf and the British Ist Corps on the left moving towards the Seine below Rouen.

By 27th August the British forces were across the Seine and Amiens was reached on 31st August. On 3rd September the Guards Armoured Division entered Brussels and the Canadian IInd Corps crossed the Somme; on the 4th the 11th Armoured Division reached Antwerp and, on the following day, the 7th Armoured Division captured Ghent. The British Second Army had covered 250 miles in six days.

At this time the U.S. First Army had reached the general line Namur-Tirlement, while the U.S. Third Army had advanced against negligible opposition to the Meuse at Verdun and Commercy. On 1st September, Eisenhower took over personal command of all land forces, leaving Montgomery with 21st Army Group.

The enemy's losses in Normandy had been enormous, but they also suffered heavily on the Seine where all the bridges were down. "From the point of view of equipment abandoned the Seine crossing was almost as great a disaster as the Falaise pocket."⁵ The battle had cost the Germans little short of half a million men, 3,000 guns, 1,500 tanks, 2,000 aircraft, and 20,000 vehicles. An outstanding victory had been won—all that remained was to exploit it. But the supply position was beginning to affect the mobility of the Allied forces.

At the beginning of September the lines of communication of the British 21st Army Group were already some 300 miles long and those of U.S. 12th Army Group even longer. Transport was the limiting factor; the consumption of petrol during the pursuit was very great and most of the transport had been used to bring it forward. In the British Second Army the VIIIth Corps had been grounded and all its second line transport employed in supplementing that of the other two corps. More transport was obtained by reducing the daily import of stores, thus releasing vehicles from beach and port clearance for use in maintaining the forward troops. The Americans' difficulties were also acute, and the U.S. Third Army was halted at the end of August for two days owing to shortage of petrol in spite of an air lift.

COMMENTS

The principles of *concentration*, *offensive action*, and *co-operation* between the three Services were successfully applied in the assault on Normandy and subsequent operations. Everything which could be brought to bear was used to cover the landing and to support the troops once ashore. The strategic air forces had attacked the communications leading into Normandy long before D-Day, had also taken part in the fire plan for the assault, and in some of the major attacks before the breakout. *Security* was applied by the establishment of a firm base or lodgement area as a preliminary to further offensive action.

Surprise, that principle which Clausewitz considered "lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable," proved once more to be a vital factor. In the landing, surprise as to time and place was gained, and the deception that the main effort would be made on the Pas-de-Calais was maintained, so much so that it was not until late in July that infantry divisions from the German Fifteenth Army were sent to Normandy. Moreover, in this operation the value of initial surprise was enhanced by the action taken to increase the length of time it would take the enemy to mount effective counter-measures. The means by which surprise was gained are summarized in Appendix II.

⁵ Quoted in *The Struggle for Europe*, by Chester Wilmot.

The principle of *maintenance of the object* was successfully applied by Montgomery, who adhered throughout to his aim of holding the maximum German strength in front of Caen and of making the breakout in the west. This, in spite of delays caused by bad weather, some tactical setbacks, and pressure from above. Moreover, he was always thinking ahead.

The *mobility* of the enemy troops was much less than that of the Allies, due to three causes. First, the guns and transport of infantry divisions were horse-drawn; secondly, shortage of petrol; and thirdly, the action of the Allied air forces which made movement by day almost impossible. The Allies' mobility was rapidly developed after the breakout and was one of the reasons for the completeness of the victory. But, by the end of August, the supply situation began to impose limitations.

Hitler's intervention in the battle and his refusal to sanction a withdrawal behind the Seine in good time, enabled the Allies to inflict tremendous losses on the Germans in the Falaise pocket and again on the Seine. Rundstedt and Rommel had proposed withdrawal as early as 29th June, but Hitler would not hear of it or even of any tactical readjustments. Again, on 3rd August, Von Kluge, who had succeeded Rundstedt on 2nd July, asked permission to go back behind the Seine, but Hitler ordered the counter-attack on Avranches to the horror of his unfortunate generals in the field.

As always in war, the elements of uncertainty and chance made themselves felt. The enemy, being on the defensive, was more affected by the former and the bad weather early in June added to the effectiveness of the surprise. Chance in the form of bad weather caused much delay to the Allied build-up and operations, especially the "furious and unforecasted" gale which raged from 19th to 21st June. This storm caused the loss of the 'Mulberry' harbour off the American sector, the stranding of 800 craft, and the almost complete cessation of unloading. Allied offensives planned for 22nd June were held up—half the British VIIIth Corps were still in their ships—and ammunition stocks became dangerously low.

The final decision to mount "Anvil" was made on 2nd July, when the success of the Normandy landing was assured. The main American argument was that the operation conformed to the principle of *concentration*. But this principle involves the concentration of force at the decisive time and place which the Riviera on 15th August was not. Moreover, it is hardly in accordance with the principle of *economy of force* to take seven divisions out of the line, keep them idle for weeks, and then to send them to land 500 miles from the main battle. "Anvil" was, in fact, an unnecessary detachment which the Germans were quick to take advantage of.

Though some slight advantage might have been obtained if the operation could have been launched at the same time as "Overlord"; there was nothing to be gained by launching it nine weeks later. In fact, "Anvil" not only wrecked Alexander's campaign in Italy, but contributed to the distortion of Allied strategy later in the war. Another reason for the American insistence on "Anvil," apart from their views on strategy, which differed from ours, was that they do not appear to have understood that war is a political instrument and that policy and strategy must go hand in hand. In his cable to the President on 1st July, the Prime Minister said: "The splitting up of the campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can do anything decisive, is, in my humble and respectful opinion, the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible."⁶

⁶ Quoted in *Grand Strategy*, Vol., V. H.M.S.O., p. 356.

APPENDIX I

ENEMY DIVISIONS IN FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIES, 6TH JUNE

Formation	Type				
	Panzer	Panzer Grenadier	Infantry	Coast Defence	Training
ARMY GROUP 'B' (Rommel) :					
88th Corps (Holland)	1	—	—	4	—
Fifteenth Army (incl. Antwerp to excl. R. Orne)	3	—	6	9	2
Seventh Army (R. Orne to R. Loire, both incl.)	3	—	7	8	—
ARMY GROUP 'G' (Blaskowitz) :					
First Army (Biscay Coast)	2	1	1	1	4
Nineteenth Army (Mediterranean Coast)	1	—	3	3	1
	10	1	17	25	7

Totals :

43 divisions north of the Loire.

17 divisions south of the Loire.

—
60

Notes :—

1. Panzer divisions were not under command of the army groups in whose areas they were positioned, except 21st Panzer which was at Rommel's disposal.
2. The 19th Panzer in Holland had just returned from Russia to refit and was probably little more than a cadre.
3. There were also some armoured elements east of Paris.

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF THE MEASURES TAKEN AND MEANS USED TO
GAIN SURPRISE IN THE LANDING

(a) *Secrecy*.—Strict security measures in units, especially as to time and place of the assault. All civilian travel between U.K. and Eire was stopped and restrictions placed on foreign diplomats; neither they nor their couriers were permitted to enter or leave the country and their mail was subject to censorship. In April, certain coastal areas were closed to all visitors.

(b) *Deception*.—Before D-Day, for every ton of bombs dropped on the coastal defences west of Havre, two tons were dropped on those of the Pas-de-Calais. Reconnaissance flights in the same proportion and interdiction targets were arranged to present a similar picture. Action against targets in the Pas-de-Calais continued after D-Day.

Dummy landing craft were kept concentrated in ports in South-East England where dummy roads and sidings were also laid down. Follow-up formations were stationed in the same part of the country and a dummy Headquarters, 21st Army Group, was opened at Dover through which messages were relayed.

Deception also aimed at persuading the enemy that the attack would come about six weeks later than the actual date selected.

C

(c) *Diversions*.—On the night preceding D-Day two forces of naval and air craft were employed in the Straits of Dover and off Cap d'Antifer, just north of Havre, to give the same appearance to enemy radar as that given by the real invasion flotillas. Dummy paratroops were dropped in three areas to cause confusion and delay.

(d) *Matériel*.—The use of artificial harbours to speed the build-up, and of special armoured fighting vehicles.

(To be concluded)

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA, 1940-41

By CAPTAIN S. W. ROSKILL, D.S.C., R.N. (RETD.)

"History has shown from time to time the fatal results of basing naval and military strategy on an insecure line of communications. Disaster is certain to follow."—ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicoe (1ST SEA LORD) TO SIR EDWARD CARSON (1ST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY), 27TH APRIL, 1917.

WITH the attention of the world again focused on that notorious storm centre generally described—if somewhat vaguely—as the Middle East, it may be of interest to recall what happened on the last occasion when the sea routes from western Europe by way of the Suez Canal were seriously threatened. On the outbreak of the 1939-45 War the British position in the Middle East depended chiefly on the mandate for Palestine, granted by the League of Nations in 1920, and on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Palestine mandate provided naval and military bases which were well placed to control the coastal waters of the Levant, and to keep watch on the overland routes to the west from the oil-bearing Mesopotamian countries; while the 1936 Treaty gave Britain the right to station forces in the Suez Canal Zone for 20 years, and for the Mediterranean Fleet to use Alexandria harbour. Taken together the two agreements assured a reasonably firm hold over waters through which ran shipping routes which were second only to the North Atlantic in importance to Britain. With Port Said, Suez, Haifa, and Alexandria available to her fleet—as well as the more remote bases of Malta and Aden—it was reasonable to suppose that, in the event of war with Germany, British maritime control could be adequately maintained. It was, however, considered probable that, if Italy joined her Axis partner, the through-Mediterranean route would have to be closed, and the main flow of shipping diverted round the Cape of Good Hope. This, however, would greatly increase the importance of maintaining control of the Red Sea, on which the supply and reinforcement of the whole Middle East theatre depended, against the Italian naval and air forces stationed in Eritrea.

In terms of geography the Italian position appeared strong; for they possessed quite good bases close off the flank of a shipping route from which virtually no deviation was possible. But geography is by no means the only consideration which influences the strength or weakness of a strategic position, and in other respects the cards were heavily stacked against the Italians. By his Abyssinian adventure of 1935 Mussolini had landed his country with a heavy military commitment, whose support depended entirely on a supply route which would certainly be cut on the day that his country went to war with Britain. When Italian troopships were pouring through the Suez Canal in 1934-35, to an accompaniment of mocking derision directed against the impassively watching crews of British warships, this writer protested to his captain regarding allowing passage to such plainly potential enemies. The captain (who later became a distinguished Flag Officer) replied, "Don't forget that every man Mussolini sends south of the canal will never fight us to the north of it." The events of 1940-41 were to fulfil that prescient remark very accurately; for Mussolini had in fact placed many thousands of his best troops, and an appreciable portion of his Navy and Air Force, in a position where they were merely hostages to British fortunes.

In 1939 the Red Sea was still part of the Royal Navy's East Indies Station, whose commander was Vice-Admiral R. Leatham. His forces comprised three

modern 6-inch cruisers, and seven escort vessels, four of which belonged to the Indian Navy.¹ As he was also responsible for the whole Indian Ocean, for the very important oil traffic from the Persian Gulf, and for the rapidly increasing number of ships bringing supplies to Suez up the East African coast his forces were certainly not excessive. Admiral Leatham's main base was at Trincomalee in Ceylon; but subsidiary bases were available, though very little developed, at Durban, Mombasa, Aden, and Bahrein, and useful fuelling points could be established in such islands as the Seychelles and Mauritius. The two main threats to the shipping in this vast area were German warship or disguised raiders operating in the ocean spaces, and the Italian surface ships, submarines, and aircraft stationed in Eritrea. It is with the latter that we are here chiefly concerned. The Italian Navy had seven fleet destroyers², two smaller destroyers³, four escort vessels, eight submarines⁴, and a number of motor torpedo-boats based on Massawa. There were 325 Italian aircraft of all types in East Africa, but 142 of them were in reserve and only a small proportion (about 36) consisted of modern bombers. Although air reinforcements could be flown in from Libya, stocks of fuel and spares were low; and once serious war operations started it was obviously going to be difficult to maintain efficiency and avoid a high rate of wastage. These favourable factors (from the British point of view) were, however, considerably offset by our weakness in the air. At Aden there were only one bomber, one fighter, and one reconnaissance squadron—and all of them were ill-equipped and under strength. Rather greater force was available in the Sudan, and the South African Air Force was slowly building up in Kenya; but it was certain that most of these aircraft would be needed to support the land operations, and it was optimistic to expect many to be diverted to a maritime rôle. Nor was it reasonable to look for reinforcements from the main theatre in Egypt, where the shortages were every bit as serious as in the south. The British Middle East commanders were, indeed, gravely concerned over the safety of the Red Sea route; for it was obvious that the Italian naval and air forces could do much damage to slow moving convoys, which had to traverse 1,300 miles of narrow waters from Aden to Suez, and whose movements could be so easily watched by the enemy that there could be no concealment.

From the outbreak of war until June, 1940, the East Indies Command was concerned mainly with the German surface raiders; but the disasters of June, 1940, in Europe wrought great changes in those distant waters as well as in every other theatre, and as it became clearer that France was about to drop out of the war and Italy to come in, attention at once became concentrated on the security of the Red Sea. On 24th May all sailings were stopped until convoys could be formed, and a division of four modern destroyers⁵, the anti-aircraft cruiser *Carlisle*⁶, and three sloops with good A.A. armaments came south through the Suez Canal to join the cruisers *Leander* (New

¹ The modern cruisers were soon transferred to other stations, and were gradually replaced by older ships. When Italy entered the war on 11th June, 1940, the East Indies Command had a polyglot fleet of Indian, Australian, and New Zealand warships as well as Royal Navy units.

² *Pantera*, *Leone*, *Tigre* (1,526 tons, eight 4.7-inch guns, four torpedo tubes), and *Battisti*, *Nullo*, *Sauro*, and *Manin* (1,058 tons, four 4.7-inch guns, four torpedo tubes).

³ *Orsini* and *Acerbi* (669 tons, six 4-inch guns, four torpedo tubes).

⁴ *Archimede*, *Ferraris*, *Galilei*, *Torricelli*, *Galvani*, *Guglielmotto*, *Maçalle*, *Perla*.

⁵ The *Kandahar*, *Kimberley*, *Khartoum*, and *Kingston* (1,690 tons, six 4.7-inch guns, 10 torpedo tubes).

⁶ The *Carlisle* was one of the first British ships to be fitted with a search radar set for air warning purposes.

Zealand Navy), *Liverpool*, and *Hobart* (Australian Navy). Together they formed the Red Sea Escort Force based on Aden, under Rear-Admiral A. J. L. Murray. Precautions were taken at the same time to deal with any attempt to block the Suez Canal.

As soon as the Red Sea forces had been strengthened an experimental convoy of one ship was sailed from Suez to Aden, and another in the reverse direction. As this trailing of the British coat aroused no enemy response, the organization and sailing of larger convoys were at once approved.

The flow of shipping towards Suez was meanwhile increasing enormously. Fighting men from Australia and New Zealand were carried to Bombay in the 'monster liners,' and there transferred to smaller ships to join BN (Bombay-Suez) convoys; and in August the famous series of WS convoys started to bring men and supplies out from Britain via the Cape at six-week intervals. But the strain on British shipping was acute; and as the Red Sea had been declared a 'Combat Zone' by President Roosevelt, thus forbidding the entry of American ships, no easement could be looked for from across the Atlantic. None the less contemporary statistics show that between August, 1940, and the end of the year some 126,000 men (76,000 from Britain and 49,000 from Bombay or beyond) were safely carried to Egypt.

On 16th June the Italian submarine *Galileo Galilei* drew first blood by sinking a Norwegian tanker in the Gulf of Aden. For two days she was pursued by escort vessels and aircraft, and when they were diverted to other duties a diminutive trawler, the *Moonstone*, was left on patrol. On the 19th the submarine surfaced and attempted to sink her last tormentor. The trawler, however, replied vigorously and successfully, hitting the *Galilei* in the conning tower and killing her captain. The submarine thereupon surrendered, and was towed into Aden in triumph.⁷ The valuable haul of documents recovered from her revealed the dispositions of four other Italian submarines, two of which were quickly accounted for. On 22nd June, Red Sea escort forces sank the *Torricelli*, and next day the sloop *Falmouth* destroyed the *Galvani* which was lying in ambush for tankers coming down the Persian Gulf. The *Macalle* had meanwhile run aground off Port Sudan and became a total loss. The four surviving submarines were thereupon recalled to Europe and reached German-occupied Bordeaux in May, 1941. The underwater threat to the Red Sea convoys was thus quickly eliminated. There remained the surface and air forces.

The early British convoys received a certain amount of attention from the Italian bombers, but their high-level attacks were singularly ineffective. Between June and December, 1940, the R.A.F. provided air escort to 54 convoys, in which only one ship was sunk by bombing and one other damaged. It was the small strength of the surface escort forces, which necessitated their running almost continuously, and the appalling heat of the Red Sea which produced the severest trials. Ships were relentlessly overdriven, and cases of exhaustion, and even of death from heat-stroke, were not uncommon among the crews. None the less they carried on. In August four convoys passed in both directions, in September five, and in October seven, comprising 158 ships, went safely through.

On the night of 20th-21st October four Italian destroyers attacked convoy BN.7 when it was about 150 miles east of Massawa, but the escort, which consisted

⁷ In *Che ha fatto la Marina?* Captain M. A. Bragadin says that the crew of the *Galilei* were overcome by poison fumes. This may well have been so, but it is certainly incorrect to say, as he does, that the *Moonstone* found her adrift.

of the 6-inch cruiser *Leander*, one fleet destroyer, and four sloops, struck back hard and vigorously. Early on the 21st action was joined, and the *Francesco Nullo* was driven ashore, to be subsequently destroyed by bombing. The convoy suffered no losses but the destroyer *Kimberley* was hit by shore batteries during the pursuit and had to be towed into Aden.

In January, 1941, the British land offensive against the Italian East African empire started from Kenya and the Sudan, and met with rapid success. Warships of the East Indies Station, and others which were on passage to the Mediterranean, joined in a series of combined operations by which valuable bases were seized as the Army advanced.

In February the ports of Kismayu and Mogadshu in Italian Somaliland were captured almost intact, and this simplified the task of supplying the advancing armies. Of the 16 Axis merchantmen sheltering in Kismayu all but one (the German ship *Tannenfels*) were captured, or scuttled themselves on interception; and many British Merchant Navy prisoners, who had been landed there by raiders, were released. On 16th March an amphibious force, which had been mounted at Aden, assaulted Berbera in British Somaliland, which the Italians had overrun in August, 1940. After a short preliminary bombardment by the cruisers and destroyers the landings were entirely successful, and within a few days supplies were pouring in through the port, primitive though its facilities were.

On the last day of March three of the remaining six Italian destroyers put to sea from Massawa to raid Suez roads. The *Leone*, however, ran aground and sank, whereupon the others returned. On 2nd April all five surviving ships sailed to attack Port Sudan. Their departure was reported by aircraft from Aden, and torpedo-bombers, which had just flown to Port Sudan from the aircraft carrier *Eagle* at Alexandria, at once attacked. They and R.A.F. bombers sank the *Sauro* and *Manin* on the 3rd; while the *Pantera* and *Tigre*, which had been located south of Jeddah, were destroyed after being run aground and abandoned. The fifth ship, the *Battisti*, had meanwhile developed a defect, and scuttled herself. Thus all the seven large Italian destroyers were accounted for*, and the solitary success achieved by the Italian surface ships was a torpedo hit by an M.T.B. on the old cruiser *Capetown*. She was safely towed into Port Sudan.

On 8th April Massawa fell, and three days later President Roosevelt declared the Red Sea to be no longer a 'Combat Zone.' Although the campaign did not end until the Italian surrender at Amba Alagi on 16th April, the main British objects had been achieved about a month earlier. The Red Sea traffic thereafter flowed to and fro virtually unhindered except for German bomber raids on Suez and attempts to mine the canal. After those threats had been countered the only further attempt to interrupt the traffic arose when German and Japanese submarines arrived in the southern approaches to the Red Sea early in 1944. They caused more serious losses than any previous enemy action; but they were finally defeated by the convoy escorts and by the location and destruction of the German U-boat supply ships *Charlotte Schliemann* and *Brake* in the southern Indian Ocean in February and March, 1944.

Though the Red Sea operations of 1940-41 were on a small scale compared with the campaigns in many other theatres, they merit attention for the lessons they contain. In the first place the stakes were, from the British point of view, very

* The two small destroyers *Orsini* and *Acerbi* were scuttled in Massawa harbour before its capture.

high. As serious interruption to the traffic would have brought complete disaster in the Middle East, it would have been well worth the enemy's while to concentrate his maximum effort against these convoys. The geographically strong Italian position was, however, greatly vitiated by the grave weakness of the communications on which their forces all depended; and it was the collapse on land which led to the final elimination of the danger at sea. On the British side the operations showed a classic adherence to historic principles. The air and naval forces, though slender, were correctly disposed, and they grasped their opportunities with relish and determination. Reinforcements, such as the additional destroyers at the beginning and the *Eagle's* torpedo-bombers at the end, were sent at exactly the right moment, and provided just what was needed. The flexibility of maritime power was thus fully exploited. The bases at Aden, Suez, and Port Sudan were sufficiently secure to support and supply the forces which relied on them; the balance between all the different instruments of maritime power—surface guns, flotilla vessels, reconnaissance and strike aircraft—was correctly struck. The sea transport needed to support the land operations with men and supplies was adequate to its task; and co-operation between the three Services involved was never marred by what Sir Julian Corbett called "the corrupting blight" of disagreements between commanders. Finally, the campaign demonstrated how, even in circumstances which initially appeared none too favourable for its application, the convoy system provided the answer to the need to carry great numbers of men and vast quantities of stores through waters over which maritime control was in dispute. The collapse of the Italian position in East Africa came hard on the heels of the failure of their offensive against Greece in November, 1940, and of Graziani's heavy defeats in the Western Desert in the two following months. Those three Allied successes together brought about the intervention of Germany in the Mediterranean theatre, which culminated finally in the surrender in Tunisia in May, 1943; and that led to Mussolini's abdication just before the Salerno landings in the following September. It is no exaggeration to say that had control of the Red Sea ever been lost, that pattern of victory could never have been achieved.

SUMMARY PUNISHMENT FOR WOMEN

By COLONEL J. M. COWPER, T.D.

(LATE WOMEN'S ROYAL ARMY CORPS.)

IT is now 40 years since the afternoon of 29th May, 1917, when Colonel J. B. Wroughton called on Mrs. Gwynne-Vaughan, now Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, G.B.E., LL.D., D.Sc., then Chief Controller of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps with the British Armies in France and Flanders. In his capacity of A.A.G. at G.H.Q., Colonel Wroughton had just heard of the latest developments in the discussions in the War Office about the system of control of the W.A.A.C. Although there were only a few hundred women in France the matter was of considerable importance as the Corps was to build up there to a strength of 12,000.

Five months had passed since the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had first been asked whether he was prepared to accept women in replacement of men on the lines of communication, and he had agreed on condition that they should "come out under their own officers." This had been the basis on which the conditions of service had originally been worked out, but it had raised a storm of protest from the civil servants who insisted that all questions of employment of women with the Army should be related to the civilian rather than military customs of the time. Particularly did they object to the suggestion that women should be graded as officers for performing duties which they considered to be analogous to those of G.P.O. supervisors or catering manageresses.

So urgent had been the need for additional labour in France that the creation of the Corps was not delayed for these differences to be resolved. Two chief controllers were appointed in February, one at the War Office and one in France, a depot was formed in London for drafting the women overseas, and the first draft disembarked at Boulogne on 31st March. A.C.I. 537 of 1916 authorized the formation of the Corps but provided so little guidance on administration that although such things as pay, holidays, and notice of discharge were all based on civilian usage, the wording was sufficiently vague to enable G.H.Q. to organize the women in France in a military manner.

It was not until 25th May that it was finally decided that the Corps was to be extended to the United Kingdom. It was to be enrolled, uniformed, and accommodated in War Department property but in every other respect it was to be civilian. When these conditions were worked out it was proposed that the members of the Corps should be regulated under the Defence of the Realm Act. Absentees would be liable to be sentenced to anything up to six months' imprisonment with or without hard labour and/or a fine not exceeding £100. Up to this time members of the W.A.A.C. had been sworn in, but this was now abolished and the enrolment form was no more than a civil contract in which a woman agreed to accept certain punishments if she offended against the regulations. No women officers were to be appointed but "officials," graded as administrators, deputy administrators, and assistant administrators, would be in charge of detachments. Controllers were also to be appointed to Commands at home and certain areas and base ports overseas. These officials were to be empowered to stop leave, restrict privileges, and admonish. Fines were only to be imposed by the officer commanding the establishment with which the woman worked, and these were limited to 2s. 6d. for the first offence, 5s. for the second and 7s. 6d. for the third. 'Subordinate appointments' of forewomen and assistant forewomen were also authorized.

There were no special provisions for service overseas, where the women were automatically subject to military law as camp followers, under the conditions of Section 184 of the Army Act. This dealt with liability to trial by Court Martial in circumstances where their behaviour constituted a danger to the Army, but there was no means of dealing with any offence between this and trivial misdemeanour. It was presumed that those who could not be disciplined in France would be reverted to the United Kingdom where they could be brought before a civil magistrate.

The experience gained during the two months during which women had already been employed in France had confirmed the opinion of those who thought that the administration of the W.A.A.C. should follow as closely as possible that of the men whom they replaced. Only in this way had problems of supply, hygiene, canteen facilities, and general control in the highly organized life of a military base been resolved. No regulations had as yet been published, but it seemed desirable to produce some at once as it would be more difficult after the War Office regulations appeared to include many of the disciplinary measures wanted. After some discussion Colonel Wroughton went back to G.H.Q. with a sheaf of rough notes.

Two days later Mrs. Gwynne-Vaughan was summoned to G.H.Q. to meet the two A.A.Gs. and the Judge-Advocate-General, to agree the final draft of the regulations for the W.A.A.C. in France. She recorded in her diary that they were all "very friendly and willing to embody suggestions whenever practicable in proper language and get things on military lines." The discussions went on until after 6.30 p.m. but the resulting regulations were signed by the A.G., printed that night, and distributed in a matter of hours. It was therefore possible when the War Office draft arrived officially a few days later to reply that the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had found it necessary to publish his own which could not now be changed.

As these had been drawn up in the full knowledge of what was proposed by the War Office they did not have to be altered when A.C.I. 1069 of 1917 was published on 7th July, the difference between the administration in Great Britain and France being more a matter of attitude than anything else. There were rules about dress and badges, bounds, smoking, consumption of alcohol, and other details, but the most important concerned the method of maintaining discipline. The responsibility for doing so was vested in the Chief Controller, who was to publish standing and routine orders. She and her controllers and administrators were described as being comparable with the army ranks of officers, the new grades of forewomen and assistant forewomen were equivalent to non-commissioned officers, and it was laid down that members of the W.A.A.C. were normally to associate only with ranks appropriate to their grade.

The Chief Controller was to delegate to her subordinates the power to deal with minor punishments and the provisions about the imposition of fines by field officers were at first omitted from the regulations. This was partly because of the inadequacy of the punishment and partly because all concerned realized how much an administrator would lose face if she had to refer minor questions of indiscipline to an outside authority. In practice the fines had to be introduced later, not because of anything which happened in France, but because the War Office refused to authorize the reversion to Home Establishment of a woman who had not been awarded the maximum punishment. This entailed catching her four times before she could be sent home, where she had to offend again before she could be prosecuted. Although the majority of W.A.A.Cs. were keen, enthusiastic, and patriotic girls whose worst 'crime' was high spirits, there were a few whose motives in going to France were

more questionable. Among them was one who apparently belonged to an ancient profession and hoped to find a happy hunting ground on the lines of communication. Her method was to slip out of camp after Roll Call and she exercised considerable ingenuity in doing so. The unfortunate administrators had to catch her three times before the maximum fine could be imposed, and yet again before she could be reverted. The field officers had to hear such cases, but they were generally most reluctant to do so. It was a great relief to all concerned when, over a year later, the ruling was altered and W.A.A.C. officials were empowered to impose fines.

Under the General Instructions published on 1st June for the W.A.A.C. in France, Mrs. Gwynne-Vaughan was to draw up Standing Orders. She was deeply conscious of the women's own desire for justice and for a code that they could understand. When she visited a unit she had always made a practice of inspecting the women on parade, usually when they returned to camp after their day's work. She addressed them and asked if they had any complaints and more than once she wrote in her diary that some "sensible" questions had been asked. She still vividly remembers one occasion when a woman stepped forward to complain that she had been punished too severely for being late for Roll Call. The added comment that the men with whom she worked had told her that nothing like that could have happened to them strengthened the Chief Controller's determination to see that justice was administered to a member of the W.A.A.C. in the same way as to a soldier.

In the draft Standing Orders which were left at G.H.Q. for approval on 6th June, the Chief Controller delegated her power to admonish, to restrict privileges, and to order additional fatigues to both controllers and administrators, but she kept the power to stop leave in her own hands. She also ordered the introduction of conduct sheets.

Owing to the fact that the Chief Controller, War Office, arrived in France on 6th June to pay a liaison visit to the British Armies in France, Mrs. Gwynne-Vaughan had no opportunity to go back to G.H.Q. to discuss her Standing Orders again and there was an interregnum between the publication of the General Instructions by G.H.Q. and the delegation of powers to controllers and administrators. During this period, on 13th June, the first recorded punishment was awarded by the Chief Controller to two young women who had been seen talking to officers in a *pâtisserie*, in contravention of General Instructions. At the time there was no possible legal justification for the punishments awarded. They depended on the re-enrolment of each worker under the A.C.I., on an enrolment form containing a clause in which she agreed to accept them, but at this time the A.C.I. had not even been published. Certainly no one had been re-enrolled and some time was to elapse before any of them did so. All the same the code was accepted and stood the test of time, based as it was on the same principles as those governing the award of summary punishment to the men.

During her visit to France the Chief Controller, War Office, began to appreciate the reasons for the objections to the proposed A.C.I., but neither she nor anyone else was able to change its essential character. When it was published it was intended that the cooks, waitresses, and drivers of the voluntary organization called the Women's Legion should all transfer to it, as well as the civilian clerks in the various departments in the War Office and elsewhere. These already numbered some thousands and, although the strength of the Corps in France was going up by some 30 a day, the number of cooks and drivers in the United Kingdom was also increasing. It was always likely to exceed the strength abroad and the A.C.I. was therefore more directly concerned with conditions at home than with those overseas.

In order that the new legal code should be binding, all women already enrolled in the W.A.A.C. were obliged to re-enrol. In most cases they did so as a matter of routine, particularly the domestic workers whose pay was not affected. But re-enrolment also entailed other changes, the most important of which was the pay of clerks. Hitherto their rate of pay had been based on that of similar clerks in civil life, and was calculated on a 48-hour week. Overtime was admissible, but where the C.O. thought it desirable he could average the hours worked in a normal week and authorize a flat rate of pay equal to what it would have been had those hours actually been worked and overtime paid. Most of the women in France were working very long hours and their pay, calculated in this way, was very much higher than under the new A.C.I. The normal rates paid were now higher than those earned by civilians but no overtime was allowed.

There were also many women on whom the old swearing-in ceremony had made a deep impression. They regarded the new form of enrolment as being less military and they preferred to remain on the old engagement. For either or both of these reasons a number continued to resist transfer until October, when the War Office ruled that only those who had re-enrolled would be eligible for promotion. By the end of the year few remained on the original terms of service and almost all had accepted the position of civilian subordinates.

Minor changes took place during the remaining three years of the existence of the Corps but, even after it was honoured by H.M. The Queen in April, 1918, and became Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps, it was never integrated with the Army. Nor was the Auxiliary Territorial Service any more part of the Army on its formation in 1938. It remained for another manpower crisis to bring this about in 1940/41, when it was necessary to employ women in anti-aircraft batteries. Then, and then only, did the A.T.S. become part of His Majesty's armed forces, and brought under a modified form of military law. So well did the Service acquit itself that it was redesignated in 1949, and as the Women's Royal Army Corps became an integral part of the Regular Army.

The A.T.S. also provided the model for the women's services of the world and the W.A.A.C. can therefore claim with some justification to be the pioneers who showed the way to all parts of the Commonwealth, to those countries of western Europe, and even to those behind the iron curtain, where women's services exist today.

MARLBOROUGH'S WARS—II

By MAJOR E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C. (RETD.)

XVIIIth CENTURY ARMIES

THE armies of the early XVIIIth Century were in many ways the prototypes of those of the modern period. The pike was still an essential weapon of close combat during the Thirty Years War and our own Civil War, but was at last superseded as an infantry weapon, after an honourable history of over 2,000 years. Even after the general adoption of firearms, it remained indispensable because of their slowness, short range, and unreliability, which made it impossible for unsupported musketeers to hold their ground against an infantry or cavalry charge.

The matchlock musket was a very defective weapon; its user had to keep his match constantly alight or smouldering if he was not to be caught helplessly unready for action by a surprise attack; and the glow gave away his position at night, and prevented secret movement of any kind under cover of darkness. Rain, snow, and high wind made it difficult for him to light his match and keep it alight, and often disarmed him in the face of an enemy attacking with the *arme blanche*. The matchlock was moreover a long, heavy, and clumsy weapon, slow to load and difficult to handle; but as the early models of the weapon which superseded it, the flintlock, were even less reliable, it remained the standard infantry firearm until improved flintlock muskets were invented.

Cavalry had from the first used flintlock pistols, by reason of the special difficulty in kindling and keeping alight the match for men on horseback; and troops raised as artillery guards were also armed with flintlocks, because of the danger that a spark from a match might explode the powder in the magazines. By the end of the XVIIth Century an improved pattern of flintlock, known as the 'fusil,' had come into general use in all armies; it was a lighter and hardier weapon than the matchlock and fired a reduced calibre bullet.

Before the end of the Thirty Years War moreover, an *arme blanche*, known as a 'bayonet' because it was first manufactured on a large scale at Bayonne in southern France, was devised to be plugged into the muzzle of the musket for fighting at close quarters. The disadvantage that the weapon could not then be used as a firearm was overcome by the invention in the last decade of the XVIIth Century of a socket bayonet fastened by a spring to the side of the barrel. The musketeer now had no more need of the pikemen to defend him; and before the opening of Marlborough's wars infantry was armed only with firearms and bayonets, much as at the present time.

Even so, the musket remained a ponderous and unreliable piece, and took a long time and many complicated motions to load and discharge. In order therefore to be sure of maintaining a sufficient volume of fire to check the rush of an assailant, it was necessary to form the infantry in a series of successive lines in considerable depth, so that one of the lines should be constantly ready to fire while the others were preparing to do so. As the efficiency of the weapon improved, it became possible to reduce this depth to one of four or three ranks, and eventually to introduce volley firing in place of the individual action of earlier days, when the matchlock men required much elbow room to handle their clumsy and dangerous weapons. There was little point in Marlborough's day in formations of more than four deep, for the men of any rank above this number could neither take part in the volley firing nor use their bayonets in defence.

The abolition of the two separate categories of infantryman considerably simplified tactical methods. In the days of the pikemen and the musketeers one half of the force was always out of action; the pikeman was idle while firing was going on, and the musketeer could play no part when matters came to push of pike. This involved a series of complicated problems as to the proportions of one category of infantry to the other and the best methods of combining their action on the battlefield; and the generals must have been glad to be relieved of these difficulties by the disappearance of pikes and the arrival of the all-purposes soldier, who could both use firepower and carry on the fight to a finish at close quarters.

The cavalry also changed considerably in the period between the Thirty Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession. Armour had been gradually discarded, and now finally disappeared save for the helmet and in certain units the cuirass; and the lance having also become obsolete, swords or sabres, pistols, and carbines or musketoons now formed the cavalry armament. Dragoons who carried the infantry musket and bayonet and could fight either on horseback or on foot, were increasing in numbers in every army; together with light horse for reconnaissance and outpost work, they now formed the bulk of the cavalry. There were also units of cuirassiers and horse grenadiers in some armies.

Artillery ceased to be, as it had been hitherto, merely a trade union of specialized cannoners and became an integral part of the army. Its matériel was lightened and rendered more mobile, though the teams were still handled by civilian drivers. Its efficiency too was improved by better methods of manufacture. Its range and power, however, were still very limited; it fired only ball ammunition, and was of little effect against earthworks or fortress walls. Against these, mortars firing explosive bombs were normally employed; but as these had little penetrative power, much of the effect was wasted in the air or the surface walls of the defences. As the field artillery had only a short range and low trajectory, it could take part only in the preliminaries of an action and was of little service once the opposing infantry or cavalry had come to close combat; but its effect could be considerable against solid formations advancing to the attack or standing to fight in defence.

MOBILIZATION AND ASSEMBLY OF XVIIITH CENTURY ARMIES

An XVIIIth Century army was generally assembled for a campaign in an area round a fortress, which had been stocked beforehand with supplies to serve as a base depot. Its camps were laid out by the headquarters staff officers and other staff officers representing the various arms, accompanied by a strong escort, which established guards and outposts and made reconnaissances to ensure that the main body could march up and settle into the camp uninterrupted by the enemy.

The camp was laid out in lines, infantry in two lines in the centre, cavalry on both wings; 40 or 50 paces of front were allowed for each cavalry squadron and 100 paces for each infantry battalion, with its second line 300 or 400 paces in rear. The artillery with its special permanent infantry escort camped 400 paces in front of the main lines of the army. The supply park was situated to the rear, and baked and issued bread rations every four days. Each battalion mounted its own guard and held a piquet in support of it for emergency. A line of cavalry and infantry posts surrounded the camp on all sides at a distance of about a mile and a half to give early warning of hostile approach, the ground between the posts being frequently patrolled both by day and night. The rude extemporized huts formerly thrown up as shelters for the men in camp gave place to tents. The general officers, working on a roster of daily duty, supervised the security arrangements; orders were issued daily to representatives of all units attending for them at army headquarters.

AN XVIIITH CENTURY ARMY ON THE MARCH

An XVIIIth Century army on the march would, to a spectator, bear more resemblance to the British Eighth Army in the Western Desert in the last war than to one moving in a European theatre. The roads, though much inferior as to surface, were wider than those of today, and there were fewer obstacles in the way of hedges, fences, or ditches in the surrounding countryside. The army therefore could march in a close bundle of columns, the artillery and transport on the road itself, with columns of infantry on either flank, and the cavalry forming the two outer columns. Pioneers moved at the head of each column to prepare passages over any obstacles which might be encountered, and to make the roads passable at bad places, which were frequently met with. A screen of cavalry, usually dragoons, preceded and screened the advance. The order of march was governed by the order of battle, an army deploying to the front on meeting the enemy automatically finding itself in fighting order, with the infantry in the centre and the mounted troops on the wings. Marches under these conditions tended to be slow, short, and toilsome for the troops; but as conditions were the same for both sides, this low rate of mobility did not normally work to the serious disadvantage of either, though it was one of the causes of the campaigns being deliberate and long drawn out.

THE XVIIITH CENTURY BATTLE

An army's advance to battle was normally made in as many columns as possible so as to facilitate deployment, which was always a slow and methodical process. The leading troops of each column formed the front line, and those following them the support and reserve. Units still had to be aligned at close intervals so as to prevent any hostile penetration between them, though the advantages of a longer line than that of the enemy, which would give opportunity for outflanking him, were recognized. It was desirable to rest a wing, if possible, on some difficult or impassable feature of ground, or on a village which could be prepared for stubborn defence. The distance between lines varied from 300 to 600 yards, short enough for the second line and reserves to afford the front line rapid support, but not so short as to expose them prematurely to hostile fire.

The XVIIth Century practice of intermingling cavalry and infantry units in the battle order had gone out of use; two lines of infantry now formed the centre, with the cavalry, also in two lines, massed on either wing and a small reserve in rear of both infantry and cavalry. The artillery was drawn up in front of the line and opened the engagement as soon as it reached the ground and took up position, so as to cover the deployment of its own forces and hinder that of the enemy; but as soon as the armies began to close on each other it had to cease fire, and its opportunities for further useful service were limited by the weight of its guns and the impossibility of moving them quickly.

The advance of the infantry and cavalry was carried out at a slow and steady pace, with frequent halts to correct the alignment of the units. Firing during the advance was forbidden, as experience showed that it was neither accurate nor effective and led to disorder among the troops, who, once they had halted to fire, could seldom be induced to advance again. When the two battle lines confronted each other face to face at point blank range, the effect of the exchange of fire was very great, and resulted in an almost instantaneous mutual infliction of crippling casualties; but it frequently happened that one side or the other would open fire at longer ranges, that the other would halt to reply, and that a fire fight would take place at a distance where many shots would fly too high or too low and the losses would be less severe.

The fire of the British infantry was recognized by all its opponents as being more sustained and deadly than that of other troops, because it was delivered, not, as was elsewhere usual, by whole ranks, but by platoons, every third platoon firing, while the other two loaded and prepared to fire. This system had the advantage that firing never ceased completely, as was the case when the whole of one rank fired, and that throughout the line there were always some units loaded and ready to meet any sudden emergency.

When victory had declared itself, the beaten side could usually get its troops clear and reform them at a short distance from the field, because the first act of the opposing commander would be to rally and reconstruct his disordered line of battle lest his units should become scattered in reckless pursuit. It was rare for a victory to be so rapidly and relentlessly exploited as was Marlborough's at Ramillies; the conquest of two whole provinces and the capitulation of half a dozen powerful fortresses as the fruits of this battle showed what could be accomplished by a genius who could see and seize an opportunity, rare under the military procedure of the time.

THE FRENCH ARMY IN MARLBOROUGH'S DAY

The military policy of the great King of France, Louis XIV, was a continuation and completion of that which Richelieu had laid down and begun to carry out during the final period of the Thirty Years War. In order to strengthen the centralized royal control of the army, the ancient office of constable, who had been practically an independent commander-in-chief, was abolished, and his duties were divided between a number of marshals of France, each with his own army and administrative services, but all responsible directly to the monarch, who exercised control through the Minister of War. Louis XIV's Minister, the Marquis of Louvois, remained in office for 25 years, and the French army which the Allies encountered in the War of the Spanish Succession was his handiwork. The original small standing force comprised only a handful of mounted gendarmerie and six infantry regiments, and had to be supplemented in time of war by extemporized units raised by the princes and nobles. Louvois increased the standing army and organized a hierarchy of command. Each marshal of France had a number of lieutenant-generals and quarter-master-generals under him; semi-permanent brigades were instituted, with the senior unit commander as brigadier; and inspector-generals and staffs were appointed to ensure uniformity of armament, equipment, and training. A central roster for promotion and appointments was drawn up, an intelligence service and a mapping board were organized, and the military code of law was revised. These measures soon proved their value by results; Louvois's new model French army proved itself the best in Europe. It was large; it cost a great deal of money; and it made a heavy call on the manpower resources of the country. But it made France the greatest military power on the Continent, and young officers in every country who aspired to learn the art of war came to serve with it in the field. Among these apprentices was Marlborough himself, and he was proud to win praise from Marshal Turenne, the greatest soldier of his day.

The work of Louvois in reforming France's army was supplemented by that of Marshal Vauban, who remodelled France's defences. Put in charge of the country's fortresses and engineers in the middle of the XVIIth Century, he served on into the early years of the War of the Spanish Succession; and in the course of this long career he provided the frontiers and coasts of his country with an armour of fortresses impregnable against anything but deliberate, prolonged, and massive attack. His triple belt of fortresses along the northern frontiers retained its value for a century after his death. Moreover Vauban was as much a master in the attack of fortresses

as in their design and defence, and his method of sapping forward by means of successive lines of parallel trenches joined up by covered communication trenches continued to be practised right up to the end of the XIXth Century, and formed the basis of the trench system of the 1914-18 war.

It was thus against a fully worthy foe that Marlborough made his great military reputation in the war of the Spanish Succession.

MARLBOROUGH'S ARMY

The New Model Army formed in the latter part of the Civil War in Britain was, for its size, as good as any in Europe at that time, but it was disbanded on the restoration of the monarchy after the interlude of the Commonwealth and Cromwell's Protectorate. During this period it was the main instrument of government, and made itself so unpopular with the mass of the people that Charles II was allowed only a few regiments of horse and foot, because even the Royalist Parliament was unwilling to provide him with a force which might again be used for political purposes. James II's increase of the army at the time of his attempt to secure toleration for his fellow-Catholics notably increased this feeling of distrust; and so when, after the revolution which brought William III to the throne, war broke out between Britain and France, the army was too small to deal simultaneously with the adherents of James II in Scotland and Ireland, and the powerful French armies operating against William's native country, Holland, which was Britain's Ally. Our military record in this war was respectable, but not brilliant; and at its end the same policy was followed of drastically reducing the army, though fortunately the cadres of most of the existing units were retained.

Consequently, when the War of the Spanish Succession broke out only five years later, Britain could once more put only a few thousand men into the field, and had to resort to the intensive process of raising new units and reforming the cadre regiments, which has marked the beginning of all her wars to a time within our own memories. Moreover the demands on the army were in inverse ratio to its size; it had to find units to serve as marines on board the ships of the fleet, which could not put to sea without them; it had to garrison Ireland in force to guard against a Jacobite rebellion; and it had to furnish a contingent for the army sent to the Spanish peninsula to secure the throne of Spain for the Allies' candidate, Archduke Charles of Austria. All these calls left but a small residue available for service with the main Allied army in the Low Countries, to the command of which Marlborough had been appointed; and the troops necessary to make it up to an effective strength had therefore to be found from elsewhere.

If Britain had an insufficiency of soldiers, she was wealthy and was prepared to spend her wealth lavishly in subsidies to any ruler who would supply soldiers to the anti-French cause. There was no lack of clients for these subsidies, for every petty German princeling and every king in northern Europe maintained an army far too large for his territory and its population, partly for purposes of prestige, and partly so as to be able to turn an honest penny by hiring them out to wealthy but ill-prepared Powers who might, as Britain now did, find themselves at war without the manpower to pursue it. Thus two-thirds of Marlborough's army were made up of mercenary troops, paid for by Britain, and often misleadingly described as British by contemporary writers, but actually furnished by princes who had little or no reason to fight in the anti-French coalition and regarded the war merely as a profitable business transaction. From their point of view, the main object was to see that they got their money punctually, that they got as much of it as they could

persuade Britain to pay, and that they did no more than they had undertaken to do in return for it.

Much of Marlborough's time, particularly in the Winter between campaigns, had therefore to be spent in touring the capitals of these petty potentates, and cajoling them to furnish all the men for whom they were receiving payment and to get them into the field in good time and at the right place for the ensuing campaign. It was work which only he could do, and he accomplished it with the utmost patience and resourcefulness. The heterogeneous composition of his polyglot army, however, did not make for easy working on campaign. It proved impossible to develop any general system of organization, because all the little contingents of varying size and strength had to be kept together under their own commanders, who administered them in the field and in quarters and led them in battle. Again, the troops of one nation could not be put under a commander of another without constant friction over questions of relative rank, the chain of command, and the right to issue orders.

Marlborough's British troops were normally organized in an infantry and a cavalry wing, and each of these wings into two lines. In the infantry wing there were three brigades, each of from three to five battalions, and in the cavalry wing two brigades, each of eight to 12 squadrons. Upon occasions foreign units, both cavalry and infantry, would be found brigaded with British units, but this was exceptional.

The British artillery, apart from the light guns which were allotted to infantry battalions and worked by their personnel, consisted of pieces varying from 6 pounders to 18 pounders, forming the field artillery, and of heavier siege guns from 24 to 36 or even 60 pounders, though these last were seldom used on account of their weight and unhandiness. The engineers were drawn mainly from civil sources, though some officers with engineering knowledge could be seconded from infantry regiments for temporary duty if needed. British troops were therefore ill-suited for siege work, and Marlborough found himself, as Wellington did in the Peninsular War, much handicapped by their ineffectiveness in that important branch of the military art.

The British Army, as Marlborough found it, had all the makings of a first class army, but it needed his genius actually to form it into one. He did so mainly by means of a constant watchfulness and careful arrangements for its well-being in the field; as one of his officers wrote, he "secured the affections of his soldiers by his good nature, his care for their provisions, and his vigilance not to expose them to unnecessary dangers." Although he kept strict order he also appealed to his men's better natures; "his camps were like a well-governed city and much more mannerly." Women camp followers were banished; Divine Service was regularly performed; and a high standard of discipline was maintained. Marlborough's army was "the best academy in the world to teach a young gentleman; and the poor soldiers, who were, too many of them, the refuse and dregs of the nation, after one or two campaigns, became by the care of their officers and by good order and discipline, tractable, civil, orderly, sensible, and clean, and had an air and spirit above the vulgar."

Marlborough's unremitting care of his troops—a peculiarly personal care, for he had only a small staff to assist him, and had to see to and do nearly everything for himself—thus made them into an army ready and able to go anywhere and do anything under a commander who looked after them assiduously on the march and in quarters, and whom they could trust to lead them to victory on every battlefield.

(Concluded.)

PEDESTRIAN SAILOR

By "C.H.W."

EARLY in the year 1820 a naval officer made what must surely be one of the most remarkable land journeys ever performed. In the years following the final downfall of Napoleon in 1815 there were, of course, many officers for whom the Admiralty could find no employment. Captain John Dundas Cochrane, Royal Navy, was one of these officers on half pay and with little chance of being again employed afloat, at least for the time being.

He had entered the Service in 1790 at the tender age of ten. For the next 25 years the Navy was at war practically the whole time. It is not surprising, then, that finding himself ashore and with little likelihood of a job, he found life somewhat tame. He went off on an extensive walking tour through France, Spain, and Portugal. There was perhaps nothing very remarkable in that journey, although it would certainly have been an arduous affair in those days, particularly as he lived hard and cheaply.

His next effort, however, surely gives him a claim to fame as a pedestrian. It was a journey, *mainly on foot*, from Dieppe in France to Kamchatka in far eastern Siberia. This amazing journey was undertaken entirely on his own account; he had no special authority from the government except leave of absence for two years granted by the Admiralty. Previously, Cochrane had written to the Secretary of the Admiralty offering to make a journey into what was then the unknown interior of Africa to ascertain the course of the River Niger. My Lords not unnaturally turned down this idea; exploration into the heart of great continents being hardly their concern.

Cochrane considered himself to be capable of performing such a journey and he was certainly what we would today call 'tough.' At the beginning of the book which he subsequently wrote he mentioned that he was used to fatigue and privations, that he "had been roasted in some of the worst corners of the West Indies during a period of ten years without, I might say, a headache." He also stated that he had made two marches from Quebec to Lake Ontario (a distance of 300 miles or more) "in company with six hundred seamen, whose wry faces and swollen feet told me I was more of a pedestrian traveller than they."

His idea of exploring the Niger having fallen through, he decided at once on the more ambitious scheme mentioned above. To quote again from his book, "I determined to undertake a journey, varying only the object and the scene, . . . viz; to travel round the globe as nearly as can be done by land, crossing from Northern Asia to America at Bering's Straights. I also determined to perform the journey on foot, for the best of all possible reasons, that my finances allowed of no other." In the event, he omitted the American part of the journey, returning to Europe by again traversing Siberia.

Cochrane wasted no time on his preparations. His unsuccessful letter to the Admiralty had been written in January, 1820. In mid-February, having procured such documents as were necessary and having packed his knapsack with things he considered requisite to enable him to wander on foot around three-quarters of the world, he left London and landed in Dieppe.

On 14th February, 1820, with his knapsack on his back, he commenced his long walk, proceeding along the road to Paris, via Rouen. He remained several days in Paris waiting for his passports, "for which", he remarks, "no less than

seven signatures and as many francs were required." Leaving Paris on 20th February, he set his course to the eastward with the intention of crossing the Rhine at Frankfurt. He described several of the towns through which he passed: Château-Thierry, St. Dizier, Nancy, Metz, and Saarbrücken. On entering Germany he confessed to feeling somewhat depressed as he was in a strange country and ignorant of its language, but he was cheered at the sight of a small country pub, which reminded him of England. He wrote "... the country inn, with its tap and its red-faced landlord, cheering fire, plenty of good beer, tobacco, a smoky room with boisterous guests all in high dispute on politics and keeping up Saturday night, were truly acceptable to a cold, dispirited traveller." He had walked no less than 40 miles from Metz that day. In the town of Alzey the landlord of the inn refused him shelter because he was no more than a foot traveller, so he slept in a barn that night "in perfect content upon clean straw."

Cochrane lived 'hard' on his travels, and this part of his journey in cold, wet weather and a good deal of snow gave him a foretaste of what he was in for in Siberia. Passing through Mainz (he wrote it Mayence) he at length entered the "free and independent city of Frankfurt." Carrying on north-eastward he recorded that the month of March brought much snow and that the road was in a dreadful state, and so were his feet. He arrived one evening at Potsdam, having walked 30 miles that day.

The British Minister in Berlin helped him to find accommodation and he stayed a few days in that city, and the Russian Ambassador there kindly gave him blank passports for whatever route he might prefer in Russia. Alas, modern 'progress' has put an end to all that sort of courtesy.

He found the road from Berlin to Stettin (now Szczecin) was through bleak and uncultivated country. From Stettin he walked to Dantzic (now Gdansk) in cheerless wintry weather. On the way he unwittingly committed an unusual offence, for in the town of Schlawa he was taken before the magistrates charged with "smoking in the streets"! After a short stay in Dantzic he proceeded on his way, reinforced with a strong pair of English boots. In three days he reached Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) and from there went on to Memel (Klaipeda), travelling under very severe and hard weather conditions. On along the coast to Libau (Liepaja), by which time he had entered the Russian Empire, he then turned inland towards Mitau (Jelgava) and on to Riga. This part of the journey was in company with a Mr. Robson and was done in his carriage. Shortly after leaving Riga they parted company as their routes lay in different directions. Cochrane was now for the first time alone in Russia.

Trudging on, he overtook the St. Petersburg (Leningrad) waggon, but its pace was too slow for him so he carried on on foot. He reached Dorpat (Tartu) considerably fatigued, having walked about 40 miles that day. At a place called Narwa he met a coloured man who was returning to St. Petersburg with two of his employer's carriages and who kindly offered the pedestrian a lift. Seeing Cochrane's name on his passport and asking if he were related to Admiral Cochrane, it turned out that this coloured friend had been his father's and his uncle's servant in the West Indies! This was surely a remarkable coincidence. At noon on 30th April they reached St. Petersburg, 83 days from London, a distance of about 1,600 miles at an average speed of nearly 20 miles a day.

Cochrane called on Sir Daniel Bailey, the British Consul-General in St. Petersburg, who was able to obtain for him a permit from the Emperor to pass through the Russian Empire, and an order to all governors and persons in authority to assist

the traveller. An open order to the police not to interfere with nor to molest him was also supplied. The Emperor kindly enquired if Cochrane needed any money, and how much, and although he replied that he needed none he was told that in case of such necessity he was to apply to the respective governors on his route. One wonders if it would be possible to arrange such generous help nowadays in any country.

On 24th May, 1820, he left St. Petersburg on the road to Moscow. Shortly after passing a place called Tosna two armed robbers took practically everything he had, including his trousers and, what was a worse loss, the good stout boots he had obtained in Dantzic. The local military offered to clothe him, but he refused and went on to Novgorod barefooted and wearing one of his three remaining garments as a sort of kilt. At Novgorod he was fitted out by a gentleman to whom he had a letter of introduction. This kind friend refused any payment.

Later, after passing Torjoch, he was very surprised and pleased to hear himself addressed from a carriage, in English and by name. It was a Mr. Hippines, who had been on the lookout for him. Pressing on to Moscow he walked all day and much of the night. The last 32 hours must have seen one of his greatest pedestrian efforts, for he claimed to have covered about 96 miles in that time!

On eastward he went through Vladimir and Pavlovo to Nijni-Novgorod (now Gorki). The weather was by now very hot, but in spite of this he made some remarkable marches of between 30 and 40 miles in a day. At one place he was again in trouble for smoking in the village.

From Nijni-Novgorod he went aboard a big lighter bound down the River Volga to Kazan, a distance of about 200 miles. This took 12 days! He then got a lift by road to a place called Perm, a further 300 miles, so was for the time being no longer a pedestrian. He needed a bit of a 'stand easy' by then.

Now he was approaching the great Ural mountain range, the boundary between Europe and Asia. He crossed the mountains on foot and soon reached Ekatherinebourg (as he spelt it. It is now Sverdlovsk). He had entered Siberia with some foreboding but was agreeably surprised to find that the road was excellent and the inhabitants clean and good-natured. They were most hospitable, and flatly refused to accept any money for the food they gave him.

Tumen, a town of some 8,000 people, he found to be a depot of the Russian-American Company. His next important stop was at Tobolsk, a large and ancient city and at one time the capital of all Siberia. Here he stayed three days, having a new knapsack made and deciding on the route he would attempt. The local governor supplied him with a Cossack as escort and an order for horses if he should need them.

They started out on the road to Omsk, passing many Tartar villages which were "neat and clean, and the inhabitants comfortable, hospitable, and contented." Cochrane recorded that they arrived at Ishim at four in the evening "in a torrent of rain, much fatigued, and my Cossack more so; he was in fact perfectly useless." On this part of his journey the greatest possible misfortune befell him. His passport, papers, and other protections in Siberia were stolen while he was having a meal. Thus he was suddenly deprived of all testimony of himself, his connections, and the object of his journey. It was a terrible blow. Fortunately, however, he was able to make the authorities at Omsk understand his loss, and they managed to recover the precious papers for him, for which he was, of course, most grateful.

On he pushed to Semipalatinsk, mainly on foot but occasionally on horseback. At this place, and several others, he mentions military schools "on the Lancasterian system; a circumstance of pleasing reflection to the English mind." He rid himself of his useless Cossack and having obtained another he continued his journey, following up the Irtysh river in a south-easterly direction. At this stage he began again to enjoy his travels, for he was clear of the endless flat plains and was in beautiful hilly country, with much cultivation. Snowclad peaks were visible in the distance. His route led him across rivers, dangerous ravines, and fertile valleys; a lovely country of, in his opinion, very rich soil, but mainly unoccupied except for a few Tartar families with their flocks and herds. At one point he was close to the borders of China. Crossing a little stream that formed the frontier, he sat on the far bank, very pleased to think that he was within the "Celestial Empire" of China. After going by boat some 80 miles downstream on the River Irtysh, he landed and walked north towards Barnaul, a distance of about 220 miles. Barnaul was, and no doubt still is, an important mining centre. There were at that time 32 mines, silver and copper, in the neighbourhood.

Here he was fortunate enough to meet the Governor-General who was making a tour of all the Siberian governments. This gentleman suggested that Cochrane might have a chance of joining an expedition which was then fitting out on the River Kolyma to explore the north-east cape of Asia. Cochrane was delighted at the idea and readily accepted. The Kolyma river, however, was distant about 2,400 miles, or even more by the route he intended taking, which was via Irkutsk ($52^{\circ}-10' N$, $104^{\circ}-15' E$) and Yakutsk ($62^{\circ} N$, $129^{\circ}-50' E$), so he had no time to waste. With a letter from the Governor-General commending him to the care of all the authorities, he set out with a light heart towards Tomsk, about 200 miles, accompanied by a new Cossack. At a village on the way the Cossack got drunk, so Cochrane left him there to shift for himself. He arrived at Tomsk at the end of August, and had then been six-and-a-half months on his long walk.

His route now lay along the great east-west trade road to Irkutsk at the southern end of Lake Baikal, a distance of about 1,000 miles. On the way he met a great caravan of carts with teas, silks, and nankeens from China bound for Moscow. There were villages every 15 miles or so, but very few dwellings off the great road. He was most hospitably treated everywhere on this part of the journey.

At Irkutsk he was offered accommodation by several of the officials, and, deciding to "stick to the profession," he took up his abode with the Commandant of the Navy; presumably the officer commanding the Imperial ships on the great lake. He mentions meeting here an Englishman and his "homely cockney wife"! One wonders how they came to be there.

Cochrane stayed only a week in Irkutsk, and with a fresh Cossack continued his journey to the eastward, towards the great River Lena. On reaching that river his travel by land ceased for a while and he was pleased to be again afloat upon his own element. He obtained a canoe and a couple of hands, and with his Cossack paddled downstream to Kirensk. The river ran at about two knots and they managed to make about 100 miles a day. By this time the weather was again cold. They continued in this manner until overtaken by ice in the river, when they proceeded on foot again.

Arriving at Yakutsk, he stayed with the Governor, Captain Minitsky of the Russian Navy, who had passed many years in the British Service, three of them with Cochrane's cousin. Here he stayed until the end of October, 1820, waiting for the

river to freeze sufficiently for safe travel. Then, having been provided with two sledges and a new Cossack, he started on his formidable journey towards Nishney Kolymsk, distant about 1,800 miles to the north-east. This was in the coldest season of the year in the coldest part of north-east Asia. The temperature was at first about zero degrees Fahrenheit, but he was later to experience it many degrees lower.

The first part was down the frozen River Lena, to its junction with the River Aldan. There he procured horses and two native Yakuti as guides. The party suffered severely from the extreme cold; Cochrane more than the others, for he had not suitable clothing. Only his remarkable constitution and resolute determination enabled him to withstand these great hardships. Although they had horses, he covered 15 or 20 miles a day on foot himself, mainly to keep warm. In his diary he noted that his liquor was at an end, "due to a very common sort of leak; it had been tapped too often."

In mid-December they left a place called Sordak, "having well refreshed ourselves with the flesh of a wolf and a horse which had the day before fought each other to death!" At Sredne Kolymsk he was provided with another Cossack. He was very sorry to part with the previous one; his faithful and affectionate Peter Trechekoff.

The cold was by now intense, the thermometer down to -46 degrees Fahrenheit. Finally, in a terribly low temperature of 62 degrees below zero, he arrived at his destination, Nishney Kolymsk (lat. 69° N. long. $160^{\circ}-30'$ E) on the last day of December, 1820.

Here he met the explorer Baron Wrangel, who kindly fitted him out with arctic clothing and lodged him in his own house. The baron was preparing an expedition to explore to the north, and also to determine the exact position of the north-east point of Asia. This was the expedition Cochrane had hoped to join and he volunteered to go with them, but he could not be accepted because he was a foreigner. Cochrane had the highest possible opinion of the baron; he described him as "that indefatigable young officer" and believed him to have no equal in the Russian Navy.

Cochrane stayed at Nishney Kolymsk during January and February. He tried to get from the native chiefs permission to traverse their country towards Bering Strait, but it was refused; he could not pay the bribe. He mentions that the native Tchuktchi (Chukchi) use a word Errie, which he was told had the same meaning in North America, signifying a great sea or lake, as Lake Erie!

As he could not go with Wrangel there was no need to remain in north-east Siberia, so on 27th March, 1821, he left by dog sledge for Okhotsk, a distance of about 900 miles to the south-west. This was the most arduous and terrible part of his long wanderings. Both his Cossack and his native guide fell ill. The weather was very severe and they had to cross icy mountain passes and rapid flowing rivers. They often slept in the snow, and were 12 days with only horse flesh, usually raw, to eat. For the last five days of this journey they had no food at all.

They finally arrived at Okhotsk, having "travelled over a thousand miles from Kolyma through most difficult country in seventy-five days of hard labour," suffering cold, rain, hunger, and fatigue and spending 45 nights in the snow. Cochrane's appearance must have been remarkable. His face was haggard and badly frosted, and his long red beard and longer red locks, which he had not had cut for 15 months, must have made him look pretty wild. He decided to have a haircut and shave, having had neither since leaving Europe.

Here, at Okhotsk, he changed his original plan and instead of crossing to America and traversing that continent, he decided to return to Europe via Siberia and Russia. His main reason was that there were no ships at Okhotsk bound for America and none was likely that season.

Before returning home, however, he managed to visit the peninsula of Kamchatka, sailing there in August aboard the Imperial transport *Michael*, and landing at the port of St. Peter and St. Paul (Petropavlovsk). He spent 11 months in Kamchatka, during which he travelled pretty well all around the peninsula, mainly by dog team during the winter months. It was during this part of his travels that he met the Russian lady whom he later married. They returned to Okhotsk in the same brig *Michael* in which he had travelled the previous year.

In August, 1822, they set out on the long overland route to Europe with a caravan of about 200 horses. Cochrane's party had 13, for the guides and Cossack, all the tents and gear, and with provisions for six weeks. At Yakutsk they stayed for two months, during the very severe cold of the Siberian Winter. In January, 1823, they crossed Lake Baikal by horse-drawn sledge over the ice, covering the 40 miles in two-and-a-half hours.

On this homeward journey he again made a deviation to the south, and crossed the frontier into China. Here he met some Chinese merchants who spoke Russian well. They were surprised and interested at finding an Englishman there in that distant part of their empire. He was given a curious map of the Chinese empire with notes in Russian, which he later presented to the British Museum, where presumably it may still be seen.

Finally, after a good deal of hardship, they crossed the great mountain range and entered Europe. It is strange that, in spite of his sufferings in that country, Cochrane was quite sad at leaving Siberia, where, as he wrote, "I had been happier than in any other part of the world."

On to Moscow, where he stayed three weeks, and then to St. Petersburg (Leningrad) which was then the capital. It was interesting to note that he mentioned the high road on which he was travelling as being "Macadamised"—in those days quite a new system of road making.

It had been three years and three weeks since he left St. Petersburg on his great pedestrian journey to the far east. He returned to England in a ship called the *Peter Proctor*. The vast distances Cochrane had covered (he reckoned about 30,000 miles) cannot very well be shown on a small scale map, but the reader may find it interesting to trace the travels for himself in an atlas.

Captain Cochrane's book, *Narrative of a Pedestrian Journey through Russia and Siberian Tartary*, was published in London in 1825. Cochrane unfortunately died of fever in Valencia, Colombia (now in Venezuela), in that same year.

LETTERS FROM THE CRIMEA—II

By ASSISTANT-SURGEON ARTHUR HENRY TAYLOR

These letters, written to his parents by Assistant-Surgeon Arthur Henry Taylor from the Crimea between October, 1854, and March, 1856, are in the possession of his great-niece, Miss Mary G. Walker, and with her permission are now published for the first time.—

EDITOR.

2nd DECEMBER, 1854

Since I last wrote no new event has occurred, the siege progresses in the same slow way. The French alone seem to make any progress, and even that is but little. We await a more favourable state of the weather in order to get our new great guns and ammunition up from Balaklava. It has never ceased raining since I last wrote and we have all suffered dreadfully. Some Regiments have been on half rations in consequence of the impossibility of getting supplies from Balaklava, the roads being nearly impassable from the mud, and the means of transport has now become so very limited, the horses and mules dying by tens at a time.

To add to our other misfortunes, Cholera has made its dreadful appearance amongst the troops and as usual carries off the men of the new Regiments by hundreds. The Artillery, being more inured to hardships and privations, have suffered less than others, out of our small force we have only lost about six men from Cholera, one of them a fine young officer, the Adjutant of the Siege Train Left Attack. He took ill in the morning, I saw him, and in *nine hours* he was dead. He was a most promising young fellow and had volunteered for this expedition. The other men generally died after six hours. I have been on duty since I last wrote, having recovered my temporary illness, but I am sorry to say not my strength or appetite but I suppose I shall be all right after a little, particularly as the weather seems inclined to be fine. . . .

Something decisive must be done, we could never endure a Winter under canvas, and as to hutting, the attempt has been made and has failed from the simple fact that the bare hills of the Crimea afford no means whatever to make any part of a roof or hut, the soil is too shallow even to make holes in, and too loose to cut sods of. The stones lie in the valleys and are too distant to get at and, in a word, there is no means whatever of hutting all the troops and we now have no hope against a Crimean Winter but our poor, thin tents. Some few of us may manage to make holes in the earth to shelter us a little, but I fear the rain will soak into them. Everyone seems to be of the opinion that if the weather remained fine in order to harden the roads and thus enable us to get up our guns, that we should have Sebastopol in a fortnight. We have some grand guns lying in Balaklava and also some immense mortars. The guns throw 10-inch shot (10-inch in diameter, they are hollow shot!), and the mortars are for 13-inch shell, they are both the style of Siege Train which we should have had at first, but like everything else they find out what we want when we are scarcely able to use them. . . .

Poor brave fellows, clad in rags and almost shoeless, with faces haggard and worn and scarcely able to drag one leg after the other, they march day after day to work in and guard the trenches, and yet the thought of failure, or a single murmur that might give vent to a hope that we might retreat, never passes their lips. Here they seem to have made up their minds to "conquer or die" one by one; from their efforts to do so, and that such must be their ultimate fate a stranger who had just come home would evidently be inclined to believe, they all, men and officers.

seem more fit for the hospital marquee than the siege of a place like Sebastopol. Often I have heard the men say could they take Sebastopol they would willingly and gladly "die happy in the streets."

No words could convey any idea of the patient endurance and bravery of the English soldier. There is not a man here, I firmly believe, who, if ordered, would not coolly march in broad daylight right up to the batteries of Sebastopol though well they know to do so would be certain death. Never in the hottest fire or under the most unfavourable aspect of the siege has the thought of deserting the trenches come into their heads. I shall never forget the third day of the siege, when immediately after daybreak the Russians opened fire upon us in the most awful manner. I had gone down with a new relief of fresh men, nearly all young fellows who had never been under fire, never had a shot over their heads! They stood to their guns and worked them as coolly and regularly as if they were at drill! And when a poor fellow was knocked over, either killed or wounded, his place—or as they call it, his 'number'—was filled up immediately by some of his comrades. One poor fellow, who is now my servant, his name is Groom, was 'sponging-out' when a 68-lb. shot struck the gun and knocked a large splinter into his head, he coolly went on sponging the gun, and when I went to dress his head I told him he must go to the rear, but he begged me to let him stay and as hands were scarce I let him; he went back and worked away for two or three rounds and then fell down exhausted. He was carried away and after a time got well; a few days since I asked him, from curiosity to hear what he would say, "if he thought the men ever had any idea of running away." He turned round with his great stupid (for he is wonderfully stupid) face expressive of intense astonishment and indignation and almost shouted out "Run away, Sir!! We all expected to be killed but none of us thought of running away". . . .

You need not be alarmed at my being unwell and weak, no one in Camp is now in good health, and indeed it is impossible that we should be, sleeping often in damp or wet bed-clothes (for the rain comes through our tents), and always breathing a damp, moist atmosphere, and when in the trenches dragging our legs along through mud ankle-deep in the cleanest places. Still we are all borne up by the certainty that finally the place must be taken. . . .

I lately saw a *London News* of the 11th November and was greatly pleased with it, the views of Balaklava are wonderfully correct, and that of "Chapman's Battery," the one in which I have passed many an hour, so much so that I could point you out the place where I usually attend to the wounded; the only mistake they make is representing the men with their packs on, they never carry them, and the Artillery men do not wear caps, at least not such as in the sketch, they wear a large red woollen nightcap! Such is the place (Chapman's Battery) where I have passed my share of the siege, and the attempt at sketching the shot and shell is 'funny.' We don't see them so plainly here, and they are far more numerous than represented here, at least they *were*, now we return fire and they are equally careless, though we can see them busy getting up new batteries and they seem to work day and night. . . .

I suppose I have been interrupted about ten or twelve times, since I sat down, to attend to poor, sick men. You can form no idea at home of the value of those little things which at home are considered necessities and which here would be considered the most exquisite luxuries. A day or two ago, when unable to eat salt pork or tough beef, I would have given anything for a piece of *bread* and a cup of cocoa and milk. I am tired of tea without milk, and our coffee, burned on a frying pan and bruised into a coarse powder with a 60-lb. shot, is not quite the best thing

for a delicate stomach. Salt and mustard are two articles of great use and very hard to be got and cost almost fabulous prices. All the senior officers have been exceedingly kind to me, one gave me about half a pound of ship's cocoa, just now Major Morris has sent me a slice of white bread! A perfect curiosity out here, it was made on board ship for Lord John Hay, R.N., who gave it to the Major, and as he knew the biscuit made me ill, he has kindly sent it to me. Captain Henry made me a present of a tin-case of mutton, whilst I was very ill, and it made me some delicious broth which did more than anything else except the arrowroot to make me well. Every little article, such as soap, candles, cheese, sugar, chocolate, and butter, can be bought at the Maltese shops at Balaklava but at such ruinous prices that if they were to save my life I could not get them, particularly the two latter.

We are all in great spirits tonight, the weather seems to have taken up so well and although it is very cold, particularly when you remember that when lying on my bed I can see the great, cold-looking Winter through the walls of "my castle". . . . I still consider myself very fortunate in being attached to the Royal Artillery. I am so much more comfortable, and should there be any sudden move I am sure to get my baggage carried along with me on some of the gun-carriages. Also I am so much liked that they tell me I must be taken care of, as they all depend on me if any of them should be taken ill.

3rd DECEMBER, 1854

All our bright hopes of yesterday have gone, and today is worse than ever. It rains incessantly and more heavily than ever, the floor of my tent is flooded in parts and the rain drops through. . . .

I have just come back from Headquarters where I have been procuring some medicine and comforts for the sick and making an effort to procure some additional Hospital accommodation. I have got little but promises! and two rather useful medicines, but in such small quantity that I am sure to have the same trouble in a day or two. I have a case of Cholera today and am sure to have lots of it tomorrow. . . . Poor Dr. Haughton has been in the trenches all day and the other Asst. Surg., a most miserable, helpless fellow, a fine gentleman who can do nothing for himself, has been in bed all day, and when I went to him today to ask him to do duty for me for an hour or two till I tried to get some medicines, he told me there was "no use in troubling myself," for, says he, "you know, Taylor, we shall all die here of cold or Cholera or be killed by the enemy." I was disgusted with him, he would die here soon enough if he had not a poor Irishman for a servant who feeds him, I might almost say "spoon-feeds" him. I was forcibly reminded today by him of two characters in one of Dickens's books, Mark Tapley and his master. And well I might say with poor Mark that one would deserve some credit for being "jolly" here. It is quite miserable enough.

I am better and stronger today and am hungry, which I look upon as a good sign, but alas the cook-holes, or kitchens, are under water and I can get nothing to eat at present unless I eat raw pork, which the soldiers frequently do and they tell me it is better than boiled. I cannot say, and I do not think I shall qualify myself to give an opinion on the matter.

11th DECEMBER, 1854

I have been in Balaklava all day in charge of sick, seeing them on board ship, a most troublesome and distressingly tiresome business. About 2,000 sick left the Army this morning, they had to be conveyed in by the French mules, slung in chairs

across the mule's back, two on each mule. You will be glad to hear after our late sufferings that the weather is now dry again and cold, but not remarkably so, the water in my tent was frozen this morning but it has not been so cold of late. As for myself, I am daily getting stronger and better, my health is very good. . . .

It is now pretty generally acknowledged that the siege has failed, for since the battle of Inkermann we have literally done nothing. . . . We are now commencing a siege and getting up new guns and a great number of the largest size mortar (13-inch) and intend as soon as all is complete to have a grand field-day! . . . Sickness is at present very prevalent. This morning's sick list was 3,000 and more for our Army! We lose about two or three men a day, from our small force of about 600 men, from Cholera. The 9th lost 90 in one day. The new troops suffer most, we have lost all our men from a new company which has just arrived. Our sick list the day before yesterday consisted of 2 officers and 150 men!

21ST DECEMBER, 1854

I should have written by the last mail but I was suddenly seized with cold shivers, sickness of stomach, and intense pain in my back. I had to stop writing at once, went to bed, took some medicine, and piled all my clothes upon me. It was raining and snowing all night. The next morning at 4 o'clock, feeling a little better, I got a hot cup of coffee, I could eat nothing, and being in orders for the trenches and no one to take the duty for me, and if there had been, no opportunity of having the orders changed. I also was afraid the others would try to injure me by saying I was shirking my duty, so down I marched through the snow and wet, and over the dreadful slippery height between our Camp and the lines. I got there dreadfully fatigued, but as I thought it was nothing more than excessive fatigue, I got into a little hut belonging to the Engineers and tried to rest myself. I had been on duty 10 days in succession and five entire nights, during which I was often called up to see men some distance from my tent who were suddenly taken ill with Cholera or fever, walking through mud and rain with only my trousers, military greatcoat and cap on, and this out of my warm bed, sometimes three times a night!

The other five nights, out of the 10 to which I allude, were mine from 8 p.m. till 4 a.m. I generally went to bed at once and slept so soundly that when the bugle awoke me in the morning I have often asked if they had made a mistake. I now always waken, no matter how sleepy or tired, at the first sound of the bugle. It is a lesson the Russians have taught us all by so frequently surprising us.

This was hard work to continue for 10 days without ceasing, and occurred in consequence of the three Assistant Surgeons being on the sick list for five days, thus throwing all the duty on two, there being only three for the Siege Train Left Attack. One must always be in the trenches, and one on Camp duty, the latter a dreadful task in such a country and during such weather.

After remaining some hours in the hut I began to feel so sick that I had to go at once to the Commanding Officer of Artillery in the trenches. . . . He said I looked very sick and must go home immediately, for they "must take care of me." I was so weak that a Gunner had to assist me home. Shortly afterwards the Doctor came, saw me, ordered me to bed immediately as I had an attack of low nervous fever brought on from exposure, wet, and excitement of duty. The next day or two I was very ill. They all thought a fatal attack of Cholera. Nothing could exceed the kindness of Dr. Elliott, my P.M.O., who came to see me several times a day, and brought me each time some little comfort as a present from his own stock. Captain

Henry gave me a bottle of very good sherry, and Dr. Elliott had some beef-tea of great strength and delicious flavour made from some essence of beef. Since then, thank God, I have daily but slowly gone on improving in health and increasing a little in strength. I had given myself up for lost several times on the day on which I was so ill and indeed everyone seemed of the same opinion, for that I had a slight attack of Cholera there can be no doubt. It was exceedingly gratifying to find myself so well liked.

Captain Henry was unceasing in his kindness and attention to me. Colonel Rowan, late Military Secretary in Canada, to whose Company of Artillery I am attached, sent me several little articles not procurable here. The other Assistant Surgeon was nearly as hard-worked as I was and is now on the sick list also, though he had only had continuous duty for five days, before that having had his usual reliefs. I got in for so much more because they considered me more careful and attentive than the others, and therefore in addition to my other duties I had been sent into Balaklava in charge of sick and wounded to see them on board ship; also on one or two occasions to Balaklava to look for medical stores and comforts and see them brought out; simple duties to tell of, but not to discharge properly in a place like this where conveyance is hardly to be procured for any consideration.

However, now that I have told you the whole "history of my case," I may conclude by telling you that I have applied for leave to go on board ship, to recruit my strength, for 10 days, which has been granted, and I leave Camp tomorrow for Balaklava. This is absolutely necessary as at present there is not a single portion of my ration with the exceptions of my rice and sugar, that I can bear to see, even eat them. This morning I got a piece of white bread(!) from Henry, which I think he begged somewhere for me, or I should have had no breakfast that I could eat. Tea without milk has now become almost an emetic to me, and indeed to all here, coffee is much preferable. The little comforts of warmth and a dry place to sleep in, together with nutritious food, are not to be procured here, particularly the former, the latter may be got at Balaklava in the Maltese shops at ruinous prices. . . .

A new Company of Artillery have arrived, splendidly equipped with large sealskin caps with a flap behind to let down over the back of the neck, an indiarubber waterproof coat—such as would sell here for about £10 and at home for about £3—the strongest and best thing of the sort I have ever seen. They also have a grand, untanned pair of huge Canadian Jack-boots which cover their whole legs. The men are literally waterproof, or rather weather-proof; besides this they have a double set of warm underclothing of the best possible description, such as you seldom see for sale. All these have been given to the officers and men without charge, the most sensible thing the Government have done since the War commenced. All the artillery are to get them shortly and Captain Henry has just promised to secure me a set if they should arrive while I am at Balaklava. . . . The weather for the past few days has been most delightful, mild as Spring! Five days ago it rained and snowed and was very cold indeed, and everything was a picture of misery.

25th DECEMBER, 1854—BALAKLAVA

I am better, very much better, and quite out of danger, but I am far from well. I have had a Medical Board. They were exceedingly kind to me and ordered me a month's convalescence to Scutari. I am so weak, as weak as a child, and my long legs almost refuse to do their office of carrying from place to place my thin and greatly worn body. I have had a narrow escape. The second day of my illness presented every appearance of Cholera, and had it continued for a little time longer

I should have laid down to rest for ever in the cold climate of the Crimea amongst the hundreds who have already been cut off from pure fatigue, hard work, and bad food, for of late we could get nothing but salt rations, and they are unhealthy to eat for any length of time. I thank God I am now well in health, and on board a most comfortable ship, where I expect to eat a comfortable Christmas dinner. A dinner under any circumstances will be a treat, but such comfort as I shall have on board will indeed be something wonderful after the mud and misery of a wet tent. I can now talk of my illness with almost pleasure, now that it has brought me to such quarters, not that they are to boast of as things are at home. The bed-places are still stained with the blood of the wounded officers carried down to Scutari in her. They give no bedclothes, but I have brought everything on board with me. I have been here in this horrid, muddy town for three or four days, sent down as the P.M.O., Dr. Elliott stupidly thought, to go on board ship at once, but I found on applying, that my name had not appeared in General Orders and they would not admit me, but that Dr. Carte (with whom I slept), and Mr. Adams (with whom I dined every day on chicken and chicken-broth) were here I might have died on the wharf before anyone would help me. . . .

The ship I have got my passage to Scutari in is called the *Australian*, a very fine vessel, some of those which brought out the Siege Train. . . . I am going away from the scene of action, though I am promised that I shall get back to the Siege Train, Dr. Hall told me so himself. He saw me in Balaklava ill, and the P.M.O. there told Dr. Hall that I "had been his most active assistant on the day of Inkermann"; Dr. Hall smiled and said "those things were not forgotten."

ON BOARD THE "AUSTRALIAN," 27th DECEMBER, 1854

I am daily recovering my strength, though it is wonderful how much I have been reduced and how weak I still am, although I feel quite well and have a capital appetite which, with the good living I have here, will soon make me all right. I have taken my servant on board as there is no attendance and I could not do anything for myself. We have been delayed in Balaklava unloading shot, shell, and powder; of the latter we have a great deal on board and as they have not sent us a Fatigue Party, the ship's crew have to do all, hence the delay. I am much in want of a long overall pair of leather boots to keep my feet dry in the trenches. I hope, if not served out to us, I shall try and get a pair at Constantinople, if I can get any money. My socks, my woollen ones, are nearly all worn out with frequent washing to get the mud out of them.

I see by General Orders that we are to have a medal for the Crimea and clasps for Alma and Inkermann, that is, those who have been here at both engagements. I shall only get Inkermann, but that I earned I can honestly say. After I fully recover I shall be better able to undergo fatigue and hardship than ever, everyone seems to think it necessary that they should have the fever before they become fully "climatised."

OFF CONSTANTINOPLE. THE "AUSTRALIAN," 1st JANUARY, 1855

We arrived yesterday morning at about 11 a.m. after a delightful trip down the Bosphorus out of the Black Sea, where we had been lying on and off all night, the entrance to the Bosphorus being too narrow and dangerous to make during the dark. . . . It seems more like an English river or seaport than Turkish or eastern, it is full of transport ships, the finest in the world, and the grand men-of-war of

both France and England, and here and there a Danish man-of-war, a Greek dhow, and then a grand Turkish frigate.

I suffer a great deal now and then from rheumatism, got, no doubt, in those miserable trenches and afterwards sleeping in the moisture of our tents. However, I hope to be able at the end of my leave of absence to go back to the Artillery and see the end of the siege. . . .

I have not yet been to Scutari. I go there today when I shall learn if I can get quarters, which is doubtful, the place is so full of sick and wounded; if I cannot get quarters I shall, as I am on good terms with the captain, stay on board ship. Living at Pera would cost me about £1 per day, and that of course I could not afford if it were to save my life. . . . I am greatly better than when I left Balaklava.

OFF CONSTANTINOPLE, "AUSTRALIAN," 2nd JANUARY, 1855

I have not landed yet, and do not think I shall, living in Pera is expensive and quarters at Scutari are so very miserable, and as, thank God, I am not sick enough to require to go into Hospital as a patient, no consideration of attention will be paid me as a convalescent. The *Australian* goes back to Balaklava tomorrow or the next day and I think I shall remain with her and go up the Black Sea for the trip. She is placed as one of a line of steamers to run from Balaklava to Scutari once a week. The weather has been so dreadfully wet, since last night the rain has never ceased, the poor fellows in Camp must suffer dreadfully. I was today told that the mortality in the Crimea has increased 5 per cent., it is now above 100 per day.

I went to Scutari to see the grand hospital there, and was greatly pleased with the comfort of the men and the arrangements, and astonished at the extent and excellence of the accommodation afforded. The men are placed in long galleries with wards off them, and all are clean and well ventilated. It was the grand barracks for the Sultan's troops; along the walls are fixed large, well-made racks for arms. As a barrack its arrangements are very good and deserve credit. It is the only good thing I have seen in Turkey. As a hospital it is as nearly perfect as can be imagined, when its extent and hasty adoption for this purpose is considered. However, unfortunately at present fever of a bad type has made its appearance and has carried off many men.

I did not see Miss Nightingale herself, but I met several others of the "Sympathisers" as we call them. They all dress in plain black woollen dresses with unbleached linen aprons and a scarf across the shoulder from right to left, embroidered in red thread with the words "Scutari Hospital"—it gives them quite a martial, uniform appearance. They go about slip-shod, and very meek-looking, but evidently proud of their office. The Medical Officers say they are very kind and do a great deal of good, but are very much in the way.

(To be continued.)

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION¹

by A. K. CHESTERTON, M.C.

EUROPE

THE White Paper entitled *Defence : Outline of Future Policy* is the most important British document of our times. It may be possible for a political commentator to offer Service readers some guidance as to how the proposals are likely to affect Great Britain's position in the world, but in his turn he requires Service guidance about their military meaning, because there is much that is obscure. The admission is made, for instance, that the role of naval forces in total war is regarded as uncertain, but the uncertainty is not such as to prevent the scrapping of at least 150 ships and the reduction over the next five years of naval strength from 121,000 men to 75,000 men. It may be that the nuclear power with which the midget fleets are to be armed will more than compensate for the disappearance of these ships and the disbanding of these men, but we have not been given that assurance. The White Paper presents the matter to us in quite different terms.

Thus we are told that since "the nuclear battle might not prove immediately decisive" the necessity remains for N.A.T.O. to maintain substantial naval forces and maritime air units. To those who regard the North Atlantic Alliance as permanent that statement is no doubt adequate. There are others—those who believe that no alliance in the nature of things is permanent—whom the statement does not satisfy. They want to know what will be Great Britain's position, five years hence, should the present coalition, for whatever reason, collapse.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

I stress the naval aspect because the Government admits the uncertainty of the naval role, but of course the problem embraces, and is embraced by, the defence proposals in their entirety. The White Paper asserts that the defence of Britain "is possible only as part of the collective defence of the free world." It will be seen that the "free world" is regarded as a single cohesive entity, for which view there is no historical justification. There has never been such cohesion over a long period in peace-time and in war-time the hazards and disruption are naturally much greater. In as far as the *Entente* relied upon Russia's continuing participation in 1917 it gave to fortune almost as large a hostage as did Great Britain when she relied upon France in 1940. Such hazards would be no less formidable in a future war. The advance of the Red Army to the Atlantic Coast would put out of action an important slice of the "free world."

The solution to the problem in official favour is that the Old World in such contingencies looks for redress to the New World, but there is at least one political commentator whose anxiety is in no way diminished by that answer. Public opinion polls in the United States up to the time of Pearl Harbour revealed overwhelming support for isolationism. What guarantee is there that there will not be a return to an isolationist position? The fact that the United States is committed to the defence of the "free world" may at present give some assurance, but should one leave out of all reckoning the possible effects upon public opinion of a megaton bomb on New York? This is not written in disparagement of the American people. I would not like to predict the result of a megaton bomb on London.

¹ As deduced from reports up to 9th April.

Where the present writer is most in need of guidance from Service experts is in his effort to understand the Government's assertion that the defence of Britain "is possible only as part of the collective defence of the free world." The validity of the thesis in the circumstances of today is not challenged, but what of its validity tomorrow or the day after? There was no need to demonstrate this truth in the era of the wars of mass from which we have just emerged. We had not the manpower to 'go it alone' and win. Whether or not there can be victory for neither side in a nuclear war—the proposition does not sound to me very convincing, if it be agreed that the will of one could still subdue the will of the other—the fact that war-making has passed from a quantitative to a qualitative basis seems to me to refute the premise upon which the White Paper proposals are based.

Indeed, I am so certain that the premise is false that I find no alternative but to affirm that, if our defence is indeed possible only as a part of collective defence, the reason is not military but political. It would be naive to suppose that the White Paper embodies the thought of no more than the last five months—obviously much of it is the product of years of thinking—but, even so, I am convinced that the shape of the new programme is a reduced shape, and that the reduction is one of the many derivatives of Suez. In other words, our defence is now rationed, and our own Government may not be the highest authority which decides the allocation.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these considerations. The British Press seems to wish to spare its readers the embarrassment of reading what the men of other lands have to say about the White Paper, which everywhere has been interpreted as Great Britain's abdication from the status of a great Power. By the renunciation of Britain's independent war-making capacity, the Government is regarded as having surrendered to foreign control the sovereignty of the British realm. The Foreign Secretary's statement that this Country does not wish to become a satellite has not obscured the insight into the realities of the position possessed by intelligent observers abroad. Yet almost the only recognition at home of these realities comes from quarters which hail them as a triumph.

Thus the *Manchester Guardian*, which would not claim to be a proponent of the idea that Great Britain must maintain overseas influence and power, accepts the White Paper with unconcealed delight. It writes:

"The Government's plans for our defence are realistic, sensible, and therefore drastic. A Minister has admitted for the first time that most of the conventional armed forces will soon be out of date, that no one can defend civilians against nuclear attack, and—above all—that no one can defend Britain itself without American help. The new Five-Year Plan, announced yesterday, rightly describes itself as 'the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times.' But it is also the firmest pledge ever given that Britain will stay in the Atlantic Alliance, and rely upon it."

The curious reluctance of politicians and editors who do not share the *Manchester Guardian's* satisfaction to publish their own views perhaps accounts for the fact that the general public is not very conscious of what is happening to their national status. If Britons were aware that reliance on the Atlantic Alliance means, as it must mean, foreign domination, the prevailing mood would not be one of acquiescence and complacency.

TOWARDS EUROPEAN FEDERATION

Another result of Suez is the speed with which Great Britain has become committed to participation in a free trade area based on the European Common Market. The

Common Market treaty, which has now been signed, contains curious features for an enactment designed to allow six nations to form a Customs Union. It is not immediately apparent why such a union should require not only an Investment Bank but a High Court! The sceptical may be forgiven for assuming that the purpose is to place under supranational patronage both credit and justice. Our own Country does not propose to enter this inner ring, but those who study trends have reason to suppose that the associated free trade area is the thin end of the wedge of full membership. French leaders now openly declare that the grand objective is the United States of Europe. The idea of Europe as a nation presents many difficulties, however, not the least of which will be to know where to draw the line. Logically the ambition of the federalists must range from the Ural Mountains to the West Coast of Ireland!

Even these would not be the ultimate bounds of the federal idea. It is significant that M. Spaak, who worked harder than anybody else in Europe to create the Common Market, should have gone on the instant of success to labour in the wider context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As its new Secretary-General it will be his task to create the economic counterpart of the Atlantic Alliance's military organization which has long been at the blueprint stage. This is undoubtedly another functional approach to a federal objective—an objective more ambitious than the United States of Europe. What is being realized as a result of inexorable drive on the policy-making plane is the concept of Federal Union, given to the world in the name of Clarence Streit nearly 20 years ago. Should M. Spaak succeed, the United States of Europe will no sooner be established than it will burgeon into the United States of the Western World.

MIDDLE EAST

CYPRUS

There is nothing extravagant in the belief that the British Government's release of Archbishop Makarios from his detention in the Seychelles is yet another result of Suez. The Prime Minister assured the House of Commons that the matter was not discussed at his Bermuda conference with President Eisenhower, which of course is what one would expect: such discussion, as Mr. Macmillan said, would have been improper. But there was nothing to preclude the expression from the American side of the view that the atmosphere in the Middle East should be relieved of as many tensions as possible, and that steps should therefore be taken in Cyprus to replace terrorism with negotiation. As no other Greek Cypriot has the power to negotiate, that step—if agreed—would involve the freeing of the Archbishop.

This estimate of the probabilities of the situation is admittedly guess-work, but I know of no other interpretation which would explain the fact that the Colonial Secretary, a few days before the Bermuda conference, told Parliament that in no circumstances would Archbishop Makarios be released until he had denounced terrorism, only to inform the House a few days after the conference that the release would take place, even though the required denunciation had not been made. As the Government some months ago placed on record the Archbishop's personal responsibility for terrorist action in Cyprus, it could scarcely have relished the task of asking the Colonial Secretary in so unsavoury a business to eat his words. Beyond doubt external pressure was applied.

The Archbishop, once the release-order was made known, assumed the attitude of a man who has suddenly become master of the situation. He announced with

whom he was and was not prepared to negotiate. He rejected out of hand the island's partition, in which many British M.P.s had begun to place their hopes of a settlement. He declared that the question of whether or not Great Britain would be allowed to maintain a base in Cyprus could not be considered before the principle of self-determination had been conceded. It became apparent on the instant that the all too familiar post-war pattern of 'phased withdrawal' was about to be retraced, with Archbishop Makarios cast for the Nehru or Aung San role.

This time, however, there may be a variation. The White Paper mentioned the need to maintain a base in Cyprus, not in defence of British interests, but to enable Britain to discharge her obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact. Although at the beginning there may be only two negotiating parties, it is probable that the final settlement will recall that of Abadan, where an international consortium took over what had been an exclusively British industry. There is a very strong likelihood that this, or something like it, was the context in which Cyprus was discussed at the Bermuda conference.

KENYA RESERVOIR

If Cyprus, under whatever form of government, becomes an international base, it will signal the total eclipse of British power in the Middle East. Our troops are rapidly being withdrawn from Jordan, following the annulment by that country of the treaty which allowed us to maintain bases there. The British base in Libya is to be diminished almost to the point of uselessness. At the next remove nothing will remain to us between Malta and Aden. Public opinion may be appeased, as to some extent it was appeased over the Persian oil settlement, by the fact that we have some share, however minor, in our own succession. It cannot be too strongly urged, however, that as an international consortium is not the same thing as a British company, so a N.A.T.O. base will not be the same thing as a British base.

In an effort to save something from the wreck, the British Government is giving weighty consideration to the idea of making Kenya a citadel of British military power. The plan, considered strategically, has much to commend it: with the development of long-range missiles Kenya could be used for packing a nuclear punch on the nose of any army attempting the conquest of the Middle East. It would be less vulnerable than the United Kingdom and could carry on should the Old Country be put temporarily out of action. There are also tactical advantages in relation to neighbouring African territories. But would the organization of Kenya as a great strategical reservoir compensate for the loss of our tactical bases in the Middle East? Whatever the military answer, the political answer is "No."

SUEZ

After five months the Suez Canal is again open for navigation by ships of all sizes. At the time of writing Israel is reported to be about to send a ship on a test run through the Canal in an effort to defeat the continued Egyptian ban on her shipping, and Cairo radio has transmitted a warning in Hebrew that any such vessel will be destroyed, even if doing so leads to a world war. The reader will be in a position to know whether this dire outcome has been realized: it seems improbable! As a result of United States pressure, exerted by the withholding of aid and the promise of further financial accommodation, the Israeli Government has withdrawn its troops from both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The Strip is now restored to Egyptian sovereignty, with units of the United Nations Emergency Force in attendance, though not in any clearly defined role. If there is any belief

that the *status quo* will be maintained, I do not think it will be found in a single Israeli heart. Fruits of victory in the early days of November were too easily plucked for the lesson to be forgotten.

Colonel Nasser has decreed that Canal dues in future shall be paid to Egypt and there is discrimination against the British and French in that he will not take payment in sterling or francs. British Government spokesmen declare that these conditions are unacceptable and British ships, pending agreement, have been advised not to use the Canal. Whether or not the agreement will have to await a general settlement in the Middle East remains to be seen.

AUSTRALASIA

The Australian Government is to standardize its defence equipment with that of the United States. It declares that in total war Great Britain might experience difficulty in maintaining a supply-line to South-East Asia. A fact that seems not to have been taken into account is that Great Britain might be in the fight and the United States, reverting to some earlier policy such as 'cash and carry,' might not.

Australia's argument is not entirely convincing. Total war would be nuclear war. If the nuclear war were to be lost, tactical weapons might still have a part to play in delaying actions, but the supply-lines from both the United Kingdom and the United States would presumably be disrupted, making replacements impossible. Conversely, should the nuclear war be won, tactical weapons might still be needed for mopping-up operations, but replacements from overseas would not then present a problem of great urgency. In neither event would standardization materially affect the issue.

Some 'build-up' had to be furnished for the standardization programme. The impression was given of Southern Seas teeming with Soviet submarines, as though an invasion were imminent. Then the U.S. Secretary of State declared that America was Australia's friend and protector. Now comes the announcement that Australia is to pass into the military orbit of the United States.

* * *

It may be remarked by readers that there has been traced a recurring pattern throughout these notes. Should the fact give rise to criticism, the writer would respectfully enquire: What other pattern is it possible to trace? Were space available, I could pile up evidence in support of my theme, including the bitter experience of the French in North Africa. Whether or not it is possible to stem the flood, I submit that we should at least face the fact that the floodgates are down.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the JOURNAL, or which are of general interest to the Services. Correspondents are requested to put their views as concisely as possible, but publication of letters will be dependent on the space available in each number of the JOURNAL.—EDITOR.)

THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN

To the Editor of the R.U.S.I. JOURNAL.

SIR,—May I write to say that I support most sincerely the letter of Major de Gruchy in the February number of the JOURNAL,¹ particularly the last sentence in it. There have been too many instances lately of such 'debunking.'

Besides myself, there will probably be others of my generation who read Major Sheppard's article with sorrow.

A hero of our childhood, Lord Cardigan, came under similar adverse comment not long ago at the hands of a distinguished biographer. I do not think any good or useful purpose is served by such criticisms, especially as their reputations in the Service have been so securely fixed in their favour for so many years as leaders of British troops to glory.

R. NORTH,
Lieut.-Colonel.

25th February, 1957.

SIR,—Despite Major de Gruchy's letter commenting on my article on the Corunna campaign, it still seems to me a historical absurdity to maintain that the failure of a French corps to prevent the escape of a small British force from Spain in 1809 was the prime cause of the collapse of Napoleon's Empire five years later. Napoleon was supreme in western and central Europe from 1807 until 1812 (three years after, according to Major de Gruchy, his Empire had received its death blow), and his overthrow was brought about only in 1814 after three years of continuous fighting in Russia, Germany, and France. His Empire, like Charles II, seems to have been an unconscionable time a-dying.

The secondary nature of the role played by the British Army in this battle of giants is shown by the facts that, until in 1812 Napoleon weakened his forces in Spain for the war against Russia, it rarely ventured out of Portugal into Spain, and was driven back whenever it did so; and that it was the fighting in the main theatre in the three following years which wore down Napoleon and his armies by 1814.

To reckon the abortive attempt of Moore's force to halt the French occupation of Spain as a decisive success is as misleading as it would be to reckon the Allied disasters in Norway, France, Greece, and Crete in the period 1939-41 as death blows to Hitler's Germany. This is the absurd result of the creed put forward by Major de Gruchy that every "technical defeat" (whatever that may be) is a strategical victory in disguise, provided of course that the defeated forces are British. This seems to me to land us in a sort of historical cloud-cuckoo-town, which is completely divorced from reality, where defeat and victory are indistinguishable the one from the other to such an extent that we can learn no useful lessons from either.

To represent British defeats as victories may be necessary for the war-time propagandist, in order to maintain our prestige and morale. It is certainly no part of the duty of the honest historian, writing a century and a half after the event.

E. W. SHEPPARD,
Major (Retd.).

4th April, 1957.

¹ Pages 92-93.

ASSISTANT-SURGEON A. H. TAYLOR

SIR,—Perhaps a few biographical details may provide an interesting footnote to the series of Assistant-Surgeon Taylor's Sebastopol letters now appearing in the JOURNAL.

He was born in Belfast on 17th June, 1830, and was appointed Staff Assistant Surgeon in 1854. He joined the Medical Establishment for the Military Department of the Ordnance the following year.

He became a Staff Surgeon in 1858 and died in Chelsea Hospital in 1859. He was awarded the Legion of Honour for his services in the Crimea and was mentioned three times for conspicuous gallantry and skill.

We are indebted to Miss Mary Walker (who is a great-niece of Taylor) not only for the Sebastopol letters, but also for various 'personalia' now in our Corps Museum. These include some of his uniform and accoutrements, his shaving mirror, thermometer, pharmaceutical balances, etc.

Among them is a black-edged funeral paper which shows how this young officer, who died when he was 29, won the affection of all ranks of the Royal Artillery. The Garrison Orders, Woolwich, of 24th August, 1859, show that all the officers of the garrison were invited to attend his funeral together with all the non-commissioned officers and men not on duty of the Horse Brigade, Riding Establishment, the 1st Brigade, and the 4th Brigade Depot.

The Times of 27th August, 1859, tells how the coffin was carried by six gunners whose wounds, sustained at Inkerman, had been treated by Taylor. The cortège, which included Major-General Dacres, K.C.B., and all the senior officers of the garrison, was headed by the full band of the Royal Artillery, and the two bands of the Royal Marines and the Royal Horse Artillery followed the bier.

It is gratifying to recall that the friendly relationship which has always existed between the Royal Regiment and its medical officers was already apparent nearly 100 years ago. It is a relationship which brings back so many happy memories for those of us who have spent a lifetime with the R.A.M.C.

R. E. BARNESLEY,
Major-General (Retd.).

17th March, 1957.

SUEZ CANAL : SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES

SIR,—In the JOURNAL of February, at the end of Lieut.-General Sir John Glubb's lecture, Sub-Lieutenant J. C. Appleyard-List asked if "it is an engineering possibility to build a canal from Aqaba to the Mediterranean." The Pasha was very wise in his non-committal answer.²

I have just turned up a letter to the Editor of the *Morning Post* dated 13th July, 1936, entitled "A Canal Solution" by Lord Portsea. He advocated an alternative route from Haifa through the low lying plain to the Valley of the Dead Sea down the Wadi to Aqaba.

Since that date a great advancement has taken place in engineering, so to shorten appreciably the length of this canal, though more rock cutting would be necessary, it might be considered better to construct a canal port at or near Jaffa, to allow the passage of tankers of not less than 100,000 tons with greater speed than the Suez Canal. Another great result of this work would be to make Jerusalem a sea port.

F. DITMAS,
Lieut.-Colonel (Retd.)

6th April, 1957.

² Pages 13-14.

GENERAL SERVICE NOTES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHANNEL AND SOUTHERN NORTH SEA.—It was announced on 15th February that Admiral Sir Guy Grantham would succeed Admiral of the Fleet Sir George Creasy as Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Southern North Sea, in May, 1957.

COMMANDER, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE.—It was announced on 4th February that Vice-Admiral A. R. Pedder would succeed Vice-Admiral G. B. Gladstone as Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Northern Europe, in June, 1957.

GREAT BRITAIN

NEW POWERS FOR MINISTER OF DEFENCE

On 24th January, in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, announced new powers to be vested in the Minister of Defence, Mr. Sandys. He said that Mr. Sandys would be responsible for : (1) formulating in the light of present strategic needs a defence policy to secure a substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower ; (2) a plan for reshaping and reorganizing the armed forces in accordance with that policy ; (3) decisions on all matters of policy affecting the size, shape, organization, and disposition of the armed forces, their equipment and supply, including defence research and development, their pay and conditions of service, subject to consultations with the Cabinet, Treasury, and Defence Committee on matters of finance ; (4) decisions on any matters of Service administration or appointments which, in his opinion, are of special importance.

The Prime Minister also said that the Minister of Defence would have a Chief of Staff, responsible to him in that capacity, who would be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson had been appointed to that post. The corporate responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff as the professional advisers to the Government would remain unchanged.

DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1957-58

The Government's White Paper on Defence published on 4th April, entitled on this occasion "Defence: Outline of Future Policy," provides for an expenditure of £1,483,000,000 in 1957-58 compared with £1,599,000,000 for 1956-57. After deducting U.S. aid and German payment, this figure becomes £1,420,000,000 (£1,499,000,000 in 1956-57).

The following were among the main announcements made in the White Paper :—

General. (1) The Government have decided to plan on the basis that there shall be no further call-up of National Service men after the end of 1960, with the aim of stabilizing the armed forces on an all-Regular footing at a strength of about 375,000 by the end of 1962, excluding Colonial troops and other forces enlisted overseas. But if voluntary recruitment fails to produce this number there will have to be some limited form of compulsory service to bridge the gap.

It is proposed to reduce the combined strength of the three Services from about 690,000¹ to 625,000 during the next 12 months.

(2) In order to encourage recruiting, steps will be taken to make life in the Services more attractive, and the recruiting campaign will be intensified.

Those whose service careers have to be prematurely ended by the reduction in the size of the forces will be given fair compensation and will be helped to find civil employment.

(3) High priority will continue to be given to the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear bombs and war-heads.

Navy. It is proposed to base the main elements of the Navy on a small number of carrier groups, each composed of one aircraft carrier and a number of supporting ships.

¹ This figure relates only to adult male uniformed U.K. personnel.

The Navy's contribution to N.A.T.O. is to be somewhat reduced. Cruisers are to be reduced and replaced in due course by "Tiger" class ships. Many ships now in reserve are to be disposed of, including four battleships. Naval strength east of Suez will be kept at about its present level.

Army. (1) Manpower reductions in the Army will be achieved mainly by reducing overseas commitments.

(2) Troops are being withdrawn from Jordan and will be withdrawn from Korea and reduced in Libya, and reductions will be made in the garrisons of British Colonies and Protectorates wherever practicable.

(3) The British Army of the Rhine is to be reduced this year from 77,000 to 64,000 men, and subject to consultation with Allied Governments further reductions will be made later.

(4) A central reserve in Britain will be established from which reinforcements can be despatched without delay.

Air. (1) Fighter Command is to be reduced, its new role to be the defence of bomber bases only, and will be progressively equipped with air-to-air guided missiles. Fighter aircraft will in due course be replaced by a ground-to-air missile system. Work on projects for fighter aircraft of types more advanced than the supersonic P1 will stop.

(2) V-class bombers are to be supplemented by ballistic rockets, initially of U.S. manufacture. Development is being stopped of the manned supersonic bomber which could not be brought into service in much under 10 years.

(3) A substantial fleet of transport aircraft is being built up in R.A.F. Transport Command to carry the Central Reserve.

(4) The number of aircraft in the Tactical Air Force in Germany is to be reduced to about half the present number.

Reserve Forces. Individual reservists and certain reserve units will be needed to make good deficiencies in the Regular Army in emergencies. The Territorial Army will, as at present, be trained and equipped as a fighting force primarily assigned to the task of home defence. The Government consider that it would be more appropriate if the two Territorial Divisions at present earmarked as reinforcements for N.A.T.O. were assigned to home defence duties. This question is being discussed with N.A.T.O.

Apart from the units of the Air Branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force which have been disbanded, the Naval and Air Force Reserves will be retained in their present roles, though they will have to be reduced and, to some extent, reorganized to accord with the new plan.

Civil Defence. In 1957-58 the main task will be to keep the existing organization in being. The necessary training equipment will be provided. Essential research will proceed, and work on emergency communications and on setting up the fall-out warning and monitoring system will continue. These preparations will provide a framework for expansion, should that be necessary.

The following statistical details were included in a second follow-up White Paper on 5th April:—

(a) Allocation of gross estimates:—

	1956-57	1957-58
	£ million	£ million
Admiralty	351.5	316.15
War Office	519.0	445.50
Air Ministry	527.0	506.15
Ministry of Supply ...	185.0	197.60
Ministry of Defence ...	16.2	17.63
Totals	1,598.7	1,483.03

Receipts from the United States and Germany will reduce the Army figure by £44,100,000 and that of the R.A.F. by £18,500,000.

(b) The armed forces will require this year about 160,000 men from Regular engagements, National Service, boys, and apprentices. About 121,000 are within the age groups liable for call-up for National Service during 1957-58. Of this 121,000 the distribution is expected to be: Royal Navy, 2,000; Army, 84,500; R.A.F., 34,500.

(c) Estimated figures for the active strengths, including women, of the three Services on 1st April, 1957, and 1st April, 1958, show that the Navy is expected to decline during the year from 115,500 to 109,000; the Army from 373,300 to 335,000; and the R.A.F. from 230,000 to 210,300. This shows a decline in total strength from 718,800 to 654,300.

NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR ESTIMATES, 1957-58: VOTES ON ACCOUNT

As it was not possible to present the usual Service Estimates on time owing to the delay in publication of the Government's annual Statement on Defence, Votes on Account for the three Service Departments were published on 19th February. The amounts given therein covered only the first four or five months of the financial year 1957-58. These Votes on Account showed a decrease of 65,500 in the maximum strength of the Navy, Army, and Royal Air Force which may be maintained at any time during the year (including those on terminal leave). The maximum strengths shown were:—

Royal Navy.—121,500, a reduction of 6,500.

Army.—443,000, a reduction of 42,000 including 5,550 Commonwealth, Colonial, and Gurkha troops.

Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, and Home Guard: 385,000, 285,000 and 1,900 respectively.

R.A.F.—240,000, a reduction of 17,000.

Reserve and Auxiliary Forces: 224,000 and 9,000 respectively.

As the figures given for Service strengths were maxima, they enabled the Minister of Defence to reduce them further if he desired to do so.

The sums asked for in the Votes on Account were: *Royal Navy*, £125,000,000; *Army*, £210,000,000; *R.A.F.*, £240,000,000.

The Votes on Account were subsequently agreed to in the House of Commons.

The usual Service Estimates will be published later in the year.

IMPERIAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

NEW COMMANDANT

It was announced on 18th March that Lieut.-General Sir William P. Oliver would succeed Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell as Commandant of the Imperial Defence College with effect from 1st January, 1958.

AUSTRALIA

NEW DEFENCE PROGRAMME

When announcing the new defence programme in the House of Representatives on 4th April, Mr. Menzies said that National Service training will cease for the Navy and Air Force and that the intake for the Army will be reduced from 39,000 to 12,000 men annually. This will release for service 2,000 men of the Regular Army who have been training National Service men, and will provide more money for the purchase of modern equipment, particularly aircraft and guns, which will be standardized where possible with those used by United States defence forces. This was considered to be necessary as it might be difficult for the United Kingdom to maintain a supply line to South-East Asian areas in the event of global war, though the United States could do so. Expenditure will be maintained at the present level of £A190,000,000 a year.

No major changes in the Navy were proposed. The strength of the permanent naval forces would be maintained at an average of 11,000 for the next three years, while naval construction would be expedited to correct the present shortage of ships of appropriate kind.

Arrangements had already begun in the Regular Army to organize a brigade group over 4,000 strong as a cohesive battle formation equipped with the latest weapons, which would be additional to the battalion group serving in Malaya.

Air Force innovations would include the formation of the first ground-to-air guided weapons unit and the establishment of mobile control and reporting units at Darwin and Perth. The production of Jindivik pilotless aircraft in Australia was continuing. Co-operation with the U.K. in the long-range weapons establishment would continue at the present level for some years.

INDIA

DEFENCE PORTFOLIO

On 30th January, it was announced that President Prasad had accepted the resignation of Dr. Katju as Minister of Defence and that Mr. Nehru had taken over the portfolio.

FOREIGN

GERMANY

CONTROLLER, GERMAN ARMED FORCES

Lieut.-General Heusinger assumed control of the three Service Departments when he took over Department IV (Armed Forces) in the Defence Ministry on 1st March.

POLAND

REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES

It was reported on 27th March that Poland had decided on an immediate reduction of her armed forces by a further 44,500 men. An official announcement stated that this was intended both to reduce expenditure and to show good will at a time when the United Nations sub-committee on disarmament was meeting in London. Two previous reductions have been made, one in September, 1955, and one in August, 1956, totalling 97,000 men.

UNITED STATES

NEW CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

It was announced from Washington on 26th March that President Eisenhower had nominated General Nathan Twining, U.S.A.F., to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in succession to Admiral Arthur William Radford, with effect from 15th August, 1957.

NAVY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

For The Queen's State Visit to Lisbon, which began on 18th February, the Royal Yacht *Britannia* was escorted by the destroyers *Chieftain*, *Chevron*, and *Chaplet*, under the command of Captain A. E. T. Christie, Captain (D) 1st Destroyer Squadron, in the first-named ship.

H.M.Y. *Britannia* returned to Portsmouth on 24th February. She had left England on 28th August, 1956, and during the longest cruise yet undertaken by a Royal Yacht had steamed 39,500 miles and circumnavigated the globe, rounding both the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. The earlier part of the cruise was undertaken in order that Princess Margaret might travel by sea from Mombasa to Mauritius and Zanzibar, returning to Dar es Salaam. On 16th October the Duke of Edinburgh embarked to visit Melbourne for the Olympic Games. The vessel later visited New Zealand, the Falkland Islands, Tristan da Cunha, St. Helena, Ascension, and Bathurst.

The Queen, having flown from England, rejoined the Duke of Edinburgh on 16th February and embarked in the Royal Yacht for the Lisbon visit.

AIDES-DE-CAMP.—The following were appointed Naval Aides-de-Camp to The Queen from 7th January, 1957, in succession to the officers stated:—Captain E. C. Bayldon, D.S.C., in succession to Rear-Admiral V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C.; Captain B. E. W. Logan in succession to Rear-Admiral G. A. F. Norfolk, D.S.O.; Captain W. Evershed, D.S.O., in succession to Captain G. H. Peters, D.S.C.; Captain G. T. Lambert, D.S.C., in succession to Captain A. H. Wallis, C.B.E.; Captain R. B. Honnywill in succession to Rear-Admiral K. St. B. Collins, O.B.E., D.S.C.; Captain J. N. Hicks, D.S.C., in succession to Captain P. L. Saumarez, D.S.C.

The following were also announced from the dates stated:—Captain W. G. Pulvertaft, O.B.E., in succession to Captain L. F. Ingram, 30th January, 1957; Captain J. K. Highton, C.B.E., in succession to Captain J. Parrott, C.B.E., 31st January, 1957; Captain H. C. N. Rolfe, in succession to Captain R. C. Medley, D.S.O., O.B.E., 15th February, 1957; Captain S. A. Harrison-Smith, O.B.E., in succession to Captain J. E. Best, 5th March, 1957; Instructor Captain S. W. Clark in succession to Instructor Captain P. Bracelin, C.B.E., 17th January, 1957.

DUKE OF GLOUCESTER.—On 5th March, the Duke of Gloucester flew from the R.N. Air Station, Cudrose, to the aircraft carrier *Albion* in mid-Channel on her return from the Mediterranean and service in the Port Said landings. His Royal Highness spent the night on board and left next day by helicopter, landing in H.M.S. *Vernon*, Portsmouth. A congratulatory signal was made by the Duke to the ship after his return.

BOARD OF ADMIRALTY

NEW CIVILIAN MEMBERS.—In the Ministerial appointments announced on 17th January, following the succession of Sir Anthony Eden as Prime Minister by Mr. Harold Macmillan, Lord Selkirk, formerly Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in succession to Lord Hailsham, who became Minister of Education. Subsequently Mr. Christopher Soames, M.P., was appointed Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, in succession to the Hon. George Ward, M.P., who became Secretary of State for Air; and the Hon. Thomas Galbraith, M.P., was appointed Civil Lord in succession to Mr. Kenelm S. D. Wingfield Digby, M.P.

NEW PATENT.—The Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, bearing date the 18th day of January, 1957, to appoint the following to be Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral:—

Group Captain the Right Hon. George Nigel, Earl of Selkirk, O.B.E., A.F.C.
Admiral of the Fleet the Right Hon. Louis F. A. V. N., Earl Mountbatten of Burma, K.G., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., D.S.O.

Admiral Sir Charles E. Lambe, K.C.B., C.V.O.
Vice-Admiral Sir J. Peter L. Reid, K.C.B., C.V.O.
Rear-Admiral Robert D. Watson, C.B., C.B.E.
Vice-Admiral Alexander N. C. Bingley, C.B., O.B.E.
Admiral Sir William W. Davis, K.C.B., D.S.O.
Vice-Admiral Sir Eric G. A. Clifford, K.C.B., C.B.E.
Captain A. Christopher J. Soames, C.B.E.
The Hon. Thomas G. D. Galbraith.
Sir John G. Lang, G.C.B.

REVISED COMPOSITION.—On 5th March it was announced that the duties of the Fifth Sea Lord and the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff are to be amalgamated. In future the holder of the combined post will be responsible both for the general direction and co-ordination of policy on naval air matters and also for all questions of tactics, technical policy, and fighting efficiency, including proposals for the staff requirements of new ships and the development and use of weapons in relation to naval warfare. The first holder of the post, who will be known as the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff and Fifth Sea Lord, will be the present Fifth Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral A. N. C. Bingley, C.B., O.B.E.

FLAG APPOINTMENTS

C-in-C., PORTSMOUTH.—Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., to be Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, in succession to Admiral of the Fleet Sir George E. Creasy, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O. (May 1957).

C.O.S., PORTSMOUTH.—Rear-Admiral V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, in succession to Rear-Admiral P. W. Burnett, D.S.O., D.S.C. (February, 1957).

FLAG OFFICER, MALTA.—Rear-Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden, Bt., C.B., to be Flag Officer, Malta, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. G. Brittain, C.B., C.B.E., to take effect in June, 1957. The appointment of Rear-Admiral Sir St. John R. J. Tyrwhitt, Bt., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer, Malta, announced on 28th December, 1956, has been cancelled on the grounds of ill-health.

C.O.S., MEDITERRANEAN.—Captain C. D. Bonham-Carter, R.N., to be Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, serving in the acting rank of Rear-Admiral, to take effect in early July, 1957.

MALTA DOCKYARD.—Rear-Admiral J. Lee-Barber, D.S.O., to be Admiral Superintendent, H.M. Dockyard, Malta (February, 1957).

F.O.2, FAR EAST.—Rear-Admiral L. G. Durlacher, O.B.E., D.S.C., to be Flag Officer Commanding Fifth Cruiser Squadron and Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, in succession to Rear-Admiral W. K. Edden, C.B., O.B.E., to take effect in August, 1957.

PERSONAL SERVICES.—Rear-Admiral G. A. F. Norfolk, D.S.O., to be Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Personal Services) in succession to Rear-Admiral L. G. Durlacher, O.B.E., D.S.C. (April, 1957). Rear-Admiral D. E. Holland-Martin, D.S.O., D.S.C., to be Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel (Officers), in succession to Rear-Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden, Bt., C.B. (May, 1957).

D.G.S.—Rear-Admiral H. P. Koelle to be promoted Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet and appointed Director General Supply and Secretariat Branch, in succession to Vice-Admiral Sir Maurice H. Elliott, K.C.B., C.B.E., to take effect in August, 1957.

NUCLEAR PROPULSION.—Rear-Admiral G. A. M. Wilson to be Deputy Engineer-in-Chief (N), Rear-Admiral Nuclear Propulsion (18th February, 1957). (See under *Matériel*.)

RETIREMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

The following changes on the Flag List were announced to date 10th January, 1957:—
To be placed on the Retired List—

Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.

Vice-Admiral Sir Peter G. L. Cazalet, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C.

To be promoted to Admiral in H.M. Fleet—

Vice-Admiral Sir Caspar John, K.C.B.

To be promoted to Vice-Admiral in H.M. Fleet—

Rear-Admiral G. B. Sayer, C.B., D.S.C.

Rear-Admiral A. N. C. Bingley, C.B., O.B.E.

The following change was announced to date 15th January, 1957:—Rear-Admiral R. L. Fisher, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., D.S.C., to be placed on the Retired List.

The following change was announced to date 14th February, 1957:—Rear-Admiral R. A. Currie, C.B., D.S.C., to be placed on the Retired List.

The following change was announced to date 1st April, 1957:—Rear-Admiral B. Bryant, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., to be placed on the Retired List.

PERSONNEL

NEW LISTS.—In *The London Gazette* on 1st January there was published an Order in Council dated 19th December, 1956, giving effect to the decision of the Admiralty that it is no longer desirable for officers of the Royal Navy to be divided into the separate categories of Executive, Engineer, Supply and Secretariat, and Electrical Officers, but that a new General List should be formed. The Order also provided that the former Branch List of Officers should be reorganized to form new Special Duties Lists, to comprise officers promoted from ratings other than those selected for promotion to the General List; and Supplementary Lists, as may be required, to comprise officers commissioned for specialized duties. The new schedules had effect from 1st January, 1957. The provisions of a further Order in Council of 15th February, 1957, were published in *The London Gazette* on 19th and 26th February, 1957.

R.F.R. REDUCED.—On 15th March the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty announced in the House of Commons that a review of the Royal Fleet Reserve had been carried out and it had been decided to reduce the strength of the Reserve, which contained over 30,000 men, to about 5,000. The men concerned were notified that they would be discharged from the R.F.R. at the end of March. Those discharged will still be subject to recall in emergency up to the age of 45 under the terms of the Navy, Army, and Air Force Reserves Act, 1954. The Royal Fleet Reserve was set up by the Naval Reserve Act, 1900. Its main source of recruitment has been from ratings and Royal Marine other ranks serving on an engagement for seven years' active service followed by five years in the R.F.R. "provided their services are so long required." The size of the Reserve has been much larger than was really necessary.

MATERIEL

NUCLEAR PROPULSION.—The Admiralty has given tangible expression to its belief in the vital importance, both to the Royal and Merchant Navies, of the early development of nuclear propulsion for ships. It has announced the creation of a new post of Rear-Admiral Nuclear Propulsion (see under Flag Appointments). This officer will act as the focus within the Admiralty of the operational and material aspects of nuclear propulsion, and will keep in touch with developments by the Atomic Energy Authority and by industry in the application to ships of this revolutionary form of power. He will have general direction of the work of the Navy Section at Harwell.

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE.—It was announced in the House of Commons on 5th March that an order had been placed with Vickers-Armstrongs (Shipbuilders), Limited, for the construction of a prototype nuclear propulsion submarine. The name *Dreadnought* has been approved by The Queen for this first British nuclear submarine.

HARWICH TO CLOSE.—The Admiralty, it was announced on 14th March, has decided to close down the naval base at Harwich, with the exception of H.M.S. *Ganges*, the training establishment at Shotley. The following facilities are involved:—the civilian-manned local servicing craft; surrender of playing fields (not those of H.M.S. *Ganges*); naval storehouses and berths on Parkeston Quay; Bristol Pier on the Shotley side (*Ganges* Pier will be retained); a proportion of the mooring buoys; the artificial small-craft harbour; and the degaussing range.

COMPLETIONS.—H.M.S. *Russell*, the seventh of the "Blackwood" class of anti-submarine frigates, was provisionally accepted into service on 7th February. H.M.S. *Salisbury*, the first of the "Salisbury" class of air direction frigates, was provisionally accepted into service on 27th February. Frigates of this class are designed primarily for the direction of carrier-borne or shore-based aircraft. They will also serve as a smaller type of destroyer in offensive operations. H.M.S. *Lynx*, the first of the "Leopard" class of frigates, designed primarily for the protection of convoys against attack by aircraft, was provisionally accepted into service on 14th March.

LAUNCH.—The "Whitby" class anti-submarine frigate *Blackpool* was launched on 14th February by Messrs. Harland and Wolff, Limited, Belfast. Frigates of this class, having been primarily designed for the location and detection of the most modern type of submarines, will be fitted with the latest underwater detection equipment and anti-submarine weapons of post-war development.

FLEET AIR ARM

BOYD TROPHY.—The Boyd Trophy for 1956 has been awarded to the crews of the two helicopters from the R.N. Air Station, Lossiemouth, Sea Air Rescue Flight, for their rescue of the crew of the stranded Norwegian vessel *Døvreffjell* on 3rd February, 1956, in extremely hazardous circumstances in a gale. In announcing the award Admiral Sir Caspar John, the Flag Officer Air (Home) states: "I gave particular attention to the deservedly strong claims made on behalf of all those who took part in the Suez operations. The past year has, however, been exceptional in fine feats of aviation and the rescue described is judged the most outstanding."

U.S. AIR PRESENTATION.—On 21st February Vice-Admiral R. F. Elkins, Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, presented to Vice-Admiral A. K. Doyle, U.S.N., Chief of U.S. Naval Air Training, a silver trophy replica of a jet fighter, a model of the aircraft which landed on H.M.S. *Ocean* in December, 1945, and thus performed the first scheduled jet deck landing in the world. The presentation marks the appreciation of U.S. co-operation whereby some 258 pupil pilots of the Fleet Air Arm were trained up to operational standards with the U.S. Navy.

AUTOMATIC FIXER.—The first automatic fixer control stations for Service aircraft in Britain are now being used by the Fleet Air Arm at the R.N. Air Stations at Yeovilton (Somerset) and Abbotsinch (near Glasgow). These stations cover the whole of the United Kingdom and much of the surrounding seas. By telemetering bearings from direction-finding equipment, the reply is almost instantaneous; the system previously employed involved delays of up to a minute.

LEE-ON-SOLENT.—On 15th March the R.N. Barracks and R.N. Air Station, Lee-on-Solent, were amalgamated under the command of a captain as a single establishment known as H.M.S. *Daedalus*, R.N. Air Station. From the same date the post of Commodore, R.N. Barracks, Lee-on-Solent, lapsed.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE

GENERAL SERVICE RATINGS' SECTION DISBANDED

It was announced on 5th February that the Admiralty have decided to disband the General Service Ratings' Section of the Royal Naval Reserve from 1st March. This decision has been reached because, since most merchant seamen would not be immediately

available on mobilization, they can in the event of war best serve their Country by remaining in their merchant ships. The number of ratings involved is about 950. The Officers' Section of the Reserve and the Patrol Service Section (Fishermen) will continue unchanged.

ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE

AIR BRANCH DISBANDED.—The Board of Admiralty announced on 15th January that the Air Branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was to be disbanded. The disbandment was completed by the week-end 9th/10th March. A message of appreciation sent on 15th January referred to the "extreme reluctance" with which Their Lordships had been compelled by financial and manpower considerations to agree to the disbandment.

NEW "H" LIST.—The formation of a new section of the R.N.V.R. and of the Women's R.N.V.R. was announced in the House of Commons on 13th February. It will be known as List "H," and its purpose, said Mr. Soames, Parliamentary Secretary, "is to provide a reserve of trained men and women living near to naval headquarters who will be immediately available in war to assist in manning the headquarters and will be able to assist in naval exercises by undergoing peace-time training at the headquarters."

CLYDE DIVISION MEMORIAL.—The ship's bell of H.M.S. *Vimiera*, mined off Sheerness in 1942, and bought 10 years ago by her former commanding officer, Captain R. B. N. Hicks, who now commands the aircraft carrier *Warrior*, was presented by him on 17th January to the Clyde Division of the R.N.V.R. at Govan, Glasgow, as a memorial to the ratings who lost their lives. It was received by Captain W. S. Dobson, V.R.D., R.N.V.R., who was a sub-lieutenant in the *Vimiera* when Captain Hicks had command of the ship.

ROYAL MARINES

HON. COLONEL COMMANDANT.—The Queen has approved the appointment of Major-General V. D. Thomas, C.B., C.B.E. (Retired) as Honorary Colonel Commandant, Plymouth Group, Royal Marines, in succession to Major-General C. R. W. Lamplough, C.B.E., D.S.C., J.P. (Retired), with effect from 1st February, 1957.

HONOURS AND AWARDS.—In *The London Gazette* on 29th January, awards for distinguished services in operations against terrorists in Cyprus included the following:—

Bar to the D.S.O.—Lieutenant-Colonel N. H. Tailyour, D.S.O., 45 Commando, Royal Marines.

Military Cross.—Captain R. H. Grant, 40 Commando, Royal Marines.

VISIT OF U.S. COMMANDANT.—General Randolph McC. Pate, U.S.M.C., arrived at London Airport on 3rd April for a short visit to the Royal Marines and to visit units and establishments of the Portsmouth and Plymouth Groups.

CANADA

BOVAVENTURE HANDED OVER.—Lord Hailsham, late First Lord, was present according to promise at the handing over of H.M.C.S. *Bonaventure* at Belfast on 17th January to the Royal Canadian Navy. This new aircraft carrier was formerly H.M.S. *Powerful*. Her sister-ship, H.M.C.S. *Magnificent*, is being returned to the Royal Navy.

"FAIRWAY" CONFERENCE.—Advantage was taken of the presence of senior United States and Canadian naval officers in England for the Commonwealth Naval Conference at the R.N. College, Greenwich, from 29th April to 2nd May, for an exercise called "Fairlead," to hold a further exercise called "Fairway" to study naval problems solely related to the North Atlantic.

AUSTRALIA

TERRORIST BOMBARDMENT.—While operating off the coast of Malaya on 22nd January, two Australian frigates, *Queenborough* and *Quickmatch*, each fired 40 rounds of high explosive at suspected terrorist camps. The targets included two isolated huts, a coconut grove, and a log bridge situated in south-east Johore, near Tanjong Siang.

H.M.A.S. VOYAGER.—A new "Daring" class ship, the *Voyager*, built in Australia, was commissioned by the Royal Australian Navy at Sydney on 12th February. She is a sister-ship of the *Vendetta*, launched in 1954, and the *Vampire*, launched last October, both in Australia. She carries six 4.5-inch guns, six 40-mm. anti-aircraft guns, and 10 21-inch torpedo tubes.

SOUTH AFRICA

SIMONSTOWN TRANSFERRED.—The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selkirk, represented the United Kingdom Government at the ceremony which marked the transfer of Simonstown naval base to the South African Government on 2nd April. Admiralty House, Simonstown, ceased to be the residence of the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief on 11th March, after 143 years.

NEW FRIGATES.—It was announced from Cape Town on 22nd February that the South African Navy has placed orders in Britain for the building of three modern anti-submarine frigates of 2,000 tons displacement. They are the latest vessels ordered in the Navy's £18m. development scheme.

PAKISTAN

NEW DESTROYERS

Two destroyers sold to the Pakistan Government have been handed over by the Royal Navy. H.M.S. *Gabbard* was transferred by the Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral R. D. Watson, at Newcastle-on-Tyne on 24th January, and renamed the P.N.S. *Badr*. H.M.S. *Cadiz* was transferred by the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir William Davis, at Glasgow on 1st February, and renamed the P.N.S. *Khaibar*.

FOREIGN

DENMARK

VISIT TO ENGLAND

Danish ships of the First Frigate Division and a submarine arrived in England early in February for a period of five weeks for anti-submarine and gunnery exercises, some of which took place in company with British warships. During their visit the ships were based at Portland. They were the *Holger Danske* (ex-British "River" class frigate *Monnow*), the *Rolf Kraake* and *Valdemar Sejr* (ex-British "Hunt" class destroyers *Calpe* and *Exmoor*), and the submarine *Springeren* (ex-British submarine *P.52*, which served in the Polish Navy during the 1939-45 War). The Squadron was commanded by Captain O. L. W. Marckmann.

FRANCE

NEW AIRCRAFT CARRIER.—The keel was laid in February at St. Nazaire of an aircraft carrier, the *Foch*, which with her sister-ship, the *Clemenceau*, will be the largest to be built for the French Navy since the War.

ATOMIC SUBMARINE.—The Assistant Director of the Centre of Nuclear Studies, M. Baissas, said at Tarbes on 23rd March that an atomic submarine for France may be ready to take the water within four years. The vessel will be the *Q.244*, soon to be begun, of about 5,000 tons. When commissioned she will serve as a training ship for crews of other vessels to be driven by atomic power.

GERMANY

BREMERHAVEN BASE.—The United States naval base at Bremerhaven is to be taken over this Spring by the West German Navy. This was announced on 21st January by Mr. W. C. Trimble, the United States Minister to the Federal Republic, on the occasion of the handing over of seven vessels to West Germany, the last of 42 former German vessels seized by the United States at the end of the war to be returned.

SALVED U-BOATS.—The Bonn correspondent of *The Times* reported on 18th February that the prototype of a German U-boat which was to have revolutionized submarine warfare had been sighted 15 fathoms deep on the bottom of Flensburg Fjord, where she was scuttled by her commander at the end of the war. She is described as a schnorkel-elektroboot with a displacement of 1,500 tons. The submarine will be raised this Spring for the Federal Navy, which has already taken over two salved U-boats.

GREECE

MALTA REPRESENTATIVE

Commodore G. Karvelis, Royal Hellenic Navy, on 16th February took up his appointment at Headquarters of Allied Forces, Mediterranean, in Malta as Senior Greek National Representative and Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics Division. In his capacity as Senior Greek National Representative he relieved Commander P. S. Pyromillios, R.H.N., who had been at Headquarters since February, 1955; and he has relieved Captain R. L. Kirby, Royal Navy, as Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics Division.

TURKEY

BRITISH DESTROYERS

The Istanbul correspondent of *The Times* confirmed on 10th March that Great Britain has sold to Turkey four destroyers, which will be delivered soon. It is understood that the British and Turkish Governments are discussing the details of this transfer and of payment for the destroyers, which amounts to about £3m.

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC CARRIER.—On 4th March the United States Navy awarded contracts totalling \$11,376,315 (about £4,060,000) for the main propulsion machinery for the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and for five more nuclear-powered submarines. The Westinghouse Electric Corporation was given a contract to build steam turbines, gears, condensers, and other machinery for the carrier; and the General Electric plant at Lynn, Massachusetts, was given contracts to supply propulsion machinery and gears for the five submarines.

The first atomic submarine, the *Nautilus*, commissioned in January, 1955, completed her first 60,000 nautical miles of cruising on 5th February.

NAVAL REVIEW.—The Admiralty has been invited by the American State Department in Washington to send a squadron of the Royal Navy to the United States for an international naval review which is being held at Hampton Roads between 8th and 17th June as part of the 350th anniversary celebrations of Virginia. Twenty-seven countries have been invited to join in the review.

ARMY NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

The Queen has been graciously pleased to assume the Honorary Colonelcy of The Queen's Own Warwickshire and Worcestershire Yeomanry, with effect from 1st January, 1957.

The Duke of Edinburgh, on 20th March, presented "The Duke of Edinburgh's Trophy" to Major-General B. A. Coad, Colonel, The Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's), who received it on behalf of the winners, 1st Battalion, The Wiltshire Regiment.

The Duke of Edinburgh visited the Headquarters of The Leicestershire and Derbyshire (Prince Albert's Own) Yeomanry at Derby on 28th March.

The Duke of Gloucester visited the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade at Aldershot on 4th February.

The Duke of Gloucester, as Colonel-in-Chief, visited the 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders, at Dover on 2nd April.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to approve the following appointments:—

Field-Marshal H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh, K.G., K.T., G.B.E., to be Honorary Colonel, The Leicestershire and Derbyshire (Prince Albert's Own) Yeomanry, with effect from 1st January, 1957.

TO BE AIDE-DE-CAMP (GENERAL) TO THE QUEEN.—General Sir Nevil C. D. Brownjohn, K.C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C. (31st January, 1957), vice General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired.

TO BE AIDES-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN.—Brigadier W. R. Smijth-Windham, C.B.E., D.S.O. (4th December, 1956), vice Major-General L. de M. Thuillier, O.B.E., promoted; Brigadier I. H. Good, D.S.O. (29th January, 1957), vice Brigadier A. M. Finlaison, C.B.E., D.S.O., tenure expired.

TO BE COLONELS COMMANDANT.—Of the Royal Horse Artillery, Major-General G. W. E. Heath, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (1st March, 1957), vice Field-Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D., tenure expired; of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Major-General J. M. Kirkman, C.B., C.B.E. (1st January, 1957), vice Lieut.-General Sir Charles W. Allfrey, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., tenure expired, and Lieut.-General D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st March, 1957), vice Field-Marshal the Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D., tenure expired.

TO BE COLONELS OF REGIMENTS.—Of The King's Regiment (Liverpool), Brigadier R. N. M. Jones, C.B.E., A.D.C. (1st April, 1957), vice General Sir Dudley Ward, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., tenure expired; of The Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany's), Lieut.-General Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (15th March, 1957), vice Colonel (Honorary Major-General) Sir John E. Laurie, Bart., C.B.E., D.S.O., resigned; of the Corps of Royal Military Police, Lieut.-General Sir A. James H. Cassels, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (27th May, 1957), vice General Sir Miles C. Dempsey, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., D.L., tenure expired.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

The following was included on 8th March in the list of awards published in the Supplement to *The London Gazette* of 5th March, 1957, in recognition of distinguished services in Kenya for the period 21st April to 20th October, 1956:—

C.B.—Brigadier R. M. P. Carver, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

ARMY COUNCIL

The Queen has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal bearing date the 18th day of January, 1957, to appoint the following to be Her Majesty's Army Council:—

Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. J. H. Hare, O.B.E.—*President*.

Captain H. J. Amery.—*Vice-President*.

Field-Marshal Sir Gerald W. R. Templer, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O.

General Sir Charles F. Loewen, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C.

General Sir Nevil C. D. Brownjohn, K.C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

Lieut.-General Sir William P. Oliver, K.C.B., O.B.E.

Lieut.-General Sir Richard A. Hull, K.C.B., D.S.O.

E. W. Playfair, Esq., K.C.B.

APPOINTMENTS

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY.—Major-General A. H. Musson, C.B.E., appointed President Ordnance Board, Ministry of Supply (2nd March, 1957).

WAR OFFICE.—Lieut.-General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War (1st February, 1957). Substituted for the notification in the August, 1956, JOURNAL.

Major-General C. P. Jones, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Vice-Adjutant-General (1st March, 1957).

Major-General J. B. Churcher, C.B., D.S.O., appointed Director of Military Training (May, 1957).

Major-General G. S. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., appointed Director of Staff Duties (June, 1957).

Major-General L. N. Tyler, C.B., O.B.E., B.Sc.(Eng.), M.I.Mech.E., A.M.I.E.E., appointed Director of Mechanical Engineering (June, 1957).

Brigadier A. F. J. Elmslie, C.B.E., A.M.I.Mech.E., appointed Inspector R.A.S.C., with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1957).

Colonel S. Moore-Coulson, E.R.D., appointed Director of Army Education, with the temporary rank of Major-General (July, 1957).

Major-General R. J. Moberly, O.B.E., appointed Signal Officer-in-Chief (August, 1957).

Brigadier G. Peddie, D.S.O., O.B.E., appointed Director of Manpower Planning, with the temporary rank of Major-General (August, 1957).

Lieut.-General Sir William H. Stratton, K.C.B., C.V.O., O.B.E., D.S.O., appointed Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (September, 1957).

Colonel M. K. R. Colvin, O.B.E., T.D., appointed Director, Women's Royal Army Corps, with the temporary rank of Brigadier (September, 1957).

Lieut.-General Sir Gerald W. Lathbury, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.B.E., appointed Director General of Military Training (November, 1957).

UNITED KINGDOM.—Major-General J. N. R. Moore, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., London District (July, 1957).

Brigadier H. A. Borradaile, D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., 43rd Infantry Division, T.A. and South-Western District, with the temporary rank of Major-General (September, 1957).

GERMANY.—Brigadier K. C. O. Bastyan, C.B.E., appointed Chief Signal Officer, Headquarters, Northern Army Group, with the temporary rank of Major-General (June, 1957).

MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES.—Lieut.-General Sir Geoffrey K. Bourne, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., appointed Commander-in-Chief (9th January, 1957). Substituted for the notification in the August, 1956, JOURNAL.

Brigadier R. E. Lloyd, D.S.O., O.B.E., B.A., appointed Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, with the temporary rank of Major-General (June, 1957).

EAST AFRICA.—Major-General N. P. H. Tapp, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., East Africa (July, 1957).

FAR EAST LAND FORCES.—Major-General R. G. Collingwood, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., appointed G.O.C., Singapore District (March, 1957).

PROMOTIONS

General.—Lieut.-General to be General :—Sir Dudley Ward, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. (4th February, 1957).

Lieut.-Generals.—Temporary Lieut.-Generals to be Lieut.-Generals :—C. D. Packard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (4th February, 1957); H. E. Pyman, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (8th March, 1957).

Major-Generals.—Temporary Major-Generals or Brigadiers to be Major-Generals :—L. de M. Thuillier, O.B.E., A.D.C. (4th December, 1956); G. A. T. Pritchard, C.B.E. (15th December, 1956); J. N. Carter, C.B.E. (1st January, 1957); W. G. Stirling, C.B.E., D.S.O. (23rd January, 1957); G. P. Gregson, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (29th January, 1957); R. W. Urquhart, D.S.O. (29th January, 1957); R. W. Jelf, C.B.E., A.D.C. (4th February, 1957); L. H. O. Pugh, C.B.E., D.S.O. (1st March, 1957); E. D. Howard-Vyse, C.B.E., M.C. (7th March, 1957); R. W. Ewbank, C.B.E., D.S.O., B.A. (8th March, 1957).

Brigadiers or Colonels to be temporary Major-Generals :—D. S. S. O'Connor, C.B.E. (30th January, 1957); R. W. Craddock, C.B.E., D.S.O. (21st February, 1957); R. K. Exham, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. (1st March, 1957); St. J. C. Hooley, C.B.E. (4th March, 1957); G. C. Gordon Lennox, C.V.O., D.S.O. (21st March, 1957).

RETIREMENTS

The following General Officers have retired :—Major-General B. Daunt, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (23rd January, 1957); Major-General H. MacG. Paterson, C.B., C.B.E., M.A. (29th January, 1957); Major-General W. H. D. Ritchie, C.B., C.B.E. (29th January, 1957); Major-General A. J. H. Dove, C.B., C.B.E. (1st March, 1957); Major-General Sir A. Douglas Campbell, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C., M.A. (7th March, 1957); Lieut.-General Sir Colin B. Callander, K.C.B., K.B.E., M.C. (8th March, 1957); General Sir Richard N. Gale, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. (20th March, 1957); Major-General A. E. Morrison, C.B., O.B.E. (23rd March, 1957); Major-General S. A. Cooke, C.B., O.B.E. (31st March, 1957).

BATTLE HONOURS

The following is the second list of Battle Honours approved by The Queen for the 1939-45 War. The Battle Honours selected to be borne on Colours and Appointments are shown in bold print.

9TH QUEEN'S ROYAL LANCERS.—"Somme, 1940," "Withdrawal to Seine," "North-West Europe, 1940," "Saunnu," "Gazala," "Bir el Aslagh," "Sidi Rezegh, 1942," "Defence of Alamein Line," "Ruweisat," "Ruweisat Ridge," "El Alamein," "Tebaga Gap," "El Hamma," "El Kourzia," "Tunis," "Creteville Pass," "North Africa, 1942-43," "Coriano," "Capture of Forli," "Lamone Crossing," "Pideura," "Defence of Lamone Bridgehead," "Argenta Gap," "Italy, 1944-45."

15TH/19TH THE KING'S ROYAL HUSSARS.—"Withdrawal to Escaut," "Seine, 1944," "Hechtel," "Nederrijn," "Venraij," "Rhineland," "Hochwald," "Rhine," "Ibbenburen," "Aller," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45."

17TH/21ST LANCERS.—"Tebourba Gap," "Bou Arada," "Kasserine," "Thala," "Fondouk," "El Kourzia," "Tunis," "Hammam Lif," "North Africa, 1942-43," "Cassino II," "Monte Piccolo," "Capture of Perugia," "Advance to Florence," "Argenta Gap," "Fossa Cembalina," "Italy, 1944-45."

THE ROYAL WILTSHIRE YEOMANRY (PRINCE OF WALES'S OWN), R.A.C., T.A.—"Iraq, 1941," "Palmyra," "Syria, 1941," "El Alamein," "North Africa, 1942," "Liri Valley," "Advance to Tiber," "Citta della Pieve," "Trasimene Line," "Advance to Florence," "Monte Cedrone," "Citta di Castello," "Italy, 1944."

THE CHESHIRE YEOMANRY (EARL OF CHESTER'S), R.A.C., T.A.—"Syria, 1941." *Honorary Distinction*: A Royal Corps of Signals Badge with year-date "1945" and scroll "North-West Europe."

THE DERBYSHIRE YEOMANRY, R.A.C., T.A.—"Dives Crossing," "La Vie Crossing," "Lisieux," "Lower Maas," "Ourthe," "Rhineland," "Reichswald," "North-West Europe, 1944-45," "Alam el Halfa," "El Alamein," "Medjez el Bab," "Tabourba Gap," "Bou Arada," "Kasserine," "Steamroller Farm," "Maknassy," "Fondouk," "Kairouan," "El Kourzia," "Tunis," "North Africa, 1942-43," "Cassino II," "Liri Valley," "Aquino," "Arezzo," "Advance to Florence," "Argenta Gap," "Fossa Cembalina," "Italy, 1944-45."

THE ROYAL GLOUCESTERSHIRE HUSSARS, R.A.C., T.A.—"Tobruk, 1941," "Gubi I," "Sidi Rezegh, 1941," "Chor es Sufan," "Gazala," "Bir el Aslagh," "Cauldron," "Alam el Halfa," "West Point 23," "North Africa, 1941-42."

THE FIFE AND FORFAR YEOMANRY, R.A.C., T.A.—"Dunkirk, 1940," "Cheux," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Le Perier Ridge," "Scheldt," "Ourthe," "Rhineland," "Rhine," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45."

WESTMINSTER DRAGOONS (2ND COUNTY OF LONDON YEOMANRY), R.A.C., T.A.—"Normandy Landing," "Villers Bocage," "Venrai," "Meijel," "Venlo Pocket," "Roer," "North-West Europe, 1944-45."

THE ROYAL LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT.—"Norway, 1940," "Antwerp-Turnhout Canal," "Scheldt," "Zetten," "North-West Europe, 1944-45," "Jebel Mazar," "Syria, 1941," "Sidi Barrani," "Tobruk, 1941," "Montagne Farm," "North Africa, 1940-41, '43," "Salerno," "Calabritto," "Gothic Line," "Monte Gridolfo," "Monte Colombo," "Italy, 1943-45," "Crete," "Heraklion," "Kampar," "Malaya, 1941-42," "Chindits, 1944."

THE DUKE OF CORNWALL'S LIGHT INFANTRY.—"Defence of Escaut," "Cheux," "Hill 112," "Mont Pincon," "Noireau Crossing," "Nederrijn," "Opheusden," "Gellenkirchen," "Rhineland," "Goch," "Rhine," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Gazala," "Medjez Plain," "Si Abdallah," "North Africa, 1942-43," "Cassino II," "Trasimene Line," "Advance to Florence," "Incontro," "Rimini Line," "Italy, 1944-45."

THE WILTSHIRE REGIMENT (DUKE OF EDINBURGH'S).—"Defence of Arras," "Ypres-Comines Canal," "Odon," "Caen," "Hill 112," "Bourguebus Ridge," "Maltot," "Mont Pincon," "La Varinjere," "Seine, 1944," "Nederrijn," "Roer," "Rhineland," "Cleve," "Goch," "Xanten," "Rhine," "Bremen," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Solarino," "Simeto Bridgehead," "Sicily, 1943," "Garigliano Crossing," "Minturno," "Anzio," "Rome," "Advance to Tiber," "Italy, 1943-44," "Middle East, 1942," "North Arakan," "Point 551," "Mayu Tunnels," "Ngakyedauk Pass," "Burma, 1943-44."

THE YORK AND LANCASTER REGIMENT.—"Norway, 1940," "Odon," "Fontenay le Pesnil," "Caen," "La Vie Crossing," "La Touques Crossing," "Forêt de Bretonne," "Le Havre," "Antwerp-Turnhout Canal," "Scheldt," "Lower Maas," "Arnhem, 1945," "North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," "Tobruk, 1941," "Tobruk Sortie, 1941," "Mine de Sedjenana," "Djebel Kournine," "North Africa, 1941, '43," "Landing in Sicily," "Simeto Bridgehead," "Pursuit to Messina," "Sicily, 1943," "Salerno,"

" Vietri Pass," " Capture of Naples," " Cava di Terreni," " Volturmo Crossing," " Monte Camino," " Calabritto," " Colle Cedro," " Garigliano Crossing," " **Minturno**," " Monte Tuga," " Anzio," " Advance to Tiber," " Gothic Line," " Coriano," " San Clemente," " Gemmano Ridge," " Carpineta," " Lamone Crossing," " Defence of Lamone Bridge-head," " Rimini Line," " San Marino," " Italy, 1943-45," " **Crete**," " Heraklion," " Middle East, 1941," " **North Arakan**," " Maungdaw," " Rangoon Road," " Toungoo," " Arakan Beaches," " **Chindits, 1944**," " Burma, 1943-45."

PRINCESS LOUISE'S KENSINGTON REGIMENT, T.A.—" **St. Valery en Caux**," " **Saar**," " Tilly sur Seules," " **Odon**," " **Antwerp-Turnhout Canal**," " Venlo Pocket," " Zetten," " **Arnhem, 1945**," " North-West Europe, 1940, '44-45," " **Centuripe**," " Sicily, 1943," " **Termoli**," " **Sangro**," " **Cassino II**," " Liri Valley," " Monte Spaduro," " **Argenta Gap**," " Italy, 1943-45."

ROYAL HONG KONG DEFENCE FORCE.—" **Hong Kong**."

REGULAR ARMY RECRUITING

The Regular Army recruiting statistics for February show that the total number of enlistments from civil life during the month were 2,737 men and 504 boys compared with 1,850 and 81 in December, and 2,875 and 159 in January. The figures for re-enlistments were 6 from Short Service (December, 8; January, 5), and 186 from National Service (December, 238; January, 198).

TRAINING OF NATIONAL SERVICE MEN IN 1957

It was announced on 15th January that National Service men will not be called up for part-time training with the Territorial Army or the Army Emergency Reserve, including the Mobile Defence Corps, during 1957. This decision concerns 1957 only and in no way affects the statutory obligation of National Service men to carry out part-time training under the National Service Acts, 1948 to 1950, if required to do so.

EAST AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES

The future of the East African forces, which are at present under the control and administration of the Army Council in the United Kingdom, has been under discussion between H.M. Government and the East African Governments. These Governments have now accepted reversion to the system in force before the outbreak of the 1939-45 War, whereby the forces in East Africa will be administered not by the War Office but by the East African Governments. H.M. Government have agreed that this reversion to local control and administration shall take effect as from 1st July, 1957.

The Commander-in-Chief's responsibilities will not be affected but he will be responsible not to the War Office but to the three Governors. Each of the three Governors will continue to control the use and movement of the territorial forces in his territory.

The new arrangement will enable the territorial Governments to assume greater responsibility for the expenditure on the forces, and will permit of a closer control by each Government of the administrative organization needed for the forces.

On grounds of economy and efficiency, it is proposed that certain administrative functions connected with stores, rations, pay, and records should be performed on behalf of the three Governments by a section of the Administrator's Office of the East African High Commission; this will require the approval of the Legislatures of the three East African territories, and appropriate resolutions will be submitted to the Legislatures.

WAR MEMORIAL

THE ROYAL ULSTER RIFLES

The Royal Ulster Rifles Book of Remembrance, containing the names of 10,000 officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and riflemen of the Regiment who gave their lives in the South African War, the 1914-18 and 1939-45 Wars, and the Korean War, was placed in St. Anne's Cathedral, Belfast, on 17th March.

MISCELLANEOUS

GUIDED WEAPONS REGIMENT.—The first guided weapons regiment, the 47th Guided Weapons Regiment (Field), R.A., started forming on 1st March.

W.R.A.C. STAFF BAND VISITS B.A.O.R.—The W.R.A.C. band, 35 strong, visited B.A.O.R. between 24th March and 2nd April. The band gave three concerts, one at Field Records, one in the Kaiser Friedrich Halle, Moench Gladbach, and the other at the Concert Hall; the band also beat Retreat at Headquarters, B.A.O.R.

CADETS VISIT B.A.O.R.—Five hundred and fifty-four officers, instructors, and cadets from Army Cadet Force and Combined Cadet Force units in schools paid a 10-day visit to units in the British Army of the Rhine in April. They were attached to armoured, artillery, and infantry units—in most cases with the county regiments or regiments with whom they have some affiliation. They saw special demonstrations and took part in unit exercises.

VISIT OF BURMESE ARMY WOMEN OFFICERS.—Six women officers of the Burmese Army paid an 18-day visit to W.R.A.C. establishments in the United Kingdom in March, to study organization and training.

CANADA

APPOINTMENTS.—Major-General C. B. Price, C.B., D.S.O., D.C.M., V.D., C.D., has been appointed Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps.

REGIMENT'S NAME CHANGED.—It was announced on 29th January that the 8th Princess Louise's (New Brunswick) Hussars had been selected from the Militia to join the Regular Canadian Army as the third armoured regiment, and that it had been renamed the 1/8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's). There would also be a Militia unit, the 2/8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's).

ARMoured CORPS CONFERENCE.—Approximately 60 officers representing Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States attended the annual Armoured Corps conference at the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps School, Camp Borden, from 4th–8th March. Equipment development, organization, and tactics were discussed.

ARMY CADET CAMPS.—Nearly 8,000 Royal Canadian Army Cadets will be going to camps in Canada this Summer. The programme will be the largest in the history of the Army Cadet organization and reflects the recently increased ceiling on cadet membership.

PAKISTAN

NEW CHIEF OF STAFF

It was reported on 2nd March that Lieut.-General Mohammad Musa had become Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army in succession to Lieut.-General Nasir Ali Khan.

NOTICE

REGIMENTAL MUSEUM, THE QUEEN'S OWN NIGERIA REGIMENT

A regimental museum of The Queen's Own Nigeria Regiment has just been started at the Nigeria Regimental Training Centre at Zaria in Northern Nigeria. The Curator is Major W. J. Martin, O.B.E., of the Training Centre.

The museum is at the moment in its infancy and the archives are very incomplete. It is felt that there are many late officers and non-commissioned officers of the Royal West African Frontier Force who have trophies, exhibits, or items of regimental interest which they might like to send to the museum either as gifts or loans. These gifts or loans will be carefully recorded and preserved and effectively displayed.

By this means it is hoped to build up a lively and interesting collection, which will preserve and enhance the proud tradition of the Regiment.

AIR NOTES

GREAT BRITAIN

H.M. THE QUEEN

ROYAL RECEPTION FOR AUXILIARIES.—The Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh received 66 commanding and senior officers of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force at Buckingham Palace on 16th March to mark the disbandment of most of the units of this Auxiliary Force.

THE QUEEN MOTHER AT FINAL PARADE OF NO. 600 SQUADRON.—On 10th March, Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother inspected the final parade of No. 600 City of London Squadron, Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH AT FINAL PARADE OF NO. 601 SQUADRON.—On 6th March, the Duke of Edinburgh addressed the final parade of No. 601 Squadron, Royal Auxiliary Air Force.

AIR AIDE-DE-CAMP.—Air Marshal Sir Claude B. R. Pelly, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.C., appointed Air Aide-de-Camp to The Queen (29th January, 1957).

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR

In the recent Government changes the Hon. George Ward, M.P., was appointed Secretary of State for Air.

APPOINTMENTS

AIR MINISTRY.—Air Marshal D. H. F. Barnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., appointed Air Secretary (1st February, 1957).

Air Vice-Marshal J. L. F. Fuller-Good, C.B., C.V.O., C.B.E., appointed Commandant-General of the Royal Air Force Regiment and Inspector of Ground Combat Training (12th February, 1957).

Air Vice-Marshal J. N. T. Stephenson, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) (7th March, 1957).

Air Vice-Marshal E. C. Hudleston, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (September, 1957).

Air Commodore D. M. T. Macdonald, C.B., appointed Director General of Personal Services with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (March, 1957).

Air Commodore acting Air Vice-Marshal J. Marson, C.B., C.B.E., appointed Director-General of Technical Services (March, 1957).

Group Officer L. Turner, O.B.E., appointed Deputy Director, Women's Royal Air Force (February, 1957).

FIGHTER COMMAND.—Air Commodore E. S. Butler, C.B., O.B.E., appointed Air Officer in charge of Administration with the acting rank of Air Vice-Marshal (March, 1957).

MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCE.—Air Vice-Marshal L. W. C. Bower, C.B., D.S.O., D.F.C., appointed Senior Air Staff Officer (March, 1957).

SINGAPORE.—Group Captain P. D. Holder, D.S.O., D.F.C., appointed Air Officer Commanding with the acting rank of Air Commodore (February, 1957).

PROMOTIONS

Air Marshals to be Air Chief Marshals.—Sir Harry Broadhurst, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.; Sir Claude B. R. Pelly, K.C.B., C.B.E., M.C., A.D.C. (14th February, 1957).

Air Vice-Marshal to be acting Air Marshal.—F. B. L. Potter, C.B.E., M.D., Ch.B., D.P.H., D.T.M. & H., Q.H.S. (1st February, 1957).

Air Commodores to be acting Air Vice-Marshals.—S. C. Elworthy, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.F.C.; D. R. Evans, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C.; H. J. Kirkpatrick, C.B.E., D.F.C. (1st February, 1957).

RETIREMENTS

The following officers have retired:—Air Chief Marshal Sir Francis J. Fogarty, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C., A.F.C., A.D.C. (29th January, 1957); Air Marshal Sir James MacC. Kilpatrick, K.B.E., C.B., M.B., B.Ch., D.P.H., Q.H.P. (1st March, 1957).

ORGANIZATION

NEW UNIT IN R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND.—A new unit, the Central Reconnaissance Establishment, has been formed in R.A.F. Bomber Command to control the photographic reconnaissance squadrons. These squadrons are equipped with Valiants and Canberras.

MARITIME SQUADRONS DISBANDED.—Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Coastal Command, was the reviewing officer at R.A.F., Pembroke Dock, on 31st January, when the two remaining Sunderland squadrons in the United Kingdom were formally disbanded. Consisting of No. 201 Squadron, which was the senior maritime squadron in the Command, and No. 230 Squadron, this disbandment has reduced the total number of flying-boat squadrons in the R.A.F. to one, No. 205/209, which operates as a 'link' unit with the Far East Air Force and is based at R.A.F., Seletar.

ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE

In accordance with the announcement made by the Air Ministry on 15th January, most units of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force were disbanded by 10th March. These included all the fighter and air O.P. squadrons, the Regiment squadrons for ground defence of airfields, and nine of the fighter control and radar operating units.

MATERIEL

REDUCTION IN ORDERS FOR HUNTERS

The Ministry of Supply announced on 15th January that as a result of a reduction in R.A.F. requirements orders for Hunter aircraft have been reduced by 100.

TRAINING

JET TRAINING

The Royal Air Force has become the first air force to train pupil pilots entirely on jet aircraft.

MISCELLANEOUS

C.A.S. AT MEETING OF S.E.A.T.O.—Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle, Chief of the Air Staff, accompanied the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to a meeting in Canberra of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization from 11th to 13th March.

A YEAR'S AIR TRANSPORT IN MALAYA.—Royal Air Force air transport operations in support of the campaign against terrorists in Malaya achieved new records in 1956. The total weight of supplies delivered by the three R.A.F. Valetta squadrons—Nos. 48, 52, and 110—and No. 41 Squadron, Royal New Zealand Air Force (Bristol freighters), of the Far East Air Force transport wing totalled some 2,630 tons. The same squadrons dropped nearly 97,000,000 leaflets.

No. 155 Squadron, flying Whirlwind helicopters, carried 17,112 troops; No. 267 Squadron (Pioneers, Pembrokes, and other types), 4,164; and No. 194 Squadron (Sycamore helicopters), 173. The same squadrons also operated as air ambulances,

carrying Malayan civilians and aborigines as well as Service men in urgent need of medical attention. No. 194 Squadron carried 386 casualties, No. 155 carried 141, and No. 267, 123. Other passengers—Service, police, and civilian—totalled 6,677, with No. 267 Squadron carrying the major share (3,753). Fifty-five tracker dogs were also flown to their duty stations. Freight lifted by these three squadrons of small aircraft totalled 10,356,320 lb., with No. 267 Squadron again carrying the bulk—just over 10,000,000 lb.

During the year, No. 194 Squadron carried its 1,600th casualty since the unit was re-formed with helicopters in Malaya four years ago.

UNVEILING AT CRANWELL.—On 5th February, the 37th anniversary of the founding of the College, the cap and sword of the late Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard were unveiled at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, by the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Boyle.

MILITARY AIRCRAFT COSTS.—During the past few years the cost of bombing, fighting, and training aircraft has been: 1952/3, £44,000,000; 1953/4, £61,000,000; 1954/5, £70,000,000; 1955/6, £54,000,000.

BATTLE OF BRITAIN WEEK, 1957.—Battle of Britain Week this year will be from Monday, 9th September, to Sunday, 15th September.

By decision of the Air Council, 15th September is fixed as Battle of Britain Day. This year 15th September falls on the Sunday of Battle of Britain Week and will be made the occasion of ceremonial parades which include religious services. Special arrangements for such parades will be made with church authorities, local bodies, and other organizations.

R.A.F. "At Home" Day will be held on Saturday, 14th September, when a number of stations will be open to the public.

CANADA

PROMOTION.

Air Vice-Marshal H. L. Campbell, C.B.E., C.D., Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) at S.H.A.P.E., has been promoted to acting Air Marshal (February, 1957).

AUSTRALIA

NEW CHIEF OF AIR STAFF

Air Vice-Marshal F. R. W. Scherger, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., has been appointed Chief of the Air Staff (18th March, 1957).

NEW ZEALAND

CENTRAL FLYING SCHOOLS LINKED

The Queen has approved an affiliation between the Royal Air Force Central Flying School and the Royal New Zealand Air Force Central Flying School. This is the first affiliation between a Regular air force establishment in this Country and its opposite number in another Commonwealth air force.

FOREIGN

FINLAND

TO BUILD 20 GNATS

The Finnish Government has decided to buy 20 Mk. 1 Folland Gnat light jet fighters from Valmet O.Y., the Finnish State aircraft factory, which will build the machines under licence from Folland. It is expected that to assist initial production, orders for tooling and for the manufacture of several sets of parts and components will be placed with Folland Aircraft for production at the company's Hamble works.

GERMANY

ORDERS FOR THE NEW WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE.—To date the Germans have placed orders in the United Kingdom for 33 Hunting Percival Pembroke, 68 Seahawks, and 68 Bristol 171 (Sycamore) helicopters. The value of the Seahawk and Bristol orders amounts to nearly £7,500,000. In addition, the Canadian Government has made a free gift to the Germans of 75 Mk. V Sabre aircraft.

WEST GERMANY BUYS CANADIAN SABRES.—It is announced that Canada has agreed to sell West Germany 225 Mk. VI Sabre jet fighters to be built at the Canadian plant in Montreal. They will cost the Bonn Government £27,000,000. The Royal Canadian Air Force will train 360 Germans as air crew in the next two years. The contract will result in the employment of 3,000 people.

SPAIN

AIRCRAFT PROJECTS AT HISPANO AVIACION S.A.

Several jet projects are under development by a German team headed by Willy Messerschmidt: (a) The HA-200 R.I. Saeta (Arrow), a light twin jet trainer, powered by two French Turbomecas. The Spanish Government has placed a contract for production tooling. The trainer has been successfully tested in both Spain and Austria. (b) The HA-300, a lightweight fighter designated XC-6 and developed from the experience gained from the HA-200, to be powered by the Bristol Orpheus turbojet engine. An afterburner will be included in later models.

Professor Messerschmidt has retained licence rights to build the planes in Germany and the German designation of M.E.200 has been given to the jet trainer.

Also from the HA-200 R.I., Hispano Aviacion S.A. are designing the HA-231 R.I., a four-seat, twin jet communications aircraft.

SWEDEN

S.A.S. CONTRACT

S.A.S. has concluded a 10,000,000 kroner contract with the Glenn L. Martin aircraft works for the overhaul of some 50 U.S. twin-engined military jets. This contract will secure constant employment for the workshops for the coming 14 months. The sum will be paid in dollars. These aircraft are Martin B.51 Canberras.

UNITED STATES

B-52's EJECTOR SEATS.—Most B-52s in service with Strategic Air Command carry a minimum flight crew of six, with a maximum of twice this number on very long, flight-refuelled missions such as the 17,000 mile non-stop flights by aircraft of the 42nd and 93rd Heavy Bomber Wings. Both pilot and co-pilot sit in ejection seats which fire out through roof hatches, while the two observers eject downward. The tail gunner can jettison the entire tail cone, complete with multiple radars (including General Electric monopulse radar gunlaying) and barbette of four 20 mm. guns.

F-86L NOW BEING DELIVERED.—Deliveries have commenced of the F-86L version of the North American Sabre, an improved version of the F-86D with new radar, extended wing leading edges, and a 12-inch increase on each wing tip. Ten have been ordered for use in checking data link systems used to integrate the F-101 and F-102 interceptors into the S.A.G.E. air control system.

TACTICAL BOMBER ABANDONED.—The U.S.A.F. has cancelled development of the Martin XB-68 tactical bomber, designed to reach Mach 3. The project had reached phase II of development, calling for prototype construction.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL

American Defense and National Security. By Timothy W. Stanley. (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C.) \$3.25.

At a time when important decisions are pending, in this Country, on the future of all three Services, this little book should prove of the greatest interest to all concerned in the planning of our national security. It is a fully referenced work of some 200 pages, of which the last 50 contain copies of important documents referred to in the text. It covers events in America, during the past 12 years, and deals primarily with the two major political decisions taken there in 1947.

At the conclusion of the war in 1945, America was called upon to assume world leadership in an age when rival ideologies had divided the nations into two hostile camps. At that time, though she had many Departments covering the various political and military aspects involved, she had no adequate co-ordinating machinery for formulating a national policy. She had learned, during the war years, that it was possible to achieve some form of integration as far as the Services were concerned, but constitutionally it was not easy to overcome the various interests involved and to continue such integration in peace. The story now told sets the stage and records the events leading up to the passing of the National Security Act of 1947. It then follows the results which have been achieved by this drastic reorganization.

The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with the setting up of the National Security Council and the various Departments and agencies which are its subsidiaries, the second with the establishment of the Department of Defense and the unification of the three Services.

The interest lies not so much in the overriding need for such authorities as in the result accomplished by each since their formation. Many of the problems they have had to solve are inherent in the American Constitution, which has scarcely been revised since its inception, when some of its clauses were designed to meet totally different conditions, not the least being the role bestowed on the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Very slowly the Americans have come to realize the connection between the political and military aspects in world affairs, and there is little doubt that the Act of 1947 embodied the results of a most careful examination of the various organizations built up by other nations to solve such problems. It was a typical American production and the logical 'blue print' for handling all such questions within the framework of their Constitution. It did not take into account the actions of any dominating personalities or the interests of the Departments they controlled. In the National Security Council, the ever growing responsibilities of the State Department were given insufficient attention and when the first test of the Department of Defense came in 1950, when the Korean war broke out, the position was so unsatisfactory that General Marshall had to be recalled from retirement to set things right.

But under constant examination and revision the whole organization is now beginning to take shape and function more efficiently. Time has discovered the defects in the original plan and experience has suggested a remedy.

It is apparent that the Americans have moved much faster than we have as regards the unification of the Services, and the difficulties they have experienced in doing this are of the greatest interest to all. The author sets out most clearly the reasons underlying each amendment which the Americans have found necessary to their original plan, and not the least important parts of this book are the various charts which show the existing channels of responsibility, by which the President now receives advice on both the political and military aspects of any world problem which may arise.

Elizabethan England : Being the History of this Country "In Relation to all Foreign Princes." Volume XI, 1599-1601. By E. M. Tenison. (For original subscribers only.)

The central figure of this large quarto volume of over 600 pages, covering from Spring, 1599, to Spring, 1601, is necessarily Essex. In foreign affairs he, rather than the Principal Secretary, Sir Robert Cecil, was political heir to the great Lord Treasurer Burghley.

Of the major discoveries embodied in the previous 10 volumes, the most surprising has been that Lord Burghley, hitherto presented by writers on the period as pacific in influence, reveals himself in his own memoranda as wishing to have Drake placed in command of "a very great and royal war" seven years prior to the coming of the Invincible Armada. He is seen throughout to be a very great war minister.

One thing which stood out in Volume X was that Burghley's final effort was to prevent Henry IV making peace with Spain. Another that, far from rebuking Essex as a "man of blood," as alleged by Camden, "God's blessing upon your Lordship to be a scourge to the Spaniards" expresses his true attitude. Further, he caused Essex to be made Master General of the Ordnance, not (as usual) "during Her Majesty's pleasure," but "for the term of natural life of the said Earl" in an attempt to ensure the continuance to completion of his own strong policy that peace, when it came, must be "an assured peace" and on England's terms. Essex's reasoned argument in the Privy Council, showing why peace with Spain in 1598 was undesirable, had convinced the Queen.

Now, in Volume XI, begin the declining times when Burghley's steady hand was removed. We see how Privy Councillors, who had not succeeded in pulling against him, schemed to remove from access to the Queen the continuing pillar of his policy, namely Essex, by causing him to be appointed Lieutenant and Governor-General of Ireland, when, after the defeat of Sir Henry Bagenall at the Yellow Ford, Tyrone had reached the position of uncrowned King of Ireland.

The curtain goes up on a series of events remarkably different from what we are accustomed to believe. With campaign maps, itinerary, and exact details of "his Lordship's victorious and successful journeys" (to quote an officer on his staff), we see that, far from Essex meeting in Ireland (that grave of reputations) the failure for which his enemies at the Court hoped and contrived, he was conspicuously successful; and this despite the obstacles they put in his path and although the nature of the campaign was very different from all his experience in the Low Countries, France, and the Peninsula. The only reverses during his command were to two detached columns under subordinate commanders: Sir Henry Harington in Wicklow and Sir Conyers Clifford, who was ambushed and killed in the Curlew Mountains in Sligo. Not only was Essex successful when commanding in person, and as disciplinarian, but his strategical plan was soon vindicated by results. It was to pacify and secure the disaffected south, where Spanish invasion was expected, reinforcing and revictualling the garrisons there, before going north to meet Tyrone, from whose control he had already removed the rest of the Kingdom.

One of the most important documents given in facsimile is the Royal Letters Patent empowering Essex to return to consult the Queen whenever he should judge this advisable—it was only on this condition that he accepted the Viceroyalty. Another is the actual truce signed by Tyrone. The latter should clear away the contradictory versions of the meeting at the Ford of Aclint.

With Essex's laws and ordinances of war for Ireland given in full, and his elaborate Commission translated for the first time from the Latin, and his various actions now able to be judged from the direct evidence, it is apparent with what justification one of his officers claimed that between May Day and Michaelmas he had achieved more than any previous Lord Lieutenant. Incidentally, the intended Spanish invasion of Ireland was postponed when the news reached Spain that the victor of Cadiz was now Lord Lieutenant there.

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The portraits, facsimiles, and maps are an integral part of this first-hand account. The hitherto unpublished portrait of Essex by Gheeraedts the Younger, dispels at a glance the curious notion that this was a superficial or frivolous personage.

The incompetent and amorous pseudo-Essex of modern history gives place to the actual Essex known to his contemporaries who, single-heartedly devoted to his wife, had, before his active career ended at the age of 33, filled with strenuous distinction more high offices than any Englishman of his time, being described in Spain and Italy, according to Raleigh, as "for an enemy the most honoured man in Europe."

The Queen's contradictory orders and criticisms are shown to be unpractical; and her idea that he should go first to the north of Ireland was strongly disapproved by the Irish Council, supported by the Privy Council in England. Although her patriotic zeal is unquestioned, the Queen had been chronically unreasonable on the Irish question. Cahir Castle was a fortress strong by nature and art, as might be expected of the strategic key to the south of a Kingdom long war-ridden and abounding in strongly fortified points: when Essex captured this place, the Queen called it taking a tumbledown tower from a rabble of rogues. The age-long disharmony between civilians and men of action is exemplified in the person of Essex's cousin, Lord Henry Howard, who had never drawn sword. He professed entire devotion to Essex while drawing a secret pension from Spain to undermine him. The quasi-oriental deviousness with which he worked is astonishing.

To achieve their ends Essex's opponents needed to exclude him permanently from the presence of the Queen, so that they could work upon her and traduce him without set-back or fear of confrontation. Hence their fury at his perfectly legitimate visit from Ireland, to obtain ratification of a settlement with Tyrone, which took them by surprise; hence also his continued exclusion for 15 months even though he had undeniably been cleared of the ludicrous charges brought against him.

In a mere review one cannot epitomise the methods by which Essex was manoeuvred to his doom; but here all the particulars of the 'Essex conspiracy'—in the first place a conspiracy against Essex by his near relations—are for the first time comprehensibly unravelled, and with a thoroughness which it is hard to believe will be superseded.

Although a fabricated account of his alleged treasons was sent to every Court in Europe and proclaimed by order from every pulpit in England, the official version won little credence either at home or abroad. The remarkable devotion of the 'common sorte' in England to Essex's memory outlasted by a generation the ruin brought upon him by his calculating relatives. In Spain it was not forgotten that Essex, victorious at Cadiz, had protected women and children, had decreed the death penalty to any officer or man who injured any woman, and had allowed the Spanish officers to give up their swords to him in person. The Spaniards were also aware that in 1598 he had been an open opponent of the Treaty; yet they put him on the stage as Murdered Innocence, and depicted the Queen as manoeuvred by a trick into signing his death warrant (as is now proved to have been the case), and then deploring too late that she had slain "the bulwark of her Kingdom."

Now that we know how elaborately she was deceived, we cannot but feel pity for the Queen. The faction of collaborators with Spain had however miscalculated, because they had expected to get their way as soon as Essex was removed; but though the Queen took his life, she adhered to his policy. The Treaty to which he had objected was never to be signed so long as Elizabeth lived. We are promised that Volume XII will show how England lost the peace after winning the war.

Gallant Gentlemen. By E. S. Turner. (Michael Joseph.) 18s.

It was Kipling who put the British 'other ranks' on the literary map. His successors, working the same rich seam, have done much to familiarize the reading public with admirable qualities of the *Swaddy* and his naval counterpart. The British officer has not been so fortunate, having, very largely, been left the prey of the lampoonist, the farce writer, and the malignant caricaturist—from Gilray to David Low.

In his present volume E. S. Turner has gone a long way to present a more balanced and therefore far more creditable and attractive a picture.

It was the rise of the mercantilist Puritan element under the Tudors that first cast the profession of arms into disrepute; an obloquy which Cromwell's vile misuse of the military under the 'rule of the Major-Generals' served to intensify and crystallize into a tradition of distrustful dislike. Yet even with mediaevalism's decline under the aforesaid Tudors, "every gentleman," as Fortescue pointed out in his 1920 Raleigh Lecture, "was actually or potentially a soldier, for no profession except that of arms was thought becoming to a gentleman." The naval officer had yet to emerge; ships, in the early days of maritime warfare, being 'worked' by mariners and 'fought' by soldiers—who doubtless got in the seamen's way abominably!

It is to be realized, however, that for the most part the Tudor and Elizabethan soldier was far from being a professional. A few such existed, of course; and it is disappointing to find that Mr. Turner makes no mention of one of the finest of them, Sir John Norris, who (once more to borrow from Fortescue) "was the Moore of the XVIth Century, alike as a teacher in the camp and as a general in the field."

This quality of the amateur lingered on long after the institution of standing armies had rendered the officer's calling a whole-time job; nor was the peculiarity confined to the British Service. Few professional armies can have been encumbered by more dilettantes than those of France prior to the days of Luvois. On the other hand, the British officer brought to his task a cheerful courage and aptitude for leadership and man-management that rendered him, in many respects, unique. Above all, he took it for granted that he should advance at the head of his men, and die there if need be. It was a costly, even wasteful, tradition; but who can say to what high degree it has contributed to the British knack of winning victories?

The King's African Rifles

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Mr. Turner has cast his net wide; and although he is far from blind to certain defects that seem inseparable from the British officer's undoubted qualities, it is obvious that he fully appreciates that to demand qualities *without* defects is about as sensible as insisting on a needle being sharp at both ends. He also has a shrewd appreciation of the effect that mechanization plus democratization has had upon an institution indubitably 'aristocratic' in origin.

As is only fitting, *Gallant Gentlemen* includes a chapter on the Women's Services, which serves to remind us of the invaluable contribution to modern warfare made by "the female of the species" who, on occasion, can be even "more deadly than the male". Some well chosen illustrations that really do illustrate the text, embellish a work that can be thoroughly recommended to *militaire* and *civile* alike.

History of the Second World War—The Defence of the United Kingdom. By Basil Collier. (H.M.S.O.) 50s.

During the Second World War the United Kingdom faced three dangers; starvation through interruptions of sea communications, invasion, and bombardment from the air. This is the official history of the measures taken to counter these threats and the sequence of events which finally lead to their elimination. It is written from the inter-Service aspect. Civil Defence has already been covered in a separate volume.

The story mainly concerns the air. There are good reasons for this. From the naval point of view the defence of ocean trade and defence of the home Country are not readily distinguishable. The editor of these official histories, therefore, decided that the author should leave the defence of our sea approaches and naval anti-invasion measures to be fully covered in those volumes dealing with the war at sea. References to them in this volume are, therefore, brief. This should in no way be construed as minimizing their importance.

Similarly the importance of the part played by the field Army in home defence cannot be judged by the few pages devoted to it in this volume. It was never put to the test. On the other hand Anti-Aircraft Command was fully tested and its role is adequately covered.

Starting from the 1920s the author traces the strategy of home defence through the years of complacency and parsimony up to the critical Summer of 1940, which found the Country struggling single-handed for survival in the face of odds that at the time appeared even more formidable than history has since revealed them to have been. There follows a detailed analysis of the German plans for invasion in which we are told that when the High Command approached the problem in July, 1940, "they first pictured the voyage across the English Channel as an extended river crossing". Objections by the naval staff eventually resulted in a more realistic outlook, and the plans for "Operation Sealion" were drawn up on the basis of initial landings by nine divisions on two short strips of coast between Folkestone and Brighton about mid-September. The failure of the *Luftwaffe* to defeat Fighter Command, and in particular the heavy losses which they suffered over England on 15th September, 1940, led to postponement and eventually abandonment of all plans for invasion.

Even with the German records available to him the author finds it difficult to ascertain how far Hitler and the High Command were united in their attitude towards invasion. The army and navy staffs appear to have been in agreement on one point only—namely that local air superiority was essential to make the project feasible, whilst Goering is said "to have taken little interest in 'Sealion,' but to have believed firmly in the ability of his Service to face a decision on its own."

About one-third of the volume is devoted to a detailed account of the Battle of Britain and the night offensive against our industry and communications which succeeded it. From German records we get a picture of the problems facing the *Luftwaffe* and the changes in tactics adopted from time to time in an attempt to overcome them.

The concluding chapters are devoted to the flying bomb (V1) and long-range rocket (V2) offensives of 1944-45. Of particular interest are the origins and evolution of these weapons which the author has pieced together from official and private German sources. In a final chapter he attempts to arrive at such conclusions—albeit tentative—as may be drawn at this time so comparatively recent after the events. Few will dispute his assertion that "radar was possibly the best investment ever made by a British government", or that a country led by a Prime Minister of such courageous and defiant spirit as Winston Churchill "could not fail to resist to the utmost."

At this time, when the publication of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's private diaries have focused so much attention on the personal aspects of the higher direction of the war, it is pleasing to note that through these officially-inspired pages three war-time commanders, little known to the public, have been given their rightful place in history—Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding, Air Marshal Sir Roderic Hill, and General Sir Frederick Pile.

The volume embraces 50 appendices. The numerous maps and photographs are admirable.

Men in Arms. By S. F. Wise, R. A. Preston, and H. O. Werner. (Atlantic Press.) 42s.

The trio of authors responsible for this ambitious work have set their sights high. To aspire to compile even a moderately detailed "history of warfare and its inter-relationship with Western society" demands profound scholarship and exceptionally cool and objective judgment, for the opportunities for controversial polemics are illimitable.

Factually the authors are difficult to fault, and their work, moreover, is refreshingly free from professorial didacticism and those distressing dissertations on 'what ought to be,' to the complete disregard of 'what is,' which mar so many offerings from writers with an academic background. It seems clear that their personal experience of warfare has served to infuse their work with a wholesome sense of reality, which is as welcome

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as it is productive of confidence in their approach. Thus they judiciously affirm of the period 1800-1900, "In all the mid-century wars liberalism, or the frustration of it, was an important *casus belli*. The Italian war was a war of liberation. The Crimean War appeared to some people as a war between western liberalism and eastern autocracy. The American Civil War was hastened by the movement to free slaves. The Prussian wars were skilfully planned by Bismarck to recruit liberal national sentiment for his policy of Prussian expansion." That is true, and with so many professional pacifists and exhibitionist 'liberal humanists' cluttering up the world, it badly needed saying.

It has been left, however, to "the century of the Common Man" to see the concept of 'total' war—reintroduced by the proletarian French leaders in 1793—adopted by all the gutter-dictators thrown up by the revolt of the masses against traditional authority; a movement for which the flighty romanticism of Rousseau and the myopic materialism of Marx must bear equal responsibility.

Harnessed to the satanic ideology of communism, the menace of the most devastating of all 'total' wars hangs over an apprehensive civilization like a sword of Damocles; with policy as a continuation of warfare as communism's prime method of condemning the world to the debilitation of perpetual anxiety-neurosis. The prospect is sufficiently grim to induce a virtual nostalgia for the limited dynastic wars of the XVIIIth Century, or even for those of feudal days when, as Lecky emphasized, the aim was "to translate the brutalized Pagan fighting man into the idealized, chivalrous Christian man-at-arms, uniting all the force and fire of the ancient warrior with something of the tenderness and humility of the Christian saint." And then one recalls that the war methods of the Byzantine contemporaries of the Western 'Sir Galahad' exhibited all the barbarism, deceit, cunning subornation, and treachery of the Nazis at their very worst, and one is driven back on Foch's uncompromising dictum that, "War is savagery and you cannot refine it."

There will be readers who will question the degree of emphasis given to certain elements in the story. Have the authors, for instance, fully appreciated the impact of the English longbow on mediaeval warfare? For it was an innovation almost as momentous as that of gunpowder, since, like gunpowder, it "made all men alike tall," and thus proletarianized warfare once and for all. And have they fully grasped the comprehensive quality of the later mediaeval staff? From the constable to the harbinger, from the waggon-master to the hard-worked *Hurenweibel*, it was an organization that exercised very real control over the troops in battle and, particularly, on the line of march. And have they attached sufficient significance to Marlborough's consistent efforts to restore mobility to warfare? These are minor points, however, in a compendious, clearly written, and splendidly sweeping chronicle, which can be recommended to the discerning reader with real enthusiasm.

Ribbons and Medals: Naval, Military, Air Force, and Civil. By Captain H. Taprell Dorling, D.S.O., R.N. ("Taffrail") in association with L. F. Guille. (George Philip and Son.) 21s.

Ribbons and medals attract attention from many collectors, and this volume sets out to be a general guide whereby ordinary people may be able to recognize those most generally seen. The book has passed through many editions since its first appearance in 1916, and now includes medals issued during the 1939-45 War. Here are the most generally found decorations and awards issued not only by Great Britain and the Commonwealth, but by most of the major and by very many of the smaller countries of the world. Sixteen plates in colour make a brave and surprisingly successful attempt to reproduce ribbon colours, over 600 being shown; and scores of neat line drawings illustrate medals, badges, stars, and orders.

The earliest British medals dealt with are those for the wars against the French Revolution and Napoleon. It is a pity that the Civil War and other scarce but important medals of earlier times are omitted, perhaps, but what remains is full of interest. This is an excellent book to browse in, for however expert a reader may be in one particular field,

he is bound to find much entertainment and profit in contemplating other pastures and botanizing strange hedge-rows. There is tremendous variety, and medals have been and are granted for sometimes rather astonishing reasons: Agricultural Merit (France), Mobilization (Netherlands), Public Instruction (Egypt), Valiant Labour (U.S.S.R.). There is a sardonic comment on "Non-Intervention" in Italian and German awards for the 1936 War in Spain; it is sad to find the Turkish star issued for Gallipoli described as "tawdry and unfinished"; and it arouses alarming speculations to find the Turkish "Order of Chastity (For Ladies)" divided into three classes. Many interesting reasons are given for colours being chosen for ribbons (how many can identify Edward VII's racing colours?). The 1,346 awards of the Victoria Cross are deftly handled.

Nowadays flood tide seems to have set in, and many countries formerly averse to giving medals (as was the U.S.A.) indulge quite deeply. Some spray their decorations all over the place: Germany issued 5,500,000 Iron Crosses up to 1918, and Hitler poured out much fantastic rubbish, including one specially large Grand Cross for Goering and a unique sash ribbon for Mussolini. One can find medals issued elsewhere to members of motor-boat clubs.

Frequently details of Royal Warrants for complicated British Orders and medals are given (though surely it was supererogatory to give over six pages to naval clasps, 1914-1918, which were never issued?) All who wish to extend their knowledge, identify a medal, or brood on the vanity of human wishes will enjoy this handsome volume.

The Secret War, 1939-45. By Gerald Pawle. (Harrap.) 18s.

This is an account of the work done during the 1939-45 War by the Miscellaneous Weapons Department of the Admiralty. It is factual since the author was one of the 'team' in question. It makes very interesting reading, is written in an entertaining style, and describes not only the exploits of, but also the unorthodox methods used by the men and women who made up the Department. After reading the book one can well imagine why this unique Department became known as the "Wheezers and Dodgers." They were responsible for some very original work, and no matter how scatter-brained were the ideas submitted to them for investigation they gave them a fair trial and in many cases developed them so that they could be applied to the furthering of the general war effort—the work was not confined to naval matters alone.

To all those who served in the Navy during the 1939-45 War it will be a matter of considerable interest to learn the names of the individuals who were responsible for the many ingenious devices which found their way to sea and with which they had to deal. The majority of these had never been even thought of during the years between the wars.

It was about the time of the Dunkirk evacuation that the idea of starting a small scientific department originated. At first it was part of the Inspectorate of Anti-aircraft Weapons and Devices under the late Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville—a brilliant officer with a strong personality. However, it was not long before it became a Department on its own and the first Director was Captain G. O. C. Davies, Royal Navy, a gunnery expert. His chief assistant was Lieutenant-Commander C. Goodeve, R.N.V.R. (now Sir Charles Goodeve, F.R.S.), a brilliant Canadian scientist. It was fortunate that there were many scientists serving in the R.N.V.R. and so it was not long before a young, enthusiastic, and competent staff was formed.

The book describes how they carried out experiments ranging from those in the Canoe Lake at Southsea to find an antidote to magnetic mines to protecting merchant ships against low-flying aircraft and shooting grapnels to cliff tops to assist Commando scaling parties. Perhaps their most striking work was done in connection with the landings in Normandy on 'D' Day. Here they contributed towards the initial surveys of the beaches, the disposal of beach defences, and the construction of the famous Mulberry harbours. There are many who will remember the role played by the tank landing craft which were fitted with over 1,000 rockets each with a heavy high-explosive head, which were used to

'drench' the beach defences just prior to the first flight of infantry 'touching down' on the shore. The idea emanated from Colonel Langley, R.A., of Combined Operations Headquarters, but many details were produced by the "Wheezers and Dodgers." The effect of this barrage had to be seen to be believed.

Although the book is written in an entertaining and almost conversational style it is a valuable contribution to the history of the 1939-45 War. It shows clearly what imagination, initiative, and improvisation, when they are accompanied by scientific knowledge, can do under the stress and strain of actual hostilities.

NAVY

Battle Honours of the Royal Navy. By Oliver Warner. (George Philip and Sons.) 12s. 6d.

The official list of Battle Honours for ships of the Royal Navy and of the Commonwealth Navies was first promulgated in October, 1954, together with the Honours to which the ships and Fleet Air Arm squadrons in the then post-war fleet are entitled. The complete list of ships entitled to Battle Honours has not yet been issued; those ships which have since been restored to the post-war fleet are therefore omitted from this book.

Mr. Warner has now reproduced this interim list, adding brief historical notes to explain the circumstances of each action mentioned. He has also included certain other ships, namely, (i) those which were present at Trafalgar, (ii) the larger units in the 1939-45 War, and (iii) those with 15 or more Battle Honours. It will be seen that 26 ships come within this last category, H.M.S. *Warspite* heading the list with 25 Battle Honours. The alphabetical list of ships, with their respective Battle Honours, will be found in Part IV.

The book begins with a short explanation of the *raison d'être* and constitution of naval Battle Honours and of the several categories into which they are divided. Part II contains the complete list of the fleet actions and campaigns that have been officially recognized by a Battle Honour. These total 169 in number and range from "Armada 1588" to "Korea 1950-1953," being arranged chronologically under the war periods to which they belong. Opinions may differ regarding the selection of some of these Honours and the omission of others; but, as is explained in para. 3 of the Fleet Order, there is a distinction between a "Battle Honour" and a "Record of Service."

Single-ship actions, which are included among the individual Battle Honours of ships, are also listed in Part III, and the Battle Honours of Fleet Air Arm squadrons in Part V.

Long before Battle Honours were authorized for ships, five regiments were granted naval Battle Honours in recognition of their share in fleet actions. These regiments, three of which were then serving afloat as temporary Marines, are enumerated in Part VI; but owing to the misplacement of the inverted commas, the description of their naval Honours does not always read quite correctly.

Part VII comprises a selection of ships' badges, which form an integral part of the official teak scroll on which the Battle Honours are carved.

The print is clear and on good paper; the plates are excellent. The index contains the names of persons mentioned. Although the ships which are enumerated in this book comprise no more than a fraction of the whole, Mr. Warner has provided the reader with enough to show that the battle exploits of the Royal Navy over the years are on no small scale. To those who have ever served in any of the ships mentioned, and also to the general public, this reference book will fulfil a long-felt want.

Christopher Columbus, Mariner. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Faber and Faber.) 21s.

It is many years now since Professor Morison, late of Harvard University, began to take more than a passing interest in the voyages of Christopher Columbus. The Spanish and Portuguese archives were combed for material, but he considered that the only practical way to find out about the seagoing conditions which Columbus encountered—the

weather in the north Atlantic has not altered since the XVth Century—was roughly to sail along the routes followed by that navigator, though none of these was strictly adhered to, to check his landfalls and examine the coast line of the several islands and places on the mainland of South America that he discovered. To do this he made three separate trips. The first, in 1937, was local and merely to see if the project were feasible. Then, in 1939 and again in 1940, he got up the Harvard Columbus Expedition which sailed from Spain.

Nothing was to be gained by sailing in replicas of the XVth Century ships, with all their attendant discomforts and lack of navigational facilities, so two small and more modern sailing vessels, with auxiliary power which was seldom used, were utilized. The account of these three expeditions by Professor Morison is given in the Introduction.

Space does not permit even a brief summary of the four voyages of Columbus, which cover the period 1492 to 1504. To the end he believed in the existence of a westerly route to Cathay and Cipango, and that those countries were, so to speak, only just over the horizon. Financial hopes were raised by the discovery of gold, but the establishment of trading posts met with little success. The conversion of the natives was not forgotten, for which several priests were embarked on the second voyage; the result, however, was disappointing, though, as Mark Twain remarks in his *Life on the Mississippi*, they were always prepared to "explain hell to the salvages."

This book is written not so much for the serious student of history as for the general reader, who will find in it all the relevant details of what Columbus set out to do, what he achieved, and in what respect he failed. The narrative is easy to follow. The footnotes, and references which are needed by the student are omitted here, but will be found in the earlier books by the author on the same subject.

Track charts of each voyage are provided, as well as reproductions of some of the earlier charts. It is thus possible to follow the courses steered by Columbus, to realize the difficulties he encountered and how he overcame them. Admiral Morison rates Columbus as "one of the greatest mariners, if not the very greatest, of all time." With this evaluation, however, not everyone will entirely agree; there were others of the same period who may be considered to have a greater claim.

This short biography makes excellent reading and can be confidently recommended to all who are interested in following the exploits of those early seamen who penetrated into the unknown.

Dillon's Narrative, Volume II, 1802-1839. Edited by Professor Michael A. Lewis, C.B.E., M.A., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. (Navy Records Society, Vol. XCVII.) 45s.

This is the second and concluding volume of the Narrative of the Professional Adventures of Vice-Admiral Sir William Dillon, K.C.H., from 1802 to 1839. As in the previous volume, a great deal of the narrative has been omitted, partly from lack of space and partly because the excised portions contained nothing of Service interest or were merely a repetition of earlier remarks. Each section of the narrative is preceded by an introduction, which explains the general trend of events. There are also several appendices, among which is an interesting account of the battle of Trafalgar, written by a French army officer who was present on board the *Pluton*.

Volume I took the reader up to the Treaty of Amiens and Dillon's return home from the West Indies. After a few months spent in France he was appointed to the Impress Service, in which he was employed for six months, and a few days before the outbreak of war he went to sea as senior lieutenant of the *Africaine*. Before many weeks had passed he was sent, under a flag of truce, to deliver a letter to the Dutch Commodore at Helvoetsluys. Here he was illegally detained by the French and eventually found himself a prisoner at Verdun. It was not until four years later that he was finally released. Meanwhile, in 1805, he had been promoted to Commander.

Shortly after his return to England Dillon was given command of the *Childers* brig, an old and worn out craft. In 1808, he fought an inconclusive action off The Naze with

the Danish *Lougen*, a vessel of superior force, the small prize he had just captured being brought in. He was made post immediately after the action, having been badly wounded. This, incidentally, was his only experience of actual fighting throughout the Napoleonic War.

Following 15 months' convalescence he held three temporary commands, during which he took part in the ill-fated Walcheren Expedition, and in 1811 he was appointed to the *Leopard* troopship. Here he remained, working at first from Lisbon and later in the Mediterranean, until his return home at the end of 1813. Then, at last, he got what he really wanted, the command of an operational frigate (the *Horatio*), in which he saw the end of the war on the North America Station and returned home in July, 1815.

Dillon was lucky in retaining his command and in being ordered to China, thus escaping the inevitable peace-time reductions. On returning home in January, 1817, the *Horatio* was paid off. A period of 15 months on half-pay followed, when he was rather fortunate to get the *Phaeton*, in which he went out to Calcutta. But his mishandling of the business in which two deserters from the 18th Regiment were concerned led to his being removed from his command in 1819.

Then came 'the Wilderness,' and Dillon remained unemployed for 15½ years. Finally, in 1835, fortune once more smiled on him. He was knighted, becoming a K.C.H., and obtained command of the *Russel*, 74, which he held until January, 1839. He had no further service afloat, and in 1846 he was promoted to flag rank at the age of 66. He died on 9th September, 1857, four months before he would have been promoted to Admiral.

Dillon was a strict disciplinarian and he always endeavoured to appear 'correct'—it was the other fellow who was invariably wrong. He must have been a sore trial at times to his seniors. Of his professional ability as a seaman, however, and of his love for the Navy there is no doubt. Professor Lewis, while not slurring over Dillon's faults, has fairly summed up everything that is to be said in his favour.

The two volumes together provide some interesting aspects of the Royal Navy during the period of the last of the French wars and later.

Forlorn Hope, 1915. By Rear-Admiral G. C. Brodie. (Frederick Books.) 10s. 6d.

In this book Rear-Admiral Brodie tells the almost forgotten story of the successful passage through the Dardanelles of British submarines in the Spring of 1915. Their success in overcoming the treacherous current down the Strait led to the interruption of Turkish communications in the Sea of Marmara that might well have shortened the war.

The author devotes the first half of his book mainly to the initial attempt to break through the Strait, which was made by his twin brother, Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie, in command of the submarine *E.15*, and which ended in disaster. The possibility of running the Strait had been earnestly discussed at a conference held by Commodore Roger Keyes, Admiral de Robeck's Chief of Staff, a few days earlier. To the Commodore's blunt question 'Do you think an E-boat can make it?' four of the five experienced officers present had replied an uncompromising 'No.' But the fifth, T. S. Brodie, had electrified them all with a shy but confident 'Yes'. He was at once given the task and on 16th April set out in the *E.15* on his perilous mission whose hazards were barely guessed at and certainly not understood. Bedevilled by the hostile fresh water current which flows swiftly down the Dardanelles into the Aegean, making under-water manœuvre anything but an exact science, the *E.15* ran ashore near Kephez Burnu. She came under heavy Turkish fire, one shell killing Commander Brodie and three of his crew. An extremely gallant operation carried out by two picket boats succeeded in destroying the stranded submarine. The loss of the *E.15* had not lengthened the odds against reaching the Sea of Marmara though it had emphasized them. Admiral de Robeck found it difficult to believe the feat possible, but considered its military value so great that it must at all costs be tried again.

The next submarine to make the attempt was the *AE.2*. After a false start and an adventurous passage up the Dardanelles, in which she scraped under the minefields and was subjected to prolonged attacks by forts and surface craft, she dived out into the Sea of Marmara. Thus the submarine passage of the Dardanelles was made, and what one submarine could do, others could do also. On the 27th April, less than 48 hours after the news of the *AE.2*'s success, the *E.14* entered the Strait, her venture no longer a forlorn hope. A few days later, after meeting the *E.14* in the Sea of Marmara, the *AE.2* was sunk by Turkish surface ships. On the 17th May, the *E.14* was ordered back to base. Her triumphant return convinced Allies and Turks alike that the Dardanelles had indeed been breached.

Before long the *E.11* had entered the Sea of Marmara and the pick of E-boats in the North Sea were on their way to the Mediterranean.

Admiral Brodie's absorbing book is not illustrated but is well printed and bound. All profits from its sale will be devoted to King George's Fund for Sailors.

Frogman, V.C. By Ian Fraser. (Angus and Robertson.) 16s.

This book is an autobiography of a young naval reserve officer whose love of the sea as a boy decided his father to let him join the Training Ship *Conway*—the school for officers of the Merchant Navy—after which, having passed through the course there, he found himself at sea as an apprentice in the *Sydney Star*. His ambition was to serve in the Royal Navy, but when in the *Conway* he failed to pass into the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. Undeterred by this he volunteered for the Royal Naval Reserve, was accepted, and found himself at sea as a midshipman in H.M.S. *Royal Oak* just prior to the outbreak of the 1939-45 War. Actually, when hostilities began, he was in destroyers and saw active service in the Channel and with the ocean convoys. Then he volunteered for service in submarines and was duly given a training in them. On completion of this, the submarines he was appointed to served in waters ranging from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. His book clearly shows how service in submarines 'gets into one's blood' and the high state of morale that is always associated with this branch of the Service.

So far the author's life was following a very usual pattern, even to the way he married a member of the Women's Royal Naval Service! It was when he was first lieutenant of one of the old "H" Class submarines that he began to take an interest in the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus—the fore-runner of the Frogman's outfit. While serving in this submarine he read a signal from the Flag Officer, Submarines:—

"Two lieutenants and two sub-lieutenants R.N. or R.N.R. are required for special and hazardous service in submarines. Names of volunteers should be signalled immediately to Flag Officer, Submarines."

He volunteered and was accepted, only to discover that he was destined for midget submarines—perhaps the most 'hush-hush' craft ever in the Royal Navy.

His book describes the meticulous training with its ups and downs. Then, when everything is ready he, his crew, and *XE.3* are embarked in a depot ship and sail for the Far East. They were to attack a Japanese cruiser in Singapore Harbour. How they did this successfully makes both interesting and exciting reading. The description of the actual attack is most vivid and not over-done in any way. The book is worth reading if even for just this part of it.

After the war the author decided to leave the Navy and start a firm which specialized in diving, using Frogman outfits. To get the capital for this he and his team became exhibits in circuses and on fair grounds. He makes a handsome apology for using his naval training, and the fact that he had earned decorations, for furthering this scheme.

Altogether an entertaining book written in an easy style.

Heraldry in the Royal Navy. By Alfred E. Weightman. (Gale and Polden.) 30s.

Mr. Weightman, who has long made a study of badges and figureheads, has reproduced many of the naval badges, both official and unofficial, in his new book. With them he has included a brief history of the ship concerned and a list of her official Battle Honours.

In all, there are some 2,000 badges for ships of the Navy, far too many to be reproduced in a single volume, but Mr. Weightman has made an admirable selection and most classes of ship are amply represented. Most of the famous names, too, are here, though one would have welcomed, perhaps, a few specimens of the Fleet Air Arm squadrons.

There is much of history to be found in these designs, in the echoes of former exploits or in the commemoration of former captains and admirals connected with the ship. In this way the badge of a ship becomes a focus for her tradition, and is prized as such. It also makes a gay little spot of heraldic colouring against the grey background of a warship's coat of paint.

It is always difficult to capture the tradition of a ship between the covers of a book but, within the limitations of size forced upon him, Mr. Weightman has made a gallant attempt.

Submarine Attacking. By Admiral Aldo Cocchia. (William Kimber.) 18s.

This book is a translation from the Italian by Margaret Gwyer. It tells the story of naval operations in which the Italians took part during the 1939-45 War and is in four parts.

The first describes how Italian submarines ran the gauntlet of the Strait of Gibraltar with its dangerous currents and whirlpools, passing eastward or westward 44 times without loss. In sharp contrast no less than five of the 20 German U-boats that attempted the same passage eastward, the easier direction, in the Summer of 1941, were destroyed. After the fall of France the Italian Atlantic submarine base was shifted to Bordeaux, where the author was appointed Chief of Staff and from where Italian submarines continued to operate against the Allied Atlantic convoys.

In Part 2 the author tells of his transfer from Bordeaux to Leros, and describes briefly the Italo-German invasion of Crete, an unsuccessful British combined attack on Tobruk, and the blowing up of merchant ships by Italian limpet mines at Gibraltar. Part 2 ends with strange stories of 'Ghost Ships', lost Italian cruisers, which are alleged to have appeared at, or soon after, the Battle of Matapan.

Part 3 turns to the long-drawn-out convoy battle in the central Mediterranean, in which the author played a conspicuous part in command of a destroyer squadron and witnessed some of the most desperate and bitter fighting on either side during the War. As time went on it became increasingly clear that the Italians and their German allies could never win the Mediterranean battle, and by 1943 it had become obvious that they had irretrievably lost it.

Part 4 is devoted to the careers of "Four Brave Men", among them Admiral Carlo Bergamini, who lost his life in the battleship *Roma*. Perhaps not unnaturally Admiral Cocchia sees the Italian Navy as a Service of heroes. Referring to the encounter between the Italian raider *Ramb I* and the British cruiser *Leander* he claims that the *Ramb* fought a gallant action lasting about one hour. In fact the *Ramb* abandoned ship immediately the *Leander* opened fire. Here perhaps lies the key to the whole book.

It is possible in a short review to touch only briefly upon a selection of the many subjects covered by the author. Enough, however, has been said to show that he gives a comprehensive picture of the 1939-45 War as seen through the eyes of one who for several years played an active part in it against Great Britain and her Allies.

The War at Sea. Volume II. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. By Captain S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., R.N. (H.M.S.O.) 42s.

Captain Stephen Roskill's first volume of the naval operations of the last war gave promise of being the first instalment of a notable work in the writing of naval history.

The second instalment is to hand, and one may as well say at once that the promise is vindicated. We now have two-thirds of the story, and there can be few readers who are not already eager for the remainder. Captain Roskill's vivid sense of history and his complete mastery of the intricacies of modern naval warfare would appear ample guarantee that his work will be completed to the very high standard that he set himself at the start.

This second volume opens with the fortunes of the Navy at almost their lowest ebb. The severe losses in the Mediterranean Fleet from the air attacks of Crete and from the bold attack by Italian human torpedoes at Alexandria had been more than matched by the disaster off Malaya. These events had brought Volume I to a sad ending, but their implications stretch well into the beginning of Volume II, and Captain Roskill draws a skillful picture of the way in which so many operations were hamstrung because of these former losses. He also brings out the profound effect they had on the outcome of the land campaign, and shows by vivid example the utter dependence of the battle ashore on the battle afloat. These, indeed, are some of the most interesting pages of this intensely interesting book.

It is the role of the true historian to write without fear or favour, to draw his conclusions from the evidence which he has assembled and to set them out in all their stark reality. His description of the ill-fated PQ.17 convoy in the Barents Sea is an example of Captain Roskill's strict adherence to this historical precept. He has made no attempt to cast a gloss over this unhappy event, which revealed a faltering of the grip on naval events at sea, and he shows, with all the authority of the facts to buttress his judgment, where the mistakes lay. Here, indeed, is an indictment of the higher direction of the naval war in one of its most tender spots.

As this story of the naval war unfolds one sees the Navy climbing back to its ascendancy at sea and appreciates the effect upon its maritime enemies of the relentlessness of its steady pressure. The grand strategical plan emerges in all its majestic weight, depending for its ultimate fruition on the flexibility of a sea power exercised across the oceans of the world. We see the armies of two continents carried across the waters to descend upon the shores of a third, and we can trace as its direct result the opening of the Mediterranean seaway and the consequent liberation of the shipping required to strike the final blow. We see, too, the gradual mastery of the Atlantic U-boat threat and the similar effect it had on the organization and planning for this final blow. All this emerges from Captain Roskill's pages with a clarity and a precision that bears striking testimony to his ability as a historian.

Volume II ends on an encouraging note in the wartime story. But it ends, too, with the appetite of the reader unimpaired and eager for more. Volume III, when it appears, will bring the story to a close. If it reaches the standard of the first two—and there is no reason to conceive why it should not—it will crown a fine piece of naval historical writing.

ARMY

The Compact History of the United States Army. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy. (Hawthorn Books, Inc., New York.) \$4.95.

The author of this delightful book is the well-known American military historian, who in collaboration with his son produced the *Military Heritage of America* which was reviewed in the November, 1956, number of this JOURNAL. This new work is in quite a different vein and in some ways the title is misleading. Though it is divided into the same periods as those used in the more ambitious work referred to above, no attempt is made to follow each campaign in detail. Since, however, the various wars played an important part in the gradual development of the army, extracts are used as background material.

The author in this case is more concerned with the raising and training of the army to meet each crisis as it arose and with the general administration of its various components in the field or in their peace-time stations. Thus, though the great war leaders come into

the picture, we learn a great deal more about the reforms and methods employed by such men as Von Steuben, Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, Leonard Wood, and McNair, all of whom in their various ways made the American Army as we know it today.

In each period we are given a wonderful picture of the American fighting man, whether he belonged to the Regular Army or to the Militia. We learn of the many systems of recruitment which were tried and their results, of the uniform worn, and of the arms used. We watch the soldier carrying out his garrison duties and accompany him to war. We are told how his womenfolk contended with the many trials that confronted them, and follow the development of the military schools, the nursing services, the Army Air Force, and on a smaller scale, unit bands, the bestowal of awards for gallantry and distinguished service, and improvements in catering.

With the American passion for the use of initials we learn that the C.O.'s wife is referred to as the 'COW,' whilst in his dislike of ostentation the rows of medal ribbons which festoon many a breast have been christened 'fruit salad.' The whole book is indeed full of good stories well told and some of the comments on the strange characters which pass across its pages are so succinct as to bear repetition. In 1812, General Wilkinson gained the reputation as one "who never won a battle or lost a court of enquiry," and more than 80 years later, when discussing the command of the Vth Corps in Cuba, the author finds that "there is no satisfactory explanation for the choice of Shafter."

Similar tales are common to all armies. They embellish the traditions which are so dear to the author, who bemoans the rather reckless disbandment which followed the conclusion of each war. He points out that these have resulted in there now being no direct link with any of the units of Washington's army, except Battery "D," which has survived by pure chance. In the past the Americans disliked the thought of a standing army as much as we did, but they seem to have gone out of their way to destroy so many of those minor things which go to make the soul and body of an army. Today, divisions march where units previously trod, for the army of 840 effectives in 1789 had grown to a strength of more than 9,000,000 by 1945, but, as always, there was the hard core of the Regular soldier which made such an expansion possible. Tough and resilient, he has changed as much as the American nation has changed. Trained in the school of Indian warfare he covered the expanding frontiers and remained true to his salt in 1861, so that by the close of the Civil War he probably led the whole in his art. As America acquired colonies he garrisoned them and proved himself to be a kindly 'ambassador of his country,' and when national, mass produced armies took the stage, he moulded them to his country's needs. To him and especially to the Corps of Engineers, America owes much of her proud position today.

Long wars bring exhaustion in their train and the disbandments and resulting reorganizations temporarily lead to a lowering of morale. The author is nevertheless perturbed over the "backwash of the Korean War," when in 1956 it was disclosed that 13 per cent. of the American prisoners captured by the Communists had failed to resist the intensive 'brainwashing' employed by their captors. They had "lost faith in their nation, in their comrades, and in themselves." A survey of all these cases revealed that the longer the previous army service prior to capture the greater the resistance, and he concludes that this new form of psychological warfare can only be combated by good leadership and an uplift of moral incentive. In the spirit of the past lies the hope for the future.

This book, which is so easy to read, is of interest to all of us since so many of the problems dealt with are common to both the American Army and our own.

The Desert my Dwelling Place. By Lieut.-Colonel D. Lloyd Owen, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C. (Cassell.) 18s.

This interesting book describes the author's experience as a patrol leader in the Long Range Desert Group in North Africa in 1941-1943. In his introduction the author says he has written the story for the edification of his three sons, but it should edify and thrill a much wider circle.

The L.R.D.G. was formed soon after the Italians entered the war in 1940, the nucleus being a small band of enthusiasts who had spent their leave exploring the Libyan Desert. The role of the unit was originally reconnaissance in the depths of this desert. The men were Guardsmen, New Zealanders, Rhodesians, and Yeomen, organized in patrols each about 20 strong, of which the author commanded one formed of Yeomen. He gives a good description of these men, of the qualities and skills needed, as well as how the units were organized and commanded. The account of how the author, a young Regular Captain, joining as a 'new boy,' gained confidence in himself and won that of his men is well and modestly given. He seems to have been fascinated by the desert in spite of the climate, shortage of water, and other hardships.

Tasks included reconnaissance, road watching, and counting enemy vehicles—an unpopular job—offensive action against enemy vehicles, and the transport of agents and saboteurs into the area behind the enemy lines. All required careful planning, organization, and determination in their execution, as well as great patience, especially in road watching.

One chapter is devoted to the raids on Tobruk and Benghazi in September, 1942. They were combined operations planned by naval and military staffs in the Delta and designed to capture the ports, hold them for a day, and destroy or at least damage their installations. Montgomery had nothing to do with them and viewed the venture with disfavour, which is not surprising. The author had three tasks with his patrol. First, to convoy seven three-tonners of the land raiding party of Commandos and their gear from Kufra to the outskirts of Tobruk, a distance of 600 miles. Secondly, having 'delivered' the Commandos, to enter the perimeter and destroy a radio direction finding station; and thirdly, to destroy the aircraft on two landing grounds. All this with 20 men and five trucks! The first was successfully achieved but not the others. Both operations were a complete failure. The Germans appear to have been warned; evidently too many people knew what was pending.

Much of the story is in dialogue, but there are many good descriptions of places and life in the desert, as well as appreciations of persons and a number of anecdotes. The book is provided with a sketch map, eight pages of illustrations, and an index.

History of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1919-1955. By Marcus Cunliffe. (Clowes.) 30s.

This volume continues the story of one of our oldest Regiments of the Line with an account of its activities during the 'years between' and of service at home and abroad. The final chapter describes the aftermath of the war as it affected the Regiment and ends with an account of the 1st Battalion's services in Korea.

On the outbreak of war the 1st Battalion was in India. The 2nd Battalion went to France in the 2nd Division but was transferred to the 144th Brigade of the 48th Division in January, 1940. Two Territorial battalions of the Regiment, the 1/7th and 8th, were also serving in this Division but in the 143rd Brigade. All three battalions distinguished themselves during the retreat to Dunkirk though at the cost of heavy casualties. Their most notable actions were the defence of Wormhout by the 2nd Battalion and of the Ypres-Commines Canal by the 1/7th and 8th Battalions. The 2nd and 1/7th Battalions went back to France in 1944, the 2nd, with the 3rd Division, landed on D-Day, and the 1/7th, with the 59th Division, at the end of June. Both played a worthy part in the heavy fighting around Caen, the 1/7th doing particularly well in the Orne bridgehead early in August. Later that month the 59th Division was broken up owing to shortage of reinforcements and a large proportion of the officers and men of the 1/7th were posted to the 2nd Battalion.

On 4th September, the 2nd Battalion moved up to the Seine where they remained until the 18th, when the 3rd Division began to move up to come into action on the right flank of the Arnhem corridor which had to be widened. The Battalion spent the Winter in depressing, waterlogged country either in defence or in operations to clear the west bank

of the Meuse. On 29th March, the Battalion crossed the Rhine and, after several sharp actions, reached Bremen before the war ended.

The 1st Battalion was on the North-West Frontier at intervals from 1939 to January, 1942, and was then stationed at Calcutta until the end of August, 1944, when it "at last escaped from the vicious circle of internal security in which it had been gripped for years." In April, 1945, after intensive training, the Battalion, now with the 26th Indian Division, embarked for Rangoon only to find, on arrival, that the place had already been occupied by previous units of the formation. However, they did have a few encounters with the Japanese.

The book is well written and the operations in which the Regiment took part are clearly described and illustrated with sketch maps. The Colonel of the Regiment, Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, contributes a foreword.

The Scots Guards, 1919-1955. By Captain the Hon. D. H. Erskine. (Clowes.)

The main part of the book is naturally devoted to the War of 1939-1945. Nevertheless, the activities of the Regiment during the 'years between' and in the years after 1945 are carefully recorded, including the 2nd Battalion's service in Malaya, 1948-1951.

The book is well arranged in parts each devoted to a theatre of war and subdivided into chapters on the services of the various battalions and of two independent companies. There is also a part dealing with battalions at home. The narrative is clear, concise, and illustrated by good sketch-maps. It contains adequate reference to the major events which formed the background to the operations in which the battalions took part. There are also some apposite comments and anecdotes.

After serving in the ill-fated campaign in Norway the 1st Battalion remained at home until February, 1942. On 9th March it arrived in North Africa with the 1st Division, was soon in the line, and fought very stoutly in the final offensive from 22nd April to 6th May which ended in the destruction of the Axis forces in Tunisia. Remaining in Africa until December, it moved to Italy to prepare for the Anzio landing in January, 1944. After six weeks, mostly on the defensive, the Battalion was withdrawn only 238 strong and moved to Sorrento where it absorbed half the strength of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion returned to the line in April where it was almost continuously in action until the end of the war.

The 2nd Battalion had a remarkable odyssey. In garrison at Caifo on the outbreak of war, it entered the desert in April, 1941, fought in the abortive Summer attacks, in the Autumn offensive which drove the Germans to Agheila, and in the hasty withdrawal to the Gazala line in January, 1942. After the fighting in June, during which the Battalion suffered heavily on Rigel Ridge near Knightsbridge, it had to be amalgamated with the 3rd Coldstream, and spent July in the defence of the El Alamein position before being withdrawn to rest and reform in Syria. In February, 1943, after an approach march of over 2,000 miles, the Battalion arrived just in time to play a notable part in the "model anti-tank battle" of Medenine and then went on to the final thrust for Tunis. Employed in the initial landing at Salerno, the Battalion fought stoutly under unpleasant conditions until March, 1944, when it was decided to send it home owing to the lack of reinforcements. Nevertheless, the Battalion appeared in North-West Europe in February, 1945, in time for the Rhineland battle and the subsequent advance into Germany.

The 3rd Battalion was formed on 16th October, 1940, converted to armour in September, 1941, and eventually included in the 6th Guards Tank Brigade, equipped with Churchills. Landing in Normandy on 20th July, the Battalion first went into action in the successful battle of Caumont, 29th-30th July. It was again in action at Estry, 6th-7th August, and fought its last action in Normandy at Chenedolle on 11th August. During the Autumn and Winter the Battalion took part in a number of attacks in the Low Countries and in a month of fierce fighting during the Rhineland battle. After crossing the Rhine, the Battalion was prominent in the pursuit and finally penetrated to the Baltic Sea.

This is an excellent regimental history from which much may be learned. The volume is very well produced, profusely illustrated, and provided with six appendices and a full index.

Unarmed into Battle. By Major-General H. J. Parham & E. M. G. Belfield. (Warren and Son, the Wykeham Press, Winchester.) 25s.

This is a history of the "Air O.P." and so, like all historical works, it must be judged by the accuracy and completeness with which it reports facts of decisive influence upon the subject.

One result of the gunner 'post-mortem,' which followed the Dunkirk campaign, was the addition of a new branch to the establishment of the School of Artillery, Larkhill—a branch known as that of the "Chief Instructor (Air)." The primary task of this branch was to remedy the lack of air observation for the artillery, which had characterized the recent fighting, by the institution of an entirely new system, to be based upon the sound and simple principle of letting gunners do a gunner job.

The first holder of this new appointment accepted the task, well knowing that it would be a thankless one, because he happened to be an enthusiast for this hitherto neglected branch of the gunner's art. It was obvious that the job would be a 'backwater,' so far as concerned the holder's prospects of advancement in command on active service. It was certain, too, that it would bring upon the holder the unpopularity which attends every 'crank' with a 'bee in his bonnet' or, in other words, any pioneer, battling against apathy, scepticism, and downright obstructiveness.

Incidentally this officer first hatched the basic idea of the "Air O.P." as far back as 1918, as can be proved by inter-war articles in the *R.A. Journal*! He qualified as an "Air O.P." pilot (by far the oldest officer to do so) and flew an Auster in Normandy on legitimate "Air O.P." duty—i.e. a C.R.A.'s reconnaissance.

Not a word of this appears in this book. The question of gratitude or the reverse hardly arises, because the victim never expected much. But omission of an important relevant fact (if this feature of the "Air O.P." story may be so considered) detracts from the value of a serious history. To what extent, then, was this forgotten 'side-line' of vital importance to the story?

Charles Bazeley, the acknowledged inventor of the "Air O.P.", at any rate had no doubts on the matter. He frequently used to say that his pet theory would have got no farther than the pigeon holes of a sceptical Air Ministry had it not been for the obstinate pugnacity of the first Chief Instructor (Air). Most of the early "Air O.P." pioneers, who shared in the up-hill struggle, would probably endorse Bazeley's verdict.

As far as it goes the present story is quite good, but it only gives part of the picture. Like the tank and other battle-winning inventions the "Air O.P." had to fight for existence, not only against the German enemy but also against the dragons of apathy and obstruction in high places. That, far more than ephemeral minor tactics, is the lasting lesson to be gleaned from the "Air O.P." story. Whatever the form of future wars, there will always be new and apparently 'cranky' ideas battling for recognition against exactly the same foes which the "Air O.P." had to overcome. More candour on that aspect of the story would have been of lasting value.

AIR

Duel under the Stars. By Wilhelm Johnen. (Kimber.) 18s.

This is a plain and almost unvarnished account of a German night-fighter's experiences throughout the last war. There is a refreshing absence of the usual sexual side-lines, which so many young war-authors seem to consider an essential adjunct to an otherwise interesting narrative.

In spite of this, and of a certain tendency toward the use of a night-fighter's technical jargon, there is a strong human interest in this story, because it illustrates very clearly the

attitude of ordinary decent young men of the *Luftwaffe* toward their enemies of Bomber Command. There was little or no bitterness toward the "Tommies" (as the *Luftwaffe* rather quaintly called our airmen). Considering the fact that some of Johnen's fellow pilots were married men, with their wives and families living in the great cities, which these same pilots could see being turned into raging furnaces, it is pleasant to read this proof that not even mechanized war at its ugliest need necessarily obliterate the 'old-fashioned' chivalry of fighting men.

Books on the air war of 1940-45 are unlikely to provide many technical lessons for the earnest student of future methods. For this reason it is the human factor which repays study. From that point of view there are lessons in this book which were equally true about the aerial combat of 1918, if only our pundits had taken these early lessons to heart.

Outstanding among the phases of Johnen's narrative is his description of the night when 'window' was first employed to defeat the German radar. The bewilderment and fury of a defending pilot will strongly substantiate the claims of that simple but clever invention to have been a decisive factor in the strategic air war.

This is a book which will be enjoyed by all who like true adventure, but specially by those who have personally experienced the thrills of aerial fighting.

ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

(* Books for Reference in the Library only)

GENERAL

GREAT BRITAIN

- STONEHENGE. By R. J. C. Atkinson. (Hamish Hamilton, 1956.) 18s.
SEEING ROMAN BRITAIN. By Leonard Cottrell. (Evans, 1956.) 21s.
THE ROLLING ROAD. By L. A. G. Strong. (Hutchinson, 1956.) 30s.
DANGEROUS ESTATE. (The Press.) By Francis Williams. (Longmans, 1957.) 24s.
THE USES OF LITERACY. By Richard Hoggart. (Chatto and Windus, 1957.) 25s.
TRADE UNIONS. By Eric L. Wigham. (Oxford University Press, 1956.) 7s. 6d.
TREASURY CONTROL. By Samuel H. Beer. (Oxford University Press, 1956.) 15s.
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1898. By M. R. D. Foot. (Hutchinsons, 1956.) 10s. 6d.
CALDER HALL. By Kenneth Jay. (Methuen, 1956.) 5s.
THE MONMOUTH EPISODE. By Bryan Little. (Werner Laurie, 1956.) 25s.
THE FIRST FOUR GEORGES. By J. H. Plumb. (B. T. Batsford, 1956.) 21s.
A NIGHT TO REMEMBER. (The Titanic.) By Walter Lord. (Longmans, 1956.) 16s.
THE LAST VOYAGE OF THE LUSITANIA. By A. A. and Mary Hoehling. (Longmans, 1957.) 16s.
INTO THE WIND. By J. C. W. Reith. (Lord Reith's Autobiography.) (Hodder and Stoughton, 1949.) 25s.
THE WISDOM OF WINSTON CHURCHILL. Edited by F. B. Czarnomski. (George Allen and Unwin, 1956.) 25s.

UNITED STATES

- AMERICA AND THE BRITISH LEFT. By Henry Pelling. (A. and C. Black, 1956.) 18s.
AMERICA AT MID-CENTURY. By André Siegfried. (Jonathan Cape, 1955.) 16s.
COAST TO COAST. By James Morris. (Faber and Faber, 1956.) 21s.
THE FAR WESTERN FRONTIER, 1830-1860. By Ray Allen Billington. (Hamish Hamilton, 1956.) 35s.
THE GREAT EXPERIMENT. By Frank Thistlethwaite. (Cambridge University Press, 1955.) 25s.
POTTER ON AMERICA. By Stephen Potter. (Rupert Hart-Davis, 1956.) 12s. 6d.
THE TORMENT OF SECRECY. By Edward Shils. (Heinemann, 1956.) 15s.
U.S.A. ITS GEOGRAPHY AND GROWTH. (John Murray, 1956.) 10s. 6d.

U.S.S.R.

- BETRAYAL OF AN IDEAL. By G. A. Tokaev. (Harvill Press, 1954.) 21s.
COMRADE X. By G. A. Tokaev. (Harvill Press, 1956.) 21s.

MIDDLE EAST

- ENGLAND AND THE MIDDLE EAST. (The Fateful Years 1914-1921.) By Elie Kedourie. (Bowes and Bowes, 1956.) 30s.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. By Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi. (Penguin, 1957.) 2s.
SULTAN IN OMAN. By James Morris. (Faber and Faber, 1957.) 16s.

AFRICA

- THE AFRICAN GIANT. By Stuart Cloete. (Collins, 1956.) 21s.
THE FOUNTAIN OF THE SUN. By Douglas Busk. (Parrish, 1957.) 35s.
GHANA. By Kwame Nkrumah. (Nelson, 1957.) 21s.
THE LAST TREK. By Sheila Patterson. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.) 28s.

MOUNTAINEERING

- CHO OYU. By Herbert Tichy. (Methuen, 1957.) 25s.
 THE CONQUEST OF FITZROY. By M. A. Azema. (André Deutsch, 1957.) 21s.
 KANGCHENJUNGA. (The Untrodden Peak.) By Charles Evans. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.) 25s.

MISCELLANEOUS

- THE BIBLE AS HISTORY. By Werner Keller. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.) 25s.
 IN DEFENCE OF COLONIES. By Sir Alan Burns. (George Allen and Unwin, 1957.) 25s.
 DEVELOPMENT FOR FREE ASIA. By Maurice Zinkin. (Chatto and Windus, 1956.) 21s.
 THE EMPIRE OF OIL. By Harvey O'Connor. (John Calder, 1956.) 25s.
 FABIAN INTERNATIONAL ESSAYS. Edited by T. E. M. McKitterick and Kenneth Younger. (Hogarth Press, 1957.) 18s.
 FACING THE ATOMIC FUTURE. By E. W. Titterton. (Macmillan, 1956.) 21s.
 POLICY FOR THE WEST. By Ion Ratiu. (Harvill Press, 1957.) 21s.
 THE SECOND LESSON. (U.N.O.) By Bernard Moore. (Macmillan, 1957.) 21s.
 THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Brian Inglis. (Faber and Faber, 1957.) 16s.
 THE TRIBE THAT LOST ITS HEAD. By Nicholas Monsarrat. (Cassell, 1956.) 18s.

GENERAL (SERVICE)

- AMERICAN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By Timothy W. Stanley. (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1956.) \$3.95. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 *AWARDS OF HONOUR. By Arthur Jocelyn. (A. and C. Black, 1956.) £7 7s.
 BADEN-POWELL AT MAFEKING. By Duncan Grinnell-Milne. (The Bodley Head, 1957.) 25s.
 GLOBAL STRATEGY. By Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Jonathan Cape, 1957.) 18s.
 HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. (The Defence of the U.K.) By Basil Collier. (H.M.S.O. 1957.) 50s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. (Grand Strategy, Volume II.) By J. R. M. Butler. (H.M.S.O., 1957.) 42s. Presented by the publishers.
 100 HOURS TO SUEZ. By Robert Henriques. (Collins, 1957.) 16s.
 MEN IN ARMS. By Richard Preston and Others. (Atlantic Press, 1956.) 42s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 ON LIMITING ATOMIC WAR. (R.I.I.A., 1956.) 2s. 6d. Presented by the publishers.
 OUT OF THE GUN. By Denis Warner. (Hutchinson, 1956.) 18s.
 THE TURN OF THE TIDE. By Arthur Bryant. (Collins, 1957.) 30s.

NAVAL

- BATTLE HONOURS OF THE ROYAL NAVY. By Oliver Warner. (George Philip and Son, 1956.) 12s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, MARINER. By Samuel Eliot Morison. (Faber and Faber, 1956.) 21s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 DEATH OF A NAVY. By Andrieu D'Albas. (Robert Hale, 1957.) 18s.
 *THE DRESS OF THE BRITISH SAILOR. Compiled by Admiral Sir Gerald Dickens. (H.M.S.O., 1957.) 3s. Presented by the National Maritime Museum.
 FORLORN HOPE, 1915. (The Submarine Passage of the Dardanelles.) By Rear-Admiral C. G. Brodie. (Frederick Books, 1956.) 10s. 6d. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 FROGMAN V.C. By Ian Fraser. (Angus and Robertson, 1957.) 16s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
 *HERALDRY IN THE ROYAL NAVY. (Crests and Badges of H.M. Ships.) By Alfred Weightman. (Gale and Polden, 1957.) 30s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)

- HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.** (The War at Sea, Volume II.) By Captain S. W. Roskill, R.N. (H.M.S.O., 1956.) 42s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812.** By C. S. Forester. (Michael Joseph, 1957.) 21s.
- SUBMARINES ATTACKING.** By Admiral Aldo Cocchia. (William Kimber, 1956.) 18s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)

ARMY

- CALL ME COWARD.** By Eugen Dollmann. (William Kimber, 1956.) 18s. Presented by the publishers.
- THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY.** By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy. (Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1956.) \$4.95. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- THE DESERT MY DWELLING PLACE.** By Lieut.-Colonel David Lloyd Owen. (Cassell, 1957.) 18s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- ***HISTORY OF THE ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT, 1919-1955.** By Marcus Cunliffe. (William Clowes, 1956.) Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- ***THE ROYAL JERSEY MILITIA AND THE MILITARY ROLE OF JERSEY IN HISTORY.** By F. A. L. De Gruchy. (Extract from Bulletin of Société Jersiaise, 1956.) Presented by the author.
- ***THE SCOTS GUARDS, 1919-1955.** Compiled by David Erskine. (William Clowes, 1956.) Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- UNARMED INTO BATTLE.** (The Story of the Air Observation Post.) By Major-General H. J. Parham and E. M. G. Belfield. (Warren and Son, 1956.) 25s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- WELLINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS.** By S. G. P. Ward. (Oxford University Press, 1957.) 30s. Presented by the publishers.

AIR

- THE "AEROPLANE" PICTORIAL REVIEW.** Compiled. (Temple Press, 1956.) 7s. 6d.
- DOCTORS IN THE AIR.** By Robert Maycock. (George Allen and Unwin, 1957.) 15s.
- DUEL UNDER THE STARS.** By Wilhelm Johnen. (William Kimber, 1957.) 18s. Presented by the publishers. (See review in this JOURNAL.)
- EMPIRE OF THE AIR.** By Viscount Templewood. (Collins, 1957.) 21s.
- FAMOUS FIGHTERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.** By William Green. (Macdonald, 1957.) 18s.
- HELICOPTERS WORK LIKE THIS.** By Basil Arkell and John Taylor. (Phoenix Press, 1956.) 8s. 6d.
- MY FIFTY YEARS IN FLYING.** By Harry Harper. (The Daily Mail, 1956.) 12s. 6d.
- OBSERVATIONAL ERRORS.** By E. W. Anderson and J. B. Parker. (Institute of Navigation, 1956.) 5s. Presented by the publishers.
- ROCKET.** By Sir Philip Joubert. (Hutchinson, 1957.) 18s.

ONE HUNDRED-AND-TWENTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING

ON TUESDAY, 12TH MARCH, 1957, at 3 p.m.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR NORMAN BOTTOMLEY, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.F.C.,
presiding

THE SECRETARY (LIEUT.-COLONEL P. S. M. WILKINSON) read the notice convening
the meeting, which appeared in *The Times* of 26th February, 1957.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1956

The Council have the honour to present their Annual Report for the year
1956.

COUNCIL

VICE-PRESIDENTS

Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O.,
O.B.E., LL.D., Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Edward Ellington, G.C.B.,
C.M.G., C.B.E., and Admiral Sir Charles Little, G.C.B., G.B.E., were re-elected
as Vice-Presidents.

ELECTED MEMBERS

The following Members were re-elected at the Anniversary Meeting held
on 6th March, 1956 :—

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur J. Power, G.C.B., G.B.E., C.V.O.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, K.C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.,
A.F.C.

Major-General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., D.L.

Commodore R. Harrison, D.S.O., R.D., R.N.R.

The following elections were made to vacancies on the Council :—

Air Chief Marshal Sir Walter L. Dawson, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Vice-Admiral Sir Aubrey Mansergh, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.C.

Lieut.-General Sir Campbell R. Hardy, K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., R.M.

Captain C. P. C. Noble, D.S.C., V.R.D., R.N.V.R.

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS

Air Vice-Marshal G. D. Harvey, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., accepted the
invitation of the Council to serve as the Air Ministry Representative.

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

The following accepted the invitation of the Council to become ex officio
Members of the Council on taking up the appointments shown :—

Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot A. Boyle, G.C.B., K.C.V.O., K.B.E.,
A.F.C., Chief of the Air Staff.

Admiral The Hon. Sir Guy H. E. Russell, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Commandant of the Imperial Defence College.

Vice-Admiral G. Barnard, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., President of the
Royal Naval College.

Major-General P. N. White, C.B., C.B.E., Commandant of the Joint
Services Staff College.

Air Vice-Marshal D. H. F. Barnett, C.B., C.B.E., D.F.C., Commandant
of the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell.

Captain A. R. Hezlet, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., Director of the Royal
Naval Staff College.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of members on the roll at the end of 1956 was 6,269 compared with 6,191 in 1955. During the year 286 members joined the Institution compared with 287 in 1955. The following shows the figures for the past seven years :—

Year	Joined		Total	Re- signed	Deceased		Struck off	Total
	Annual	Life			Annual	Life		
1956	...	222	64	286	120	43	25	208
1955	...	239	48	287	142	56	35	255
1954	...	199	43	242	192	48	29	303
1953	...	190	57	247	184	34	42	278
1952	...	197	53	250	206	56	21	309
1951	...	224	56	280	125	49	35	233
1950	...	289	56	345	123	41	50	238

The details of members joining during the year are as follows :—

Regular Army	159
Royal Air Force	45
Royal Navy	23
Territorial Army	10
Canadian Forces	9
Royal Marines	6
Pakistani Forces	5
Indian Forces	4
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	3
Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve	3
Royal Naval Reserve	2
Women's Royal Army Corps	2
Australian Forces	2
South African Forces	2
Women's Royal Naval Service	1
New Zealand Forces	1
Malayan Forces	1
Ceylon Forces	1
Civilians	7
						<hr/> 286 <hr/>

COVENANTED SUBSCRIPTIONS

At the end of 1956 there were 1,291 annual covenanted subscriptions compared with 1,272 in 1955; and 210 covenanted life subscriptions compared with 202 in 1955.

During 1956, 44 annual covenants out of a total number of 58 were renewed on expiry and 36 life covenants completed the seven-year period.

FINANCE

The excess of expenditure over income is £485 4s. 5d. compared with a similar excess in 1955 of £912 8s. 1d.

Comparisons of the principal items of Receipts and Expenditure are shown below:—

RECEIPTS

	1956			1955		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Annual Subscriptions	5,756	10	4	5,748	19	6
Life Subscriptions (amount brought to credit)	2,237	8	0	2,162	3	0
Museum	3,581	17	6	3,423	8	0
Journal Sales	3,201	16	8	2,872	6	6
Journal Advertisements	1,040	6	0	790	19	11
Sales of Catalogues and Pamphlets ...	70	17	7	113	13	7

Life subscriptions brought to credit represent £1 10s. 0d. from each Life Member whose capital payment has not yet been so expended; the balance is held in the Life Subscription Fund. £559 19s. 0d. has been transferred to this Fund on account of tax rebate on covenanted life subscriptions.

Journal Sales and Advertisements are both the highest ever and the amount from Life Subscriptions is the best figure so far.

As the result of representations made, the Annual Grant from each of the Service Ministries was increased from £325 to £650 producing a total of £1,950.

EXPENDITURE

	1956			1955		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Salaries and Allowances, Wages and National Insurance	10,588	14	6	9,982	2	10
Journal Printing	4,753	17	6	4,645	8	4
Library—Purchase of Books	569	19	9	468	10	5
Binding	68	15	0	91	7	6
Heating	373	9	8	371	7	7
Electricity	563	14	0	510	9	5
General Repairs and Maintenance ...	864	3	10	195	1	5
Other Printing and Stationery	299	19	5	336	15	10
Museum Expenses	7	0	7	19	16	11
Journal Postage	631	5	10	418	2	0

Maintenance. Expenditure was rather above average as, under the terms of the Crown Lease, the exterior of the Institution building was redecorated at a cost of £521. Repairs and improvements to the windows in the Lecture Theatre accounted for £58, while a further £46 was required for major plumbing services.

Part of the electrical wiring system in the Banqueting Hall and Crypt was replaced for safety reasons. The lighting equipment of the Waterloo Model was modernized and simplified, but the cost of this will in time pay for itself as the consumption, with improved illumination, was reduced from 960 watts to 340.

Water rate. Following the revaluation of the Institution building in April, the reassessment for water rate brought an increased expenditure of £45 for a full year.

Insurance. After consulting the Institution's Architect, the cover for insurance against fire was increased from £105,000 to £130,000 for the Institution building, and from £10,000 to £12,000 for furniture, fixtures, and fittings.

Journal postage. The rise in the cost of Journal postage reflects the increase of postal rates imposed at the beginning of the year.

GENERAL

Owing to pressure of priority commissions, Commander Denis Fildes, R.N. (Retd.), was unable to complete his painting of Her Majesty The Queen, but it is hoped that this can be done in the near future.

The number of members, with a limited hospitality for guests, who attended lectures during the first part of the season, October to December, was 1,466. This gives an average of 244 for each lecture and is the highest yet recorded.

JOURNAL

The standard and popularity of the Journal was well maintained during the year and, once again, there was a rise in the number of sales. This was due, in the main, to the publication of the valuable lectures given at the Institution and the excellent articles received from officers and others.

As forecast in previous Annual Reports, the income derived from advertisements continued to show a very satisfactory increase.

The willing assistance given by Service Departments, Commandants of Staff Colleges, and Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry Representatives on the Council in preparing the lecture programme, in facilitating approval for articles written by serving officers, and in advising the Editor in many matters, is gratefully acknowledged.

LIBRARY

During 1956, the Library was much used by officers working for the Staff College and promotion examinations, by general readers, and also by authors and research workers. In spite of a further heavy increase in postal charges and the recent crisis, both of which considerably reduced requests for books in the Autumn and early Winter, the total of books issued during the year numbered 7,676. Six hundred new books were acquired during the year compared with 542 in 1955, and 50 books have been rebound.

The 12 most popular books in 1956 were :—

Defeat into Victory—Field-Marshal Slim (Cassell); *Bugles and a Tiger*—John Masters (Michael Joseph); *Gallipoli*—Alan Moorehead (Hamish Hamilton); *The Central Blue*—Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor (Cassell); *The Fatal Decisions*—Edited by W. Richardson and S. Freidin

(Michael Joseph); *A History of the English Speaking Peoples, Volume I*—Winston S. Churchill (Cassell); *The Long Walk*—Rawicz (Constable); *Walker, R.N.*—Terence Robertson (Evans); *Henry Clifford, V.C.*—Letters (Michael Joseph); *Mutiny at the Curragh*—A. P. Ryan (Macmillan); *Soldier's Glory*—Sir George Bell (Bell); *The Golden Horseshoe*—Terence Robertson (Evans); in that order.

MUSEUM

During 1956, there were 48,407 paid admissions to the Museum, made up of 31,348 adults and 17,059 children. Free admission was given to 2,453 members of the Services and to 544 cadets, scouts and school parties, as well as to members' guests passing through the private entrance from the Institution. The total number, excluding guests, was 51,404 compared with 51,177 in 1955.

A small souvenir guide was produced during the year and placed on sale in the Museum. It is designed to interest the general public, and is based on the more popular questions and on the results of a visitor research scheme carried out some time ago. Due to the co-operation of Messrs. Gale & Polden, there was no expenditure of Institution capital funds for the production of this book.

The Secretary recorded a broadcast for the General Overseas Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation celebrating the centenary of the Victoria Cross, which was instituted on 29th January, 1856. Further assistance was given to the British Broadcasting Corporation by the loan of exhibits for the Home Service programme.

Prominent among the extension services during the year was the loan of items to two exhibitions celebrating the centenary of the Victoria Cross and the tercentenary of the Grenadier Guards.

Following the policy laid down, practical help by the gift or loan of exhibits was made to Service Museums. The largest contribution was to the Museum of the Infantry Boys' Battalion, Plymouth; this is the type of Museum that rightly receives special consideration. Among others that benefited were:—

H.M.S. *St. Vincent*.

National Maritime Museum.

Inns of Court Regiment, T.A.

Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment.

Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment).

Worcestershire Regiment.

Royal Sussex Regiment.

Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment).

Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own).

Royal Ulster Rifles.

Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Museum.

School of Infantry.

Imperial War Museum.

Headquarters, Boy Scouts Association.

Royal Signals Institution Museum.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION BALANCE SHEET, 31ST DECEMBER, 1956

[illegible]

CHESNEY MEMORIAL MEDAL FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1956

BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 —	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Balance at Bankers	40 14 7	
Investment at Market Price	228 4 0	
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS		
	268 18 7	
	8 8 0	
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	£377 6 7	

DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1955	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1950 :—		
Balance at Bankers	49 2 7	
Investment at Market Price :—	218 8 0	
£280 3% Savings Bonds 1960-70		
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	267 10 7	
		<hr/>
		£377 6 7

We have audited the above Statement of the Chesney Memorial Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1966, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S HOUSE,
BISHOPS' PALACE, LONDON, E.C.2.
18th January, 1967.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE FUND

31st DECEMBER, 1956

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-						
Balance at Bankers	44	19	0			
Investments at Market Prices	1,774	10	9			
				1,819	9	9
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS				74	11	11
PRIZE ESSAYS			
DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENTS since 31st December, 1955			
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1956 :-						
Balance at Bankers	56	10	11
Investments at Market Prices :-						
£1,922 10s. 3d. British Transport	1,922	10s.	3d.			
Guaranteed Stock 1978-88	1,312	2	4
£100 0s. 0d. 31% War Stock	70	8	9
£100 0s. 0d. 4½% Defence Bonds	100	0	0
100 Cedar Investment Trust Ltd.	187	10	0
£1 Ordinary Shares			
				1,725	12	0
				£1,894	1	8

We have audited the above Statement of the French Gasoline Prize Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1956, and certify the same to be correct.

ALDERMAN'S, HOUSE,
BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
18/A January, 1957.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Auditors.

BRACKENBURY MEMORIAL FUND
31st DECEMBER, 1956

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-				EXPENDITURE ON BOOKS, Etc. ...			9 5 8
Balance at Bankers ...	49	10	5	DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1955 ...			25 9 10
Investment at Market Price ...	322	1	4	BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1956 :-			
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS ...				Balance at Bankers ...	54	19	5
				Investment at Market Price :-			
				£421 1s. 0d. 3½% War Stock ...	296	11	6
							361 10 11
							<u>£386 6 5</u>

We have audited the above Statement of the Brackenbury Memorial Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1956, and certify the same to be correct.
ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, LONDON, E.C.2.
BISHOPSGATE, 18th January, 1957.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Aldershot.

EARDLEY-WILMOT MEDAL FUND
31st DECEMBER, 1956

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1955 :-				DEPRECIATION OF INVESTMENT since 31st December, 1955 ...			4 18 0
Balance at Bankers ...	14	12	9	BALANCE OF FUND at 31st December, 1956 :-			
Investment at Market Price ...	114	2	0	Balance at Bankers ...	18	16	9
DIVIDENDS RECEIVED, GROSS ...				Investment at Market Price :-			
				£140 3% Savings Bonds 1960-70 ...	109	4	0
							128 0 9
							<u>£132 18 9</u>

We have audited the above Statement of the Eardley-Wilmot Medal Fund for the year ended 31st December, 1956, and certify the same to be correct.
ALDERMAN'S HOUSE, BISHOPSGATE, LONDON, E.C.2.
18th January, 1957.

BARTON, MAYHEW & CO.,
Chartered Accountants,
Aldershot.

CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

THE CHAIRMAN : Before we get down to the details of the Annual Report and Accounts which have been circulated, and which are in your hands, I should like to make some general remarks on one or two points.

Those of you who were present at the Anniversary Meeting of last year will remember that the Chairman then stressed the importance of increasing as much as possible our membership numbers. It is very satisfactory to note that for this year there has been a net increase of 78 in the membership numbers, and that our total membership at the end of the year is 6,269, which is the second highest recorded in our long history. I do not think those figures are any excuse for being complacent in any way about our membership. I think that if the Institution is to maintain its financial stability, and if we are to meet the ever-increasing costs, we must pay attention to the need for increasing still further the number of our members. I think it is the duty of all of us to do whatever we can to achieve that aim. *A not unusual appeal is made on occasions such as this for each member to take upon himself the job of trying to recruit at least one additional member to the Institution.* I should like to suggest that to be a fit and proper task for the coming year, not only for us here present, but for any of our friends within the Institution.

Year by year we see that the status of the Institution rises, and I think it is a very good example of the esteem in which the Service Ministries hold the Institution that their annual grant was doubled during the year from the long standing figure of £975 to the new figure which they have approved of £1,950.

A very valuable source of income to the Institution is, of course, the rebate of taxation for covenanted subscriptions, and here again we see that the year 1956 ended with an increase in both annual and life covenants compared with the previous year. We are all very much indebted to those members who have consented to this form of covenant. I hope that more members will follow that example. There is little doubt that this form of subscription is most beneficial to the members and to the Institution, and most beneficial of all, of course, is the life covenant. To the member himself it is most beneficial because it guarantees him that there will be no increase in his own subscription if at any time in the future it were felt necessary by an annual general meeting to increase the amount of future subscriptions.

In introducing the report and the accounts for 1956 I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the Chairmen and members of the various committees for giving a further year of their services to the welfare and efficiency of the Institution. I should like also on behalf of the Council to pay tribute to the staff of the Institution. We all know it is team work in this sort of business which makes for success, and we have in the staff of the Institution a first-class team. We are very grateful for their work and for all they have contributed in their varying capacities to make the work of the Institution as smooth as possible and an easy business.

Although the report in front of you deals with the year 1956, you might wish me to mention the change of Librarian which is taking place this month. Wing Commander Beauman has completed five years in his appointment and he is retiring under the maximum age limit. I should particularly like to thank him, and I am sure you would wish to be associated with it, for the sterling work which he has put in to the Institution during this period. He has always proved most helpful and most popular in his relations with members of the Institution. He has been replaced by Brigadier Stephenson who has had nine years' service at the Royal Air Force

Staff College in a similar capacity, and I am sure we shall find Brigadier Stephenson's work an asset to the Institution.

Turning to the report presented to the meeting, you will see that there are various sections. The first two pages contain a record of facts and I think call for no comment. If, however, there are any questions on those pages, I shall be glad to enlighten the questioner.

(No questions were asked.)

The next section deals with finance, and here let me say that Brigadier Longmore, who has been Chairman of the Finance Committee for the last 10 years, has recently undergone a serious operation and is not, therefore, able to be present. But I am glad to say that he is going on well. I am sure that we all wish him a speedy recovery and return to his labours with the Institution. In his absence I will ask Group Captain Sir Archibald Hope to answer any questions on the accounts and, if he wishes, to make any comments on them. I do not know whether you wish to ask Group Captain Sir Archibald Hope anything or whether you consider that the accounts are sufficiently clear in themselves.

(No questions were asked.)

As there are no comments on the accounts, the next section deals with the JOURNAL, and I am sure that if there are any questions, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Power, who is responsible for its activities, will be ready to answer any questions.

(No questions were asked.)

As there are no questions on that section, the next one is the Library, and Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, the Chairman of the Library Committee, is ready to answer any questions on that section.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB: I should also like to pay my tribute to Wing Commander Beauman for the work which he has done as Librarian, and to confirm what the Chairman has said about him.

(No questions were asked.)

THE CHAIRMAN: The next and final section is that which deals with the Museum. Are there any questions on the section dealing with the Museum?

(No questions were asked.)

THE CHAIRMAN: I propose:—

“That the Report and Accounts, as circulated, be taken as read and adopted.”

GROUP CAPTAIN SIR ARCHIBALD HOPE: May I second that resolution?

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next resolution concerns the Auditors.

COMMODORE R. HARRISON: I have much pleasure in moving:—

“That Messrs. Barton, Mayhew & Company be re-elected Auditors for the ensuing year.”

They have always served us well, and they have been most helpful in their advice and co-operation with the staff.

MR. J. O. ROBSON: I have much pleasure in seconding that.

The Resolution was carried unanimously.

VACANCIES ON THE COUNCIL

THE CHAIRMAN: The third resolution deals with vacancies on the Council. The undermentioned officers have been nominated as Candidates for the vacancies on the Council:—

ROYAL NAVY—

Admiral Sir Henry Moore, G.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

Admiral Sir Geoffrey Oliver, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.

REGULAR ARMY—

Lieut.-General Sir Hugh C. Stockwell, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O.

TERRITORIAL ARMY—

Brigadier H. P. Crosland, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., T.D., D.L.

ROYAL AIR FORCE—

Air Chief Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.F.C.

ROYAL AUXILIARY AIR FORCE AND ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE—

Group Captain Sir Archibald Hope, Bart., O.B.E., D.F.C.

Since there are no other nominations before the meeting, under the Bye-Laws, Chapter III, paragraph 5, I ask for your approval of the election of those officers.

These officers were unanimously elected.

TRENCH GASCOIGNE PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1956

THE CHAIRMAN: The next item is the result of the Trench Gascoigne Prize Essay Competition for 1956, and I will ask the Secretary to report the result of that Competition.

The Secretary announced that there were 12 entries. On the recommendation of the Referees, the Council had awarded the first prize of 30 guineas to Wing Commander J. E. T. Haile, R.A.F. Wing Commander Haile was unable to be present to receive his prize.

The Secretary announced that the second prize of 20 guineas had been awarded to Major T. P. S. Woods, M.B.E., and the third prize of 10 guineas to Captain I. L. M. McGeoch, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.

The Chairman then presented the second and third prizes.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR ARTHUR POWER: It is my privilege to propose a vote of thanks to the retiring Chairman after his year in office. He is a busy man and it requires a great effort to give up time to come and attend our meetings, which he has always conducted quickly and with charm, for which we are very thankful. Voluntary work these days is not very easy, and voluntary workers are as rare as hens with teeth! Other things take a great deal of time, to say nothing of the expense involved in voluntary work. Sir Norman Bottomley, as I say, is a very busy man, yet he has found time to conduct the business of this Institution, so I would ask you to accord him a very hearty vote of thanks.


AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JAMES ROBB: May I be allowed to add a word to the delightful tribute which has been paid to our Chairman by Sir Arthur Power.

He and I happened to serve together on the same station just after the 1914–1918 War, and his fine example of thoroughness and wise judgment, which he instilled in me then, have been clearly demonstrated to all of us by the manner in which he has carried out his responsibilities during the past year.

I have great pleasure in seconding this vote of thanks.

The vote of thanks was carried unanimously.

THE CHAIRMAN: That concludes the business of the Anniversary Meeting. Thank you.



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Vice-Admiral Sir Sydney Raw, K.B.E., C.B., *Chairman.*
Lieut.-General Sir Giffard Martel, K.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. ;
R. F. Hayward, M.C., Q.C. ; Captain W. H. Coombs, C.B.E.,
R.N.R. ; H. V. Bishop ; A. R. Johnson, A.C.I.I.

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


● Write TO-DAY for particulars to the Secretary, M4, Metropolitan College, St. Albans.

METROPOLITAN COLLEGE
ST. ALBANS


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